CHALLENGES TO PEACE OPERATIONS
IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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Traditionally peacekeeping operations were a means of resolving conflicts between hostile parties during the Cold War. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 21st century has brought about a shift in these activities from the deployment of unarmed or lightly armed military personnel to a more multidimensional level that tries to accomplish a more comprehensive peace agreement between parties to a civil war. This new level has also brought about the expansion of the non-military component of peacekeeping operations where civilian experts in the areas of rule of law, human rights, gender, child protection and elections are becoming increasingly important. As the role and function of these operations has changed, the difficulties they face have also increased. The 2000 Brahimi Report of the United Nations outlined in-depth critiques of these operations and made specific recommendations. Among the minimum requirements for a successful mission, consent of the warring parties, a clear and specific mandate and adequate resources were outlined. The vast number of operations and plans for new ones has stretched the capacity of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) providing peacekeeping efforts to the limits.

In order for an operation to become successful, adequately trained troops are absolutely necessary, yet many member states of organisations like the UN and NATO are reluctant to make them available for peacekeeping efforts. As peacekeeping efforts have also become multidimensional, the state-building aspect of reconstruction for post-conflict societies has become increasingly important. This also requires the presence of adequately trained peacekeeping personnel that can monitor the advances in the different areas such as rule of law, public utilities, civil administration and etc. to ensure that the operation can lead to long term peace in the area. Providing these services comes at significant monetary costs. Financing peacekeeping operations and collecting on the financial obligations of member states is not always easy. Thus, peacekeeping efforts currently face a shortage of personnel, equipment and financial resources. Despite these challenges, for organisations like NATO, UN, OSCE, and EU peacekeeping operations present a way to maintain their influence and status in many areas.

This second international conference on security, entitled as Challenges to Peace Operations in the 21st Century, aimed to analyse the above mentioned challenges and the uncertain future that peacekeeping operations confront. The Conference was held in Izmir at the Izmir University of Economics on April 5-7, 2006 and was organised in co-operation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division and the Strategic Research Centre of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The first international conference on security, entitled as NATO’s Transformation and The Position of Turkey, was organised by the editors of this book at Ege University in co-operation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division on April 5-6, 2004.

During the first day of this second international conference high-level officials from peacekeeping operations in different areas provide a broader understanding of these efforts. Then, the role of NATO, EU and OSCE in peace operations analysed with a special focus on the reforms of the security sector in post-conflict societies. The first day is concluded with a more specific analysis of Turkey’s contribution to UN peace operations and the training and education needed for peacekeeping personnel. The second day of the conference concentrated more specifically on two recent cases of peacekeeping in Iraq and Afghanistan, and then addressed the regional perspectives of UN peace operations. Moreover, the legal dimensions
and the politics of nuclear weapons discussed. The second day of the conference is concluded with student’s panels.

The aim of this conference was to discuss these challenges with scholars, government and organisation officials and diplomats. We feel that this conference came at a time when the presences of peacekeeping operations are growing along with the new challenges of the 21st century. Last but not least our special thanks goes to Ms. Yeter Yaman-Naucodie (Head of NATO Countries Section, NATO Public Diplomacy Division), H.E. Ambassador Murat Bilhan (Head of the Strategic Research Centre of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and Prof. Dr. Erhan Ada (Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Izmir University of Economics), who worked constantly with us to help in co-ordination. We would also like to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Prof. Dr. Atilla Sezgin (Rector of Izmir University of Economics), who provided us the facilities’ of the University and encouraged us for the publication of this book.

Izmir, 24 January 2007

The Editors

Opening speech by,

Prof. Dr. Atilla SEZGİN, Rector, Izmir University of Economics

Dear Honorary Guests,
His Excellencies,
Fellow Academic Staff and Students,

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to Izmir University of Economics for the 2nd International Conference on Security. This year’s focus is on “The Challenges to Peace Operations in the 21st Century”.

Traditionally understood as the military security of the state, the perception of security changed in the first decade of the post-Cold War era to one that also encompassed aspects of security of human life and dignity. With the tragic events of September 11, 2001, international terrorism threats along with the increase in the number of non-state actors such as warlords and paramilitaries, have caused us to yet again revisit our concept of security. The new challenges facing peacekeeping operations stem from this new enlarged concept of security in the 21st century.

The last decade of the 20th Century saw a rise in the number of intrastate conflicts along with a growing number of “failed” states. This has led to international organizations having to address internal security as well as making peace operations more complicated but without the necessary resources in terms of personnel, material and finance.

The new security challenges of the 21st century are diverse and include threats to the security and well-being of the individual, the state and the environment. Peace operations in our new century have aimed to not only end conflicts but rebuild societies and therefore now have to address institution-building, the promotion of good governance, the restoration of infrastructure and the economy, establishing human rights and building sustainable peace.
Due to their broader nature, it is more correct to now refer to these operations as “peace” operations as opposed to the more traditional “peacekeeping” operations used in popular literature. This shift from peacekeeping to peace operations also reflects the newer responsibilities that await those international organizations supplying these services, mainly the UN, OSCE, NATO and the EU. These new responsibilities however also come with new challenges.

The 2nd International Conference on Security comes at a time when the presence of peace operations are growing along with the challenges of the 21st century. This Conference will aim to discuss these challenges with scholars, government and organization officials and diplomats. These unique insights will further our knowledge about peace operations and will hopefully allow us to address the challenges and possible solutions that may emerge from the collaboration of such valued speakers.

I am also very honored to host the Honorable Hikmet Çetin, NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan. Turkey has also contributed to peace operations and we feel very proud to have him in attendance today to give us further details of this involvement.

Once again, I welcome you to our University and hope that this Conference will be a fruitful contribution to the growing literature of peace operations.
Opening speech by,
Hikmet ÇETİN, NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan

Honorable Rector, Prof. Atilla Sezgin,
His Excellency, Ambassador Murat Bilhan,
Distinguished guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am delighted to join you in this conference, which focuses on one of the major issues of our contemporary world. It is indeed a privilege for me to address this eminent audience.

Before I start my remarks, I would like to underline my humble observation that the beauty of this vivid city is inspiring everybody with a positive energy, especially in spring. In that sense, I honestly envy Prof. Atilla Sezgin as well as his staff and students.

To begin with, let me take a stock of what the whole world are faced with today. For the past two decades, unprecedented changes have taken place on the world stage. The communist regimes collapsed one after another. However, the calculable rationality of world affairs during the Cold War offered a measure of control, stability and automaticness. Some might argue that this provided a kind of comfort within the framework of foreign affairs. But when the iron curtain fell, the liberation of the peoples of Eastern Europe and Russia, ushered in a new era of hope, for a better future and freedom from the tyranny of the nuclear threat. The world seemed to be headed on the path to peace.

That perception was quickly proven to be wrong. The Cold war had suppressed tensions that later boiled into conflicts. Regional and ethnic conflicts were instigated throughout the globe. The interaction of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia escalated into violence and
terror, the like of which not seen on European soil since the end of the Second World War. Communism was replaced with aggressive nationalism. Agony in the Balkans, right in the middle of Europe was on the scene.

And the Balkans has not been the only hot spot; we have seen similar suffering wrought upon peoples in the Caucasus. In Iraq we now see uneasy cohabitation of people whose relationship was formerly structured by force, where a vicious cycle of vengeance keeps churning on.

It seems we cannot escape history. It was not easy to replace positive peace with tyrannical stability. Intimidation or “Mutually Assured Destruction” did not create a lasting stability. The hopeful world in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War was still wrought with difficulties. Today, the path to peace remains as elusive as it has ever been.

The rapid change we all faced brought along uncertainty. Although globalization and the new technologies opened up vast opportunities, they also caused insecurity. In our age, the borders are getting more transparent and the information, new technologies, actually many things are easier to reach. However, it cannot be guaranteed that the transparent information and the technology will be always in good hands or will be used to the benefit of people. This resulted in the change of the nature of threats. The worst of these has been the rise of terrorism, by what nature it is called, whether secular or religious, ethnic or fundamentalist. These dark forces are driven by an irrational worldview, by a dehumanizing outlook. Some have a global reach, willing to strike at anyone, anywhere.

The rise of extremist religious terrorist groups has been of great concern. Al-Qaeda and their supporters infect young impressionable minds with the immoral notion that suicide attacks against innocent civilians are not only an acceptable method of advancing their cause, but also a duty unto God Himself, for the greater good. The name of Islam has been started to be abused by inhumane terrorists that provoke violence and death. Their target is our identity, our values of the sanctity and dignity of human life, of human rights, democracy, freedom and kinship amongst the different peoples of the world. The terrorists who abuse the name Islam ask for the impossible. They ask for a reactionary world that never really existed within Islam. We all know that the word Islam stands for peace. However, these groups are trying to divide the people as the self-proclaimed faithful and the infidel. They alienate the other and honor the self. They aim to confuse martyrdom with murder. They are willing to strike anywhere, with any means, no matter what the consequences. Whether in New York, in Beslan, in Madrid, in Bali, in London, in Istanbul, in Afghanistan or day and night in Baghdad, the unseen enemy has revealed his intent. The fight against it requires tactics and methods, which were gained through expertise worth of lives.

Terrorism is not the only threat to peace in the 21st century. The global economic and social problems are the root of many other conflicts. The ever-increasing gap between rich and poor, haves and have-nots, North and South, constitutes a threat to stability and peace. In an age where energy, clean water and other resources are predicted to become scarce, the needs of the world’s population have to be balanced. Worsening socio-economic conditions can also foster terrorist recruitment. We should always remember that terrorism might be fuelled by different types of elements – especially those elements that I just mentioned. In this case, the military response should be consolidated with development projects in order to reach to the people. This does not automatically yield to the end of terrorism. But, once the people
are reached, then the terrorists will be isolated. They will not be able to recruit new members and their purported cause will be undermined.

Some have been talking of a Clash of Civilizations for some time. Although that may be an overstatement, we cannot ignore its implications. Indeed, the world’s great religions and its peoples have lived side by side peacefully for centuries. Perhaps instead, in this ever-shrinking world where information spreads globally in a matter of seconds, we can talk of a clash of fundamentalisms, as some scholars have hypothesized. This clash must not be indulged with an equally irrational response. The response does not only include military means but others as well. But above this, it needs strong determination, patience, and international cooperation.

The response to aggression between cultures or misunderstanding between civilizations is not always conflict, but sometimes dialogue. We can foster mutual understanding with dialogue. Of course this does not mean dialogue with terrorists, this stands for a dialogue among the people who were misled. We must stand ready to defend ourselves against attacks and no tolerance should be given to terrorists. But on the other hand, we must also counter ignorance with knowledge, prejudice with tolerance and hatred with compassion. This is a war we have to fight in both fronts. Otherwise, the challenges to peace and security in the 21st century will prove to be insurmountable.

We also have to remember that not all threats are man-made. The health of the world’s population is also confronted by disease and natural disasters. This type of challenge is mainly handled by aid organizations. However, at this point, within the brackets, I would like to mention the NATO assistance offered to Pakistan after the devastating earthquake occurred in this country in late 2005. This constitutes an example of NATO’s flexibility according to the challenges and mobility of its forces. NATO nations were all one voice when the immediate need has shown itself. Only in unity can mankind face these challenges.

However, the biggest threat to world stability and peace today is terrorism and its ever more probable marriage with weapons of mass destruction. Nations must act together to be able to deal with the complicated and difficult task of disarming and immobilizing terrorists. It is a problem that does not respect borders. The nations of the world do not live in a vacuum. Terrorists must be denied safe haven.

At this point, I would like to underline that we do not have the comfort to ignore one fact: That all forms of terrorism should be treated and responded with the same determination. No terrorist is better or worse than another. The International Community must stand ready to face this big challenge.

After 9/11, the NATO nations invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty for the first time. An attack on one nation was an attack on all. The ISAF mission in Afghanistan was initiated by the UN, but its mandate was eventually transferred to NATO. The NATO nations are now acting in unity with partner nations in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, under the legitimacy of the UN. Their task is to assist the Afghan government in its efforts to expand its authority and restore peace, stability and security within the country, where for a period of a quarter-century has suffered invasion, ground-battle, ethnic strife, insurgency, poverty and famine. The Alliance is now on the ground for an “out of area” operation, for the first time in order to enhance security in Afghanistan. NATO is more determined than ever for success.
Because, it cannot afford to fail. Only when nations are united in their efforts, then the problem of global terrorism could be solved.

I will go into the challenges to peace operations in the following session. But I am not leaving the floor without expressing my appreciation for this successful organization.

Thank you very much for your attention.
SESSION 1
CHALLENGES TO PEACE OPERATIONS
A – The context

We have witnessed in the past years a formidable expansion of peace operations, both in terms of number and size. Today, there is a dozen significant peace operations around the world (Côte d’ivoire, DR Congo, Afghanistan, Sudan, Haiti…) not to mention smaller international undertaking (Central African Republic, East Timor…). There are more than 70 000 UN military peace-keepers deployed, as well as thousand more under another national or multilateral framework.

Another significant evolution is the increasing diversity of these peace-operations.

1. Diversity in their mandates.

We have gone from simple interposition forces (UNIFIL in Lebanon, Cyprus) to complex integrated mandates covering a variety of military and civilian tasks.

In the military field, one could mention the protection of civilian population and humanitarian assistance delivery, the disarming and demobilization of combatants (the two D’s of DDR), the reform of armed forces, the monitoring of embargoes, as well as the fight against “spoilers” under robust chapter VII mandates.
In the civilian field, the increase in scope and diversity has been as impressive: Police and Law and Order, particularly in the area of training police forces (Haiti, DR Congo…), but also, in some cases, direct involvement in active policing (Bosnia); State and institution building, the organisation and monitoring of election (Afghanistan, DR Congo…), civilian aspects of DDR (reintegration).

One should also mention the development of humanitarian activities in Peace operations: the handling of refugees and internally displaced persons, assistance to population affected by conflicts, Child soldiers…

2. An increasing multiplicity of players in Peace operations

We have gone from simple one player (or a few at best)/one mission operations to operations involving an increasingly numerous and complex set of players.

The United Nations: They provide in most cases the necessary legitimacy to peace operations, through mandates given by the Security Council. They also provide in many cases a political framework for political processes, in particular through Special Envoys or Special Representative of the Secretary General. The United Nations is also by far the main provider of military Peace-keepers. UN Peace operations also include an increasingly strong civilian component that handles the political dimension as well as the more specific civilian tasks mentioned above. Sometimes UN operations are limited to such a civilian component, while the military part is left to other organisations.

Regional and sub-regional organisations: They are an increasingly important player in peace-operations. This is particularly the case in Africa, with the African Union and ECOWAS, and to a lesser extent in the Americas with the OAS.

Their first contribution is in the political field, where these organisations significantly contribute to negotiations/peace processes (ex. African Union for Sudan/Darfour, OAS for Haiti). The involvement of a relevant regional organisation is increasingly viewed as a major element of legitimacy in a peace-process.

Regional/Sub-regional organisations are also increasingly active on the ground, particularly through military presence. In some cases the deployment of peace-keepers from such an organisation has been a prelude to the arrival of UN peace-keepers (Côte d’ivoire, probably Darfour).

The European Union and NATO

These two organisations do not properly fit in the “regional organisation” category. They are nonetheless increasingly active in peace-operations.

The EU has expanded significantly its activity in this field in the past years, both in the area of police, with the missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Rafah, and in the DR Congo (Eupol – training of the Congolese police), and in the military area (operations Artemis, Eusec – assistance to armed forces reform - and Eufor in the DR Congo, Eufor in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
The EU also plays a key role in supporting, financially and otherwise, the organisation and holding of elections. It is a major financial contributor to operations led by other organisation, such as the AU operation in Darfour (AMIS).

NATO has, for its part, asserted itself as a provider of “robust” peace-keeping, in areas of major interest for its members. Its two largest operations, in Kosovo and Afghanistan, are combined with a civilian component provided by the UN. NATO also seeks to reinforce its role as a provider of training.

States: Some States have also become, on a national basis, provider of peace-keeping, sometime with a significant military involvement. This is the case of France in Côte d’ivoire (under a UN Mandate and together with a UN operation); this has also been the case for the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone, and more recently with Australia in East Timor. They usually seek a mandate from the Security Council.

States may also have a non-military involvement, in one or several areas in a larger peace-operation. An example is the role of Belgium in the reform of Congolese armed forces (together with the EU).

Non governmental organisations: they are more and more active in peace operations, in a variety of sectors, ranging from institution building, human rights, humanitarian assistance, or the building/rebuilding of basic infrastructures.

International Financial Institutions. The World Bank, in particular, is also actively involved in peace operations, mainly on activities related to rehabilitation/development. One area of particular interest to the WB has been DDR.

B. The challenges

1. Coordination

Coordination between the various players is a major and increasingly acknowledged problem.

At the political level, the issue is to ensure that the objectives and actions of all participants in a peace-keeping operation are convergent and coordinated. This can more easily be achieved when the operation is based on a clear peace-process, agreed by the parties and implemented in as much good faith as possible.

On the field, coordination is daily challenge, exacerbated by the number of missions and players involved. For example, the organisation of an election implies several steps, each of them requiring different units: the elaboration of a proper electoral law, an extensive communication effort towards the local population, the logistical part (the printing of ballots, the installation of polling station…), and the observation of the election…

By the same token, DDR processes require numerous operations (regrouping, disarmament, emergency assistance, training, development programs…) performed by different players (peace-keepers, UN agencies, World Bank, NGO’s…). There have been
cases of failure or delays in DDR plans as a result of the lack of coordination between those elements (in the DR Congo).

Attempts at a better coordination have been made over the past years in many cases such as the contact group in Kosovo, the Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition (CIAT) in the DR Congo, the Groupe de Travail International (GTI) in Côte d’ivoire or the contact group for Haiti. These groups may include the most interested powers in a given situation (Contact Group Kosovo) or, in a more comprehensive approach, States as well as international organizations involved (Contact Group Haiti).

However useful these ad hoc groups may be, the need was felt to go further, and organize coordination in peace operations in a more systematic way. This is the objective of the Peace Building Commission (PBC), created in December 2005 on the basis of a proposal by Kofi Annan. The PBC will include the most important players in peace operations, troop contributors, and financial contributors as well as the permanent members of the Security Council and the key international organisations and institutional donors, including the World Bank. Its composition will be adjusted according to the situation it considers, so that all important players in that given situation can be included.

It is premature to make a judgement on the contribution of the PBC, since it has not yet started its work. If it avoids being trapped in the kind of sterile and contentious debates that plague so many UN organs, it may well prove to be a useful instrument to improve the international community’s management of peace operations.

2. Resources

As a result of their increasing size and number, peace operations nowadays take a huge toll on resources.

Human resources: It is increasingly difficult to obtain military peace keepers, all the more so for the UN since western countries are less and less incline to send their troop to blue helmet operations. Most countries with significant military capabilities are heavily engaged in operations overseas, on a national basis or in the framework of NATO or the EU. Countries from the south, which have become the main suppliers of UN peace-keepers (particularly countries from the Indian sub continent), also begin to feel the crunch.

It is becoming even more difficult to find appropriate human resources in areas of military expertise such as logistic, communication, control and command. The same can be said about civilian police, where the increase of the demand has largely outpaced that of the supply (particularly as regards French-speaking policemen, badly needed in countries such as Haiti, Côte d’ivoire, or the DR Congo), and about civilian experts in peace operation.

The answers to that human resources shortage are being searched in the development of training, particularly the training of peace keepers in the region where they are most needed, Africa. The United States, France and the United Kingdom have developed programs to that effect; the G8 is getting involved in these efforts, as well as the EU.

It may also be necessary to build-up a specific career in peace keeping and peace-building in the main international organisations and States involved, so that a larger and more stable pool of experts in that field can be built-up.
Financial resources: The cost of peace operations has gone up in an impressive manner. That goes both for UN peace operations, financed through assessed contributions levied on UN member-States, and for non UN ones, financed by troop contributing countries on the basis of the “costs lie where they fall” principle.

To deal with this increasingly heavy financial burden is a difficult challenge. It is possible, and certainly desirable, to seek a better cost-efficiency in peace-operations, but the limitations to that approach are obvious: peace-keepers, who put their lives at risk, cannot be supported on the cheap. Certainly, not enough is being done in most countries to convince those who decide on budget issues, particularly parliaments, that peace-operations are a good and comparatively cheap investment, especially when compared with the cost of non-action.

3. Peace-keeping for the rich and peace-keeping for the poor?

Another matter of concern is the obvious unbalance between peace-operations deployed in areas of priority interest to western countries, such as Kosovo or Afghanistan, and the other operations, mostly in Africa. The former are mostly left to UN peace-keepers from the South. The former are based on robust, well-equipped and trained peace-keepers from NATO or EU countries.

Although one can hardly envisage a significant reversal of that trend at least in the short term, it is clear that rich countries can and should do more for UN peace-operations, particularly by being more forthcoming in the supply of much-needed expertise in certain fields, as well as in the increase of assistance programs in areas that key to the success of peace-building (DDR, Elections, State-building, Security sector reform…).

4. A more daunting challenge: What are we there to do?

The objectives of peace-keeping - mostly to prevent a resumption of hostility - used to be relatively simple when it was mainly about interposition. Now that peace-operations are, in most cases, about bringing back a durable stability in the countries or regions where they are deployed, the challenge is more difficult to apprehend. What does “bring back durable stability” mean, particularly in areas that have been chronically instable and disorganised over the last decades or even centuries?

At some point the prevalent thought was that the completion of an electoral process, followed by the establishment of a democratically elected government, was the end of the game, after which peace-operations could withdraw. Recent experience in places such as Haiti have taught us that successful elections are not enough to declare success, and that the international presence has to remain, in most cases, much longer after voters have cast their ballots.

Another problem often faced by peace-operations is the paralysis of the peace-process on the basis of which they are supposed to operate. Peace-operations face a dilemma in such situations: should they remain, at the risk of getting bogged down, and possibly manipulated by the parties? Should they withdraw, at the risk of taking the blame for a resumption of hostilities? The answer to these questions largely depends on the risk of instability on the
ground. In the case of Ethiopia-Erythrea, a significant decrease of the number of peacekeepers was decided. In Côte d’ivoire, the risk of instability is considered high, and the situation of the peace-process, although sluggish, is not considered to be as deteriorated. As a result, the UN operation, supported by French troops, has not only been maintained in its level of staffing, but also increased slightly in its military component.

More generally, peace-operations are often confronted with situations where the issue is not really the rebuilding of stability, institutions and infrastructures, but the building from scratch thereof (Afghanistan, Liberia, Haiti, DR Congo). How can such daunting tasks be completed in a couple of years?

The implication of the above is that the international community has to come to term with the fact that peace-operations, when deployed, are there to stay for much longer than we usually think. Peace-keeping and peace-building are long-term endeavours, which have to evolve overtime according to the situation on the ground, but cannot withstand premature disengagement of the international community.

**Conclusion**

The challenges of peace-operations are indeed many, and quite formidable. But that should not divert us from the essential fact: peace-keeping, on the whole, is a success story, and a relatively cheap one.

- Millions of deaths have been avoided as a result of peace-operations;

- In a significant number of cases, peace operations have been instrumental in contributing to the return of stability (Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador) or, at least, contribute to prevent the resumption of hostilities, thus creating better conditions for a durable peace to return eventually (Cyprus, Kosovo…).

- The cost of UN peace-operations reaches, this years, 5 Billions Dollars, which is a quite modest amount compared with the annual amount of military spending in the world (slightly more than 1 per cent of US annual military spending).

Another fact is that the demand of peace-keeping is likely to continue to increase, as a result of the number of crisis in the world, and of the increasing pressure on governments, particularly in the West, to intervene. We have to prepare ourselves for that. We also need to be aware that peace-operations are not the answer to instability in the world, but merely one of the tools at the disposal of the international community. It is crucial that we do not lose sight of the key questions at the root of global instability, particularly development and global distribution of wealth. The way in which we will be able to deal with these challenges will be decisive with respect to the future of the stability of the world.
SESSION 2
I would like to thank the organisers for giving me the opportunity to address this audience about NATO’s contribution to UN peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Let me; first of all, acknowledge the important role played by Turkey in peace operations, with its noteworthy contributions. In particular, I would like to emphasise the significant role that Mr. Hikmet Cetin is playing as NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative of the Alliance in Afghanistan.

Created two years ago, the Division of Operations is a new part of the NATO civilian structure. The rationale behind its establishment was to have a meeting point between the political and the military side on NATO’s operations, which have been lately growing in volume and diversity. Indeed, NATO did not carry on any operation in the first fifty years of its existence. The division of operations is primarily involved in crisis management and peacekeeping activities and civil emergency planning and exercises.

With the reshaping of the world strategic architecture after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Alliance has transformed and adapted to this new reality. NATO has basically evolved from a solely defensive alliance to one designed to respond to the new challenges posed to the security of its members. One threat that took a new dimension after the 2001 September the 11th terrorist attacks on the United States was terrorism. On the 12 of September, for the first time in the Alliance’s history, NATO member states have invoked
article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which stipulates that an attack on one member is an attack on all members. Ironically, after more than fifty years when European members benefited from the insurance of a potential US involvement in their security, it was eventually the European states who gave the insurance of article 5 to the US.

Following the new security reality, NATO operations have also evolved from the euro-Atlantic area to what is called “out of area” theatres. The Alliance was first involved in the Balkans on the Alliance members’ doorsteps. In Bosnia-Herzegovina NATO’s mission, under a UN mandate, was to guarantee the end of hostilities and then to maintain a secure environment for the country’s reconstruction. Then, in 1999, the Alliance conducted a 77-long day air-bombing campaign against Serbian security forces both in Kosovo and in Serbia. In 2001, NATO was active in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, mainly working on preventing the outburst of a conflict.

In May 2002 in Reykjavik the Alliance agreed that part of its new mandate would be to get involved in security matters outside of its traditional regions of concern should there be a threat to the safety and security of its members.

The first out of area operation of the Alliance started in August 2003 in Afghanistan, when NATO took over the command of ISAF. The aim of the operation is to assist the Afghan government in maintaining security in order to provide a safe environment for the development of a free society.

Another such operation is taking place in Darfur where the Alliance is providing airlift capability and training to the African Union peacekeeping mission. There is no UN mandate currently for the mission, but as one might materialise in the foreseeable future when the UN may take over from the African Union, I thought interesting mentioning it to you.

There are several lessons that NATO learnt from this evolution:

First, the UN has to be the overarching body in such missions, as it provides the legal basis for peace operations.

Second, the cooperation between the UN, the EU, OSCE, NATO and NGOs is necessary, as each institution has a specific role and expertise in different aspects of an operation. All these actors have a role to play, but it is important that they work together, that they emphasise their complementarity. The scarcity of resources demands an effective management in order to maximise their benefit. It is therefore crucial to have a good cooperation between the various actors so that there is no double use of their capacity. In that regard, the crisis in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2000 should serve as a precedent for good cooperation between international organisations.

Third, in order to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, it is important to use more the Stability Police Units (SPU). The SPU’s objectives are to maintain civil order, fill the “capacity gap” between military forces and police, and the training of local police forces along democratic lines. “Concerted Planning” is also an element, which should become key in every mission requiring an increased level of concertation and cooperation between all the actors present on the ground. Concerted planning aims at establishing the mechanisms that the various actors will use in order to complement each other in a given mission, and has
mainly two phases: planning and action. In the planning phase, all the foreseeable actors that are about to take part in an operation will identify the tasks played by every institution, in order to avoid duplicity. In the action phase, when the operation is ongoing, all the actors will continue to meet to effectively allocate their competencies.

Finally, NATO is involved in peace operations for a limited period until ownership of the country can be assured by its authorities. NATO is there to help such countries that go through difficult times, and would not be able to overcome their problems alone. The Alliance, however, is committed to leave these countries as soon as the situation has reached a satisfactory level in the host government’s assessment. This exit strategy is in line with NATO’s overall goal of building a better and safer world for future generations.

TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION TO UN PEACE OPERATIONS
TURKEY’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

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Foreign Policy

Guided by the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey has been pursuing a policy of "Peace at Home and Peace Abroad." Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Turkey crowns her democratic and secular political system, social tradition or reconciling modernity with cultural identity with a foreign policy that is a generator of security and stability in her region and beyond. The primary objective is to help secure and nurture a peaceful, stable, prosperous and cooperative regional and international environment that is conducive to human development.

Turkey pursues this objective by following a principled and proactive foreign policy that employs a broad spectrum of peaceful means. These entail, inter alia, membership in NATO and full integration with the European Union, taking the lead in regional cooperation processes, promoting good neighborly relations and economic cooperation, extending humanitarian aid and assistance to the less fortunate, participating in peacekeeping operations, and contributing to the resolution of disputes as well as post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction efforts.

In this context, Turkey has membership in a wide range of leading international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development...
OECD), the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Developing 8 (D-8). She is also candidate for membership in the EU and has officially started accession negotiations on October 3, 2005. Thus, Turkey is now officially regarded as an "accession country".

Turkey seeks to nurture a culture of understanding and cooperation between civilizations. Following the tenor attacks of September 11, 2001 Turkey hosted in February 2002 the first ever joint forum meeting of the EU and DIC in an effort to promote the crucial dialogue between civilizations. Moreover, Turkey, together with Spain has become the co-sponsor of a new initiative for an Alliance of Civilizations launched by the Secretary General of the United Nations in July, 2005.

In the post-Cold War period, Turkey found herself at the centre of a large landscape Eurasia, stretching from Europe to Central Asia. This area is destined to gain increasing geopolitical significance in the new millennium. Turkey, with her experience in democracy and economic development, and making use of the multiple ties with the vast majority of the countries in the area has been able to take part in their transformation efforts.

In this regard, she has spearheaded the formation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), which can be seen as one of the first successful attempts to capitalize on the post-Cold War spirit. Turkey has also played a leading role in the formation of a Naval Task Force for the Black Sea (BLACKSEAFOR) among the coastal states. On the other hand, the membership of another regional body, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), originally founded by Turkey together with Iran and Pakistan was expanded at Turkey's initiative to include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Republics. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to transport Caspian oil to western markets, officially inaugurated in May 2005, serves as yet another model of regional cooperation with wide ranging implications over and above the regional context.

**Security and Defense Policy**

Turkey considers NATO as the linchpin of transatlantic ties and Euro-Atlantic Security, of which Turkey is an integral part. Turkey has been and continues to be a security provider in what is indeed a volatile region. As such, she is an active participant in NATO-led peace support operations. She takes part in operations of other leading international organizations as well, such as the United Nations and the European Union. Turkey currently maintains the largest armed forces among the European allies and is only second to the USA within NATO.

Given the nature of her geo-strategic location and the prevailing global security conditions, Turkey is obliged to maintain a realistic deterrence capability. This is also in keeping with her responsibilities as a member of NATO. The state of flux in the international environment and the changing nature of risks and threats have created a need for a comprehensive transformation within NATO. In parallel, the Turkish Armed Forces have also embarked upon a similar process of transformation and modernization. The ultimate aim is to transform the Turkish military into a modern, smaller and professional force, with higher deployability and greater fire power.
Turkey has from the outset supported the internal and external adaptation of NATO in the post-Cold War era and has favored a broader approach to security, when stressing the importance of effectively maintaining the core functions of the Alliance. In support of NATO outreach efforts, a PfP training centre was established in Ankara on 9 March 1998.

Turkey is part of NATO's integrated military structure. In line with NATO's new Command Structure, the Air Component Command (ACC) HQ of AIRSOUTH which is located in Izmir became operational in the second half of 2004. Turkey continues to be of great importance not only in the south eastern region of the Alliance, but also in securing international stability, particularly in an era of increased asymmetric threats from international terrorism. The Turkish military continues to be one of the most capable forces in the world. Moreover, its role is not confined to providing security for Turkey- As the missions it has successfully undertaken in various geographies from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Afghanistan very well demonstrate, it also assumes an important role in peacekeeping in its region and beyond.

Turkey has been an active contributor to all strands of NATO transformation. Turkey undertook the leadership of the first two iterations of the land component of the NRF and hosted the first NRF exercise in Izmir on 20 November 2003. Turkey will lead the land component of NRF-8 between January-July 2007 as well. She has also established a High Readiness Force Headquarters (NRDC- T) in Istanbul. NRDC-T is among the nine Graduated Readiness Force (GRF) HQs within NATO. This HQ assumed command of the ISAF-VII in Afghanistan between February-August 2005.

Turkey is participating in the deployment of the SEEBRIG (Southeast European Brigade) Headquarters' to Afghanistan. This HQ has assumed command of the Kabul Multinational Brigade, for the February August 2006 period. Following SEEBRIG's term, Turkey, along with the United States, will lead the Kabul Regional Command on a rotational basis for two years. Furthermore, Turkey has decided to establish a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the province of Wardak as part of the fourth stage of ISAF expansion.

White NATO has already made a substantial contribution to the struggle against terrorism, efforts are still under way to better equip the Alliance in countering this threat. Turkey has been and will continue to be among the lending countries in this vein. Along with participating in all of the collective efforts of the Alliance, Turkey also seeks to contribute to the formation of a common understanding in the fight against terrorism. In this vein the Center of Excellence on Defense against Terrorism was established in Ankara and officially inaugurated in June 2005.

As a member of NATO for more than half a century and an ardent proponent of the fundamental principle of indivisibility of security, Turkey has been a longstanding contributor to the defense, security and stability of Europe at large. It is with this understanding that during the Cold War era, Turkey stood up to the challenge of guarding NATO's longest border with the former Soviet Union. However, the Cold War came at a considerable expense to Turkey, since it required her to maintain large armed forces despite limited economic means. (in the period between 1980-1990, Turkey spent an average of 3.5% of her GDP on military expenditures, a percentage that is conspicuously higher than many Allied countries.)

With the emergence of new security challenges to international and particularly European security interests, Turkey found herself at the epicenter of asymmetric risks and
threats, which characterize this new security landscape. Turkey's contributions to preserving Europe's security and stability in the face of new risks and challenges have continued unabated since the end of the Cold War. Thus, her sincere efforts towards European integration in this "New Cold War" are self-evident. Resources devoted by Turkey to security and defense in the new security scene self-explanatory. (Turkey's post-1990 military expenditures average over 4% of her GDP, whereas the average ratio for most Allies is 2-2.5%.)

Turkey is a net contributor to international peace and security. As of February 2006:

- 371 troops are deployed in KFOR, the NATO operation in Kosovo,
  209 troops are deployed in ISAF-VIII, the NATO operation in Afghanistan (Turkey has assumed the leadership of ISAF-II and ISAF-VII in 2002 and 2005 respectively.)
- 389 troops are deployed for Operation Active Endeavor,
- 4 officers take part in the NATO Training Mission in Iraq.
- Turkey has decided to deploy 4 F-16 fighters between April 1-July 31 2006 for air policing in the airspace of the Baltic States.

With over 300 civilian police currently deployed in UN peacekeeping missions throughout the world, Turkey is among the Organization's leading contributors of civilian police officers.

Humanitarian assistance to countries around the world afflicted by natural and or man-made disasters also constitutes an integral part of Turkey's politics. Accordingly, Turkey has contributed to numerous international and bilateral aid efforts, the total amount of aid extended to various causes in 2004 being in the range of 10 million US Dollars. Turkey responded immediately to the emergency needs of the South Asian countries in the wake of the earthquake and subsequent tsunami catastrophe with aid exceeding 40 million US Dollars. Similarly, Turkey extended some 3.5 million US Dollars of aid in response to the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina. Turkish aid and search and rescue teams were first to reach Pakistan in response to the earthquake disaster in this country in October 2005.

To sum up, in the aftermath of the Cold War and particularly after September 11, 2001, Turkey's security responsibilities have increased considerably, along with her security concerns. Accordingly, with a view to fulfilling her responsibilities and standing up to the contemporary security challenges, Turkey has increased her contributions both in hard and soft terms, in the vast geography ranging from the Balkans to Afghanistan.

Furthermore, Turkey's support and contribution to Euro-Atlantic stability and security are not only confined to the UN and NATO. Indeed, in line with her prospective membership to the EU and her consequent involvement in the CFSP, Turkey has from the very outset strongly supported the development of the ESDP. As such, Turkey is a leading non-EU European Ally both in terms of the number of ESDP operations in which she participates, and the capabilities she has committed to strengthening ESDP. In this sense, Turkey has partaken in most operations undertaken by the EU under the Berlin (+) arrangements or autonomously. In fact, in many operations such as Proxima in Macedonia or EUPM in Bosnia Herzegovina" Turkey has contributed more than most EU partners. Furthermore, Turkey's involvement in ESDP constitutes an indispensable added value to the further deepening of the security dimension of the EU in this critical period.
The EU has increased its operational role in crisis response operations, as manifested by operation EUFOR-ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Turkey is making a significant contribution to EUFOR-ALTHEA, including its civilian aspect. In total, her contribution to EUFOR-ALTHEA comes to nearly 400 personnel. Furthermore, Turkey has 3 police and 3 gendarmerie officers deployed to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkey contributes one police officer to the EV Police Mission in Kinshasa, plans to send one police officer to the EUPOL. COPPS Mission in Palestine and is also considering participating in the EV Border Assistance Mission in Palestine.

Turkey declared her readiness to contribute to the EV Battle Groups in November 2004. Turkey will provide both troops and capabilities to the Italian led Battlegroup which will be assigned to the EV for the second half of 2010.

Turkey believes that resolute action against contemporary threats requires coherence and cooperation. Developing synergy among the main pillars of the European security system as well as strengthening the Trans-Atlantic link are the “sine qua non”s for a credible, integrated European security architecture. Security is indivisible more than ever. Unexpected and asymmetric threats oblige the Euro Atlantic community to act in solidarity and cooperation. A common strategic vision between the EV and NATO is needed to chart a roadmap to meet future challenges.

**Composition of the Armed Forces**

Land Forces are organized into four field armies, the Logistics Command as well as the Training and Doctrine Command. Land Forces have the following components:

- 10 army corps
- 2 mech. Inf. Divisions
- 2 mech. Inf. div. HQs (tactical)
- 1 inf. div. and 1 training div.
- 14 mechanized inf. brigades
- 14 armored brigades
- 12 infantry/regional sc. brigades
- 5 commando brigades
- 5 training brigades

Naval forces consist of the Fleet Command, the Northern Sea Area Command, the Southern Sea Area Command, the Naval Training and Education Command. The navy has:

- 13 submarines
- 21 frigates
- 22 mine sweepers / hunters and layers
- 21 fast patrol boats
- 52 various landing ships / crafts
- an amphibious brigade
- 23 various maritime patrol aircraft / helicopters

Air Forces are organized into two Tactical Air Forces Command and Air Training and Air Logistics Command. The air forces have:
The role of the OSCE in Peacekeeping Operations

In various documents adopted by the OSCE so far, peacekeeping has been considered an important operational element of the organization.

The OSCE Helsinki Document of 1992 titled 'The Challenges of Change" is the main regulatory framework regarding the issue, Chapter III of the Helsinki Document puts the peacekeeping within the context of the Organization's overall capability in the field of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, in other words, OSCE’s unique role in the whole "conflict cycle". In the said Document, peacekeeping is defined as "operations which will involve civilian and/or military personnel may range from small scale to large scale and may assume a variety of forms, including observer and monitor missions and larger deployment of forces."

After the 1992 Helsinki Document, a number of other important decisions have been adopted, the most significant of which are the documents of 1993 Rome Ministerial Council, 1994 Budapest Ministerial Council and 1999 Istanbul Summit. In Rome 199 the participating States of the then OSCE decided that the role and functions of a "third party military force" in any area consistent with OSCE principles and objectives. In the 1994 Budapest Ministerial Council, a decision was adopted regarding the "intensification of OSCE action in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict". In this latter decision establishment of the High Level Planning Group-HLPG" was foreseen in order for the HLPG to make recommendation- on the size and characteristics of a peacekeeping force that will be deployed once a political settlement to the conflict had been introduced.

The prevailing understanding within the OSCE is that any OSCE peacekeeping will take place within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, 1992 Helsinki Document puts in place the possibility on resorting to EU, NATO and the CIS for financing the operations.

Although many of the present OSCE field activities could be described as peacekeeping on the basis of the broad definition introduced at Helsinki in 1992, neither this nor other decisions of the following years fully addressed the specific capacities and capabilities that will be required of the OSCE, particularly in the case of inclusion of the armed forces in such an operation. Discussions on these specific aspects of the peacekeeping operations have been initiated a couple of times in the history of the OSCE, without bearing any concrete results. The latest of such a process was the extensive debates that took place throughout the year 2003 where the participating States, with the involvement of the Conflict Prevention Centre of the Secretariat, endeavored to develop a generic concept that would include principles, procedures, aspects regarding planning and preparations, chain of command and financial
arrangements of the OSCE peacekeeping operations. However, it was not possible to reach a consensus and the issue has not been brought up within the OSCE ever since.
EU’S CONTRIBUTION TO UN PEACE OPERATIONS
EU CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACE OPERATIONS

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The inception of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the years 1998-99 led the EU to revisit its relationship with the UN vis-à-vis crisis management. In this same period, the UN found itself in the midst of reform and in need of partners in peace operations. Consequently, the UN increased its calls on regional organisations, including the EU, and the idea took form that cooperation on crisis management should be considered and possibly institutionalised.

This paper will contextualise developments in the relationship between the EU and the UN in the field of peace operations through the examination of six themes: the EU potential; the EU’s accomplishments; the lacuna between UN requests and EU contributions; the EU’s policy towards autonomy; scenarios of EU-UN cooperation; and, the EU’s preference vis-à-vis mandates.

EU POTENTIAL

In comparison with other regional organisations, the EU offers the most promising perspectives of cooperation with the UN in peace operations. There are three reasons for this.
Firstly, the EU is actively developing its capacity to carry out peace operations, and despite shortcomings, the EU is more effective than most other regional organisations. In the field of peace operations, only NATO and the UN itself possess, in some areas, better capacities and know-how than the EU. Furthermore, the EU is developing some of the ‘enabling assets’ that the UN is lacking, such as rapid reaction capabilities, movement control, intelligence, medical units, logistic units, all of which are less readily available than infantry battalions.

Secondly, the EU remains the only regional organisation with a holistic, comprehensive approach to crisis management, encompassing military and civilian tools, and theoretically covering the entire spectrum of crisis management.

Thirdly, although it is generally the EU, rather than the UN, that sets the agenda and thus dictates the terms of the relationship, the EU remains genuinely willing to cooperate with the UN in peace operations. The December 2000 EU Presidency report on ESDP underlined the value of cooperation between the EU and the UN, further stating that efforts to this end would enable the EU and EU member states to respond more “effectively and coherently” to UN requests. This combination of will and capacity (both structural and in assets) is not necessarily evident with other regional organisations; elsewhere one is likely to encounter capacity without will, or will without capacity.

BUILDING THE EU-UN RELATIONSHIP: ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Since the first visit of the European troika to UN Headquarters in New York in September 2000, many developments have taken place far surpassing rhetoric. Before 2000, the EU and the UN had limited contact and knew little of each other. Soon after, in June 2001, a Swedish EU Presidency document on EU-UN cooperation identified three themes for collaboration: conflict prevention, civilian and military aspects of crisis management, and regional issues. In September 2003 followed the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management identifying planning, training, communication and lessons learnt as four areas where cooperation between the organisations could be strengthened. The implementation of these landmark documents and further developments have included: the establishment of points of contact and task forces at different levels within both organisations; the creation of a joint consultative mechanism known as the Steering Committee that meets biannually; an agreement on information-sharing; cooperation between the two situation centres; collaboration on pre-deployment training standards; UN personnel participation in EU training courses (including an April 2005 exercise); and peace operations themselves.

The experiences of the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the EU took over a UN operation (International Police Task force, IPTF), and of Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where the EU deployed an operation before the UN took over, shed new light on the EU-UN relationship. Through these two operations, the organisations became better acquainted with the other’s capacity, their limitations and their strengths. The objective of seamless transitions was to be met through effective inter-institutional cooperation facilitated by liaison officers. The success of the IPTF-EUPM transition illustrated that the efficiency of the process had become a concrete component of EU-UN relations in peace operations. It became clear to both organisations, as they found themselves simultaneously present on the ground, that they were to a certain extent dependent
on each other, and needed to work together to ensure smooth handovers and successful entry and exit strategies. Cooperation, no longer an option with their activities now intimately linked, had become an unavoidable necessity.

The 2006 EU operation in the DRC, Eufor RD Congo, provides a new example of this cooperation. In this case, EU troops, in an EU-led operation and under EU command will offer “timely and focused support” to MONUC, the UN Mission in the country, for a specified event. It will involve “the deployment of an advanced element to Kinshasa of (…) military personnel… and the availability of a battalion-size ‘on-call’ force ‘over the horizon’ outside the country, but quickly deployable if necessary”.

**UN REQUESTS, EU CONTRIBUTIONS, AND THE LACUNA BETWEEN**

Stepping away from the positive parameters of the EU’s promising capacity and accomplishments, we arrive at the gap between what the UN asks of the EU, and what the EU is willing and able to provide, especially at the military level. The UN is faced with shortages of troops and enabling assets and is constantly looking for ways to fill needs, through reform, but also by asking states and regional organisations to provide assets necessary for complex and robust peacekeeping. The UN also welcomes any initiative to support or strengthen UN capacity, both directly and indirectly.

Today the United Nations is involved in 18 operations with more than 90,000 personnel deployed (72,778 military and civilian police) on four continents, putting the UN at a level of deployment closing exceeding its capacity. One UN concern is military assets, including infantry battalions. More importantly, the UN is concerned with enabling assets, specialised units, logistical support, information gathering, and rapid reaction capacity.

Elsewhere, the UN frets over its supply side. What the EU and its member states are prepared to offer does not include providing troops to UN operations per se. The fact remains that EU member states are overwhelmingly absent from UN operations. Together, they represent but 5.7% of UN troops (4,217 out of 73,034). Poland is the primary contributor with 712 troops in March 2006. In the DRC, EU troops represent 0.4% of MONUC (62 out of 16,803); in Sudan, EU troops make up 0.78% of UNMIS (64 out of 8,161). EU member states are major contributors to UN-mandated peace operations, but contribute very little to UN-led operations. However, with regards to finances, the EU states’ shares of the UN regular and peacekeeping budgets are very high as reflected in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU member states’ share of UN regular budget</th>
<th>EU member states’ share of the UN peacekeeping operations budget</th>
<th>EU member states’ troop contributions to UN operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37 %</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>5.7% 4,217 out of 73,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17% in 2001</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30% in 1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The troop figures above are key to understanding the context of the EU-UN relationship. What is true for individual member states is translated to the institutional level. The reasons for the European absence from UN peace operations are well-known and are rooted in the lessons-learnt from the early 1990s. Western states have become reluctant to participate in UN-led operations and favour regional organisations, including EU and NATO. The ESDP process has not led to an EU will to contribute directly to UN-led operations. There was a concern expressed by the UN that ESDP would signify that European means would be frozen for UN-led operations. In practice, this has proven to be more or less the case.

The EU and the EU member states’ policies towards peacekeeping operations are ambivalent; they are strong supporters of the UN, attached to the centrality and legitimising power of the UN Security Council, but at the same time place a strong emphasis on the EU’s political autonomy thus distancing it from the UN. This is a matter of concern for the UN as it raises the issue of the ability of the UN to conduct robust peacekeeping without Western states and their capabilities.

The four areas of cooperation identified in the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management are essential, but they are indirect contributions to UN peacekeeping. At the military level, this signifies headquarters cooperation or support (in planning and logistics for example) rather than direct field cooperation through troop contribution. The 2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, commonly known as the ‘Brahimi Report’ states that “no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping is to succeed.” A key question for the future of UN peacekeeping is: what will UN peacekeeping look like if Western states continue to disregard it?

THE NEED FOR EU AUTONOMY

Autonomy of decision and autonomy of action bear great importance for the EU. Autonomy is a key word that has acquired a particular meaning in the context of the relationship between the EU and NATO. Insofar as the EU-UN relationship is concerned, the EU does not wish to be overly constrained by the UN, particularly in the case of military operations.

What defines a military operation as an EU operation is the presence of the political-military structure: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The very fact that EU-led operations must be placed under the “political control and the strategic direction” of the PSC is incompatible with EU member states’ troops being placed under UN command. This is key to understanding the extent to which the EU is willing to work with the UN. In other words, the autonomy of the EU is difficult to reconcile with UN-led operations, which explains the reluctance of EU member states to participate in UN-led operations and their reticence to re-hat.

This played out in Artemis when the incoming UN operation requested that some of the EU assets re-hat. EU member states denied the request thus revealing the limits to cooperation. This dismissal of the UN jeopardised the smooth transition from one
organisation to the other as well as the credibility of MONUC. Although the EU has remained active in the DRC through several civilian crisis management initiatives, these actions fall short of a direct strengthening of MONUC via deployment of EU assets. This episode accentuated the fact that the EU would not contribute directly to a UN-led mission. Nevertheless, Artemis proved to be a breakthrough in EU-UN relations and led to the development of the battle group concept. The Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, signed shortly after the Artemis transition, reflected the lessons-learnt in the DRC.

**SCENARIOS OF EU-UN COOPERATION**

So where could and should the EU fit with UN operations? A number of scenarios have been developed over the recent past. These are based on the experiences in operations and are but options for future cooperation.

A first possible role for the EU is to act as a ‘clearing house’, a mechanism charged with coordinating national contributions to UN operations. This system was activated in 2004 in support of MONUC and could prove to be of particular use in coordinating ‘enabling assets’.

The ‘stand-alone’ or sub-contracting model presents the opportunity for the EU to conduct an operation under a UN mandate, but with no formal link to the UN structure. The UN would act only as the mandating body. Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrates this scenario. Regular reporting by the EU to the UN would likely be required in this case.

The ‘bridging model’ suggests a situation in which the EU deploys a short-term, robust operation before a UN force takes over. This is a response to a key challenge of the UN, rapid deployment capability. The objective of this model is to offer the UN time to mount its operation or to reorganise one pre-existing. This model also reflects a trend in peace operations whereby regional organisations enter a crisis for a certain time before being replaced by the UN.

Although the ‘bridging model’ presents multiple advantages and meets the aspirations of both the EU and the UN, it also raises a myriad of questions vis-à-vis compatibility, standards and requirements: the ability of the UN to take over a ‘robust’ peacekeeping mandate; the implications for the UN to be part of the EU exit strategy (as illustrated in the case of Artemis); the likelihood of EU intervention where the UN is unlikely to takeover; facilitation of EU-UN relations when deployed simultaneously; facilitation of EU-UN relations when deployed consecutively and faced with a transition period; the possibility of re-hatting.

The concept of a ‘stand-by model’ or a strategic reserve that remains on call and able to respond in a timely fashion to urgent needs. This would include an ‘over-the-horizon reserve’ ready to support a UN operation. Eufor RD Congo is a prime illustration of this concept. The EU will be in a position to support the operation in the case of difficulties encountered on the ground. EU members were initially sceptical of this option due to the complexity of the coordination.

With the ‘modular approach’, which is favoured by the UN, the EU would contribute a component to a UN operation. With special arrangements regarding the chain of command, EU member states might consider providing a component to a UN-led mission, but this model is more likely to apply for civilian assets rather than military.
THE QUESTION OF MANDATE

The EU policy vis-à-vis the necessity to have, or not to have, a UN mandate for its operations is ambiguous. The official documents are imprecise and only refer to the need to act “in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter”, while the UN and the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) are regularly mentioned as “leading organizations”.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003 does not explicitly say that a UN mandate is necessary for all EU-led operations. The ESS reasserts that the “fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter” but refrains from saying that any military operation that the EU might undertake should be formally mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC).

The EU is reluctant to systematically condition its crisis management policy to a vote taken at the UN. In this sense the EU seems to be willing to ask for a UNSC resolution only when it is legally and politically unavoidable. For example, the EU appears willing to ask for a UN mandate when the operation contemplated contains coercive elements and/or is outside Europe (Artemis in the DRC, in 2003; EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 2004; and the forthcoming 2006 operation in the DRC, EUFOR RD Congo), but not when the operation is non-coercive and in Europe (EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 2003; EUFOR Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in 2003; EUPOL Proxima in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in 2003). In these cases, it is the consent of the host state combined with the Joint Action of the EU Council that constitutes the legal basis.

This ambiguous approach to mandates could prove detrimental to the cohesion of the EU. The combination of the consent of the host state and a joint action for a non-coercive operation will never be as strong nor as clear as a UN resolution. This can create a delicate situation in which an operation is in the grey between non-coercive and coercive. Furthermore, in line with the ESS, and at a time when UN centrality is at stake, the EU has a particular responsibility to ensure and support UN centrality whenever possible. The latter especially, as EU behaviour is watched, observed and acknowledged in its treatment of the UN by other states and regional organisations.

CONCLUSION

Both the EU and the UN have made significant efforts to build their relationship constructively and to make their achievements tangible. Nevertheless, a degree of imbalance persists due to their differing agendas and policies. The UN would like the EU and EU member states to contribute more directly to UN-led operations, while the EU maintains its preference for autonomy of decision and action, requiring a flexible, case-by-case approach.

The relationship of the two organisations is young, and their cooperation is evolving. New opportunities, new incentives and new concerns will continue to affect the relationship positively and negatively. However, even if EU member states’ military capabilities are not ‘frozen’ for ESDP purposes, the probability that they would be deployed in UN-led operations remains low, and definitely subject to very specific conditions.
Meanwhile, the UN has called for an inter-locking system of peacekeeping capacities, enabling the cooperation between regional organisations to create predictable and reliable partnerships. Presented with humanitarian atrocities where international intervention is required – such as Darfur – the way in which the EU and the UN tackle the challenge of the changing face of crisis management will inevitably determine the shape of their relationship.
TRAINING AND EDUCATION

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Center for Strategic Research

As the world is changing, we are facing new risks and challenges. The escalation of regional conflicts threatens global peace and security. In cooperation with the UN, Turkey takes part in various activities that aim to prevent conflict and provide security and peace. A significant feature of modern peacekeeping is better planning, training, coordination and the maintenance of capabilities for the rapid deployment of both the military and police.

I would like give the details of Turkish participation in the police component of international peace operations. First of all, I have to emphasize that the police component, as a civilian contribution to peace operations, is a very recent phenomenon. In fact the Dayton Agreement, upon which UN Security Council Resolution No. 1035 on 15 December 1995 was adopted, to establish an International Police Task Force (IPTF), was signed only back in 1995. The IPTF in its role of promoting local law and order was essential in establishing a lasting peace. The IPTF also ensures that at local level, internationally accepted standards are followed in police and criminal justice activities. They also assist in ensuring that elections are carried out fairly, in an atmosphere free from violence or intimidation, and with respect to freedom of movement.

In international peacekeeping operations ever since, the involvement of police forces has been continuously growing. They are sometimes armed missions, especially in riots, or in counter crime or terrorism operations but in most cases, these are unarmed operations in
support of national local police units. The requirement of whether or not the task force would be armed is determined by the UN authority requesting the assignment of a police contingent from the member states. Again in each case, the scope and the limits of duties expected from police forces to be assigned are clearly defined in the letters of intent circulated to the members by the United Nations.

In such a recent letter, for instance, concerning the establishment of a police task force in support of a UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), a reference was made to the UNSC Resolution No.1528, which stated that the situation in Cote d’Ivoire continued to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region. According to this resolution, the civilian police component of the UN operation was expected to be in charge of advising, assisting and training the Ivorian National Police. It was underlined that UNOCI was an assistance mission, and as such, UN civilian police personnel would not carry arms.

Having contributed to the international Peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Turkey participated in the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) which was set up as the successor to the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) to which she had also contributed. Since then, the efforts of Turkey that has considerably contributed to UN police task force in the framework of operations for providing peace and prosperity in the international arena and for supporting the objectives of the United Nations (UN), have been increasingly continuing. In UN Peacekeeping Operations, Turkish police have been deployed in places such as: Kosovo (UNMIK), Liberia (UNMIL), Congo D.R. (MONUC), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), East Timor (UNMISET), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Burundi (ONUB) and the UN New York HQ. Turkey has been one of the major contributors in this field, as of October 2004. After Jordan and the USA, Turkey ranks third as the country presently providing the most police officers for peace operations.

While Turkey was in fifth place among Police Force Contributing States according to data of March 2004, she has been raised to the third place according to data of October 2004, with a total of 334 police officers effectively participating in different missions. Turkey has assigned 643 officers since 1995, mainly in the Balkans. Turkey is also a participating country in the EU Police mission in Bosnia Herzegovina and Macedonia. This indicates that Turkey attaches a growing importance to the civilian components of international peacekeeping operations. Indeed this is important, because the nature of international peacekeeping operations is changing now, these operations include more civilian aspects, in comparison with operations of the past which were essentially built upon military peace efforts.

The task and role of the police should be strengthened, in view of the fact that new concepts of threats and risks create the necessity for new approaches, and a broader look at international efforts to find solutions to those threats and risks. In Turkey, police officers are recruited for permanent duties. Their training is undertaken by the Police College, High Schools and Academy. Following the completion of the educational period, police officers are classified into specialized branches, and assigned to work in different parts of the country. Turkey has a wide range of programmes to train both Turkish and foreign police personnel and has further developed new training programmes. In this case, it is worthwhile to note that a recent seminar on Peacekeeping Operations was held in Istanbul on 9 16 June 2004 under the title of UNTAT. Furthermore, on the eve of each peacekeeping operation, pre-deployment seminars are organized in order to present to the assigned personnel the content of the operational mission, the conditions of the host country and all other information with regard to their tasks. In order to contribute to regional and global peace, to improve their cooperation

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with other countries police agencies, and to have a mutual exchange of information, the Turkish Police Academy also gives training opportunities aimed at improving the skills and professional standard of future foreign policemen, in the context of a framework of bilateral agreements with their countries. For the period between 1991 and 2005, 706 foreign students from 14 countries have been registered in the Turkish Police Academy and to date, 408 students have graduated and 209 students are still continuing their education.

The skills acquired by foreign police officers in the Turkish Police Academy provide them with valuable professional qualifications and a common professional understanding which might be used fruitfully during different types of peace operations if their respective countries participate. Furthermore in the Turkish International Academy for Fighting against Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking, established by the contributions of the UN, a variety of seminars are organized for both Turkish and foreign police functionaries.

I would like also to share with you our experience with the Turkish gendarmerie. The Turkish gendarmerie is a very specific security force which resembles both the military in its basic structure, conscription, training and operational capability as well as the Turkish National Police Force in its attributions, its field of activities and further specialized training conceived for its public order functions. Despite its military character, it is unique because it is administered by the Ministry of the Interior. The gendarmerie is in charge of rural areas, and the police in urban, suburban and metropolitan areas. Gendarmerie officials are in fact military officers and the conscripts are serving in the same way as those who undergo compulsory military service.

In summary, the internal security of the country is coordinated at the level of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and both these security institutions (police and gendarmerie) are attached to this Ministry, which is a civilian body. We are ready to share this experience with you. During peace operations, the need for police units with military structures has become increasingly more apparent. On the one hand, the Turkish gendarmerie units have the advantage that they can be deployed rapidly due to their military structure and they can perform specialized missions involving disciplined group actions because of their military capability and equipment. On the other hand, those same gendarmerie units are essentially capable of carrying out law enforcement agency functions, such as intelligence gathering, investigating cases, providing links between incidents and individuals, preparing cases for court hearings and assisting in immobilization of terrorist organizations. The Turkish gendarmerie has contributed so far to the missions established in Hebron in Israel (UNTIPH), in Kosovo (NATO’s KFOR), in Bosnia Herzegovina (SFOR) and in Afghanistan (ISAF).

Lastly I wish to give the main ideas arising from the lessons learned from the exercises carried out by the Turkish authorities during many peace operations.

1. In order to encourage participation of countries in peace operations, it is necessary to establish structures which provide transparency and participatory policy, encompassing recruitment, planning and management of operations. In this field there is a different system between the leading organizations such as UN, OSCE, and the EU. The UN system is the most transparent and easiest one to work with, cooperation starts from the very earliest stage of planning and it gives power and responsibility to national organizations to nominate and select candidates with the help of UNDPKO.

In this field, there is a need for harmonizing work between the different systems of the
leading international organizations. One of the most appropriate solutions to this end may be to consider the establishment of an ad hoc committee, formed by the contributing countries, which can cooperate equally with the structures of leading organizations for all aspects of peace operations from the beginning to the end of the mission. The appointment of candidates to senior positions in the field and at headquarters should reflect the respective level of contributions of the countries involved. Human Resources Management sections should work closely with national institutions for the nomination and selection of personnel. There should be a time limit given for the length of service in international posts, especially seconded posts, which are not career building posts.

2. It is important to have doctrinal and procedural convergence, interoperability and a set of minimum standards required by a common operation, both among the countries that provide stability police and among the international organizations that use them. To this end, there is a need for cooperation among the countries doctrine centers, training facilities and headquarters and among the leading organizations.

3. There is a crucial need for cooperation between military and Civpol components during peace operation missions. Military and police forces having complimentary skills have had to cooperate more closely in their home countries to meet the needs of peace operations which are of a multi dimensional nature, requiring the capabilities and functions of both military and Civpol units.
TRAINING AND EDUCATION OF THE UN PERSONNEL

Beyhan UGSUZ

Turkish National Police

Overview and Background

United Nations Civilian Police (CIVPOL) plays a crucial role in UN peacekeeping operations and Turkey is a major contributor country with her civilian police forces to the international policing missions all around the world, especially in Balkan’s area.

For the time being, there are 17 peacekeeping operations taking place on the field. Their primary objective of these missions is to help to implement the rule of law in the conflict area. An insecure mission field will most likely prevent the peace building process.

Turkish police has wide range of experience on peacekeeping operations in conflict areas like in Bosnia and Kosovo. For example, since 1999 Turkey has granted to deploy 523 police officers to UNMIK which are involved in many fields of UN Civilian Police such as training, investigation, community policing and operation. Those officers had remarkable contribution to peacekeeping operations. 523 police officers have been assigned 987 positions which also indicate that each officer has worked for at least two assignments

CIVPOL’s presence promotes peace and stability in areas recovering from conflict and their efforts to develop modern, democratic police forces help to ensure that peace and stability can be sustained, even after international peacekeepers depart. Civilian Police Officers currently participate 13 peacekeeping operations around the world. Everyday, more than 7000 police officers from 80 countries go on patrol, provide training, advise local police services, help to ensure compliance with human rights standards and assist in a wide range of
other fields. The new peacekeeping operation requires more civilian involvement to complete these kinds of tasks. This necessity has especially seen with regard to civilian police because it has a distinct advantage to maintain law and security when compared to military. It is quite important for UN to have well-trained civilian police forces that can effectively enforce law and order in the mission area.

**The Standardized Training Modules (STM)**

To achieve good level of service quality in the field, “The Standardized Training Modules” (STMs) are prepared by UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) as a resource for national trainers to use in their training programs which prepares the personnel for deployment in United Nations peace keeping operations. This material is found very useful and efficient.

DPKO Training policy is to specify training arrangements for UN peace keeping operations. It also includes the DPKO training issues stemming from the Secretary-General executive functions as chief administrative officer. Vital to complex peace operations is the integration of diverse capacities assembled in missions to achieve operational cohesion on the ground. The focus of training is on operational results that supports post-conflict transition.

Background to integration of training is in response to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations declared that (A/59/19/Rev.1/III.M) “…the Department proceeds to form a single multidisciplinary training service…” This service is responsible for the Identification, Organization, Development, Implementation and Evaluation of the training for all categories of the DPKO personnel.

Integrated Training Service (ITS) responsibility is to develop and disseminate standardized UN peacekeeping guidance. The aim of the ITS is to inform Member States delegates of the current status of the ITS Standardized Training Material for the Specialist (STM 2) and to acquaint delegates with the Senior Mission Leaders process (STM 3), in order to encourage Member States to adopt the STM material and therefore improve the performance of troops, police and mission leaders deployed on peacekeeping operations.

ITS optimises peace operations training and evaluation for Member States and missions, and in partnership with the UN system, through: recognition of standardized training, mission training for rapid deployment, pre-deployment, and in-mission and knowledge fusion on training for peace operations.

ITS specifies standard courses and modules for recognized training by Member States and regional organizations and reach out to emerging contributing countries and assist in gaining training recognition. And also they train headquarters, mission training cells and contingents for pre-deployment to missions.

Integrated Training Service is fuse for knowledge from Member States, regional and peacekeeping training organisations, UN committees and the community of practice, and share information and documents by providing access to databases via its Web site and publications.
The STM’s have been developed by over 70 Member States with UN Agencies, UN Missions and NGOs. All contributors represent many years of peacekeeping experience and all regions had equal input into their development.

From beginning to end of STM training, if we consider an officer as input, at the end of this training output will be the Trained UN Officer.

Module consist of 3 major components;
1- Standard Generic Training Modules,
2- Specialized Training Module for both specialist and Senior Mission Leaders
3- Mission Specific Pre-deployment training.

STM can be used all staged of training both pre-deployment phase and in missions. The Standardized Generic Training Modules (SGTMs) form a library of basic training materials and are published as a resource for national trainers in preparing personnel for deployment in United Nations peace keeping operations. The subject matter of the SGTMs represents the basic corpus of information deemed essential knowledge for United Nations peacekeepers that begin first tour of their duty. The content of each module is generic coverage of a topic that is standardized or presented uniformly for all.

The SGTMs can also be used for in-mission training, although additional mission-specific content would normally be required. The trainer should identify mission-specific issues and devote extra time to the special information requirements of the mission. The trainer should consult senior management at the mission for such material to complement the presentation. National training materials available at the mission location may also yield important inputs.

STM 2 intends to support the enhancement of Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCCs and PCCs) abilities for participation in UN PKOs through the development and provision of standardized training material for specific categories of personnel.

As an example, the outline of Module for Specialist Military and Police Officers Common Training is presented below:

- Target Audience:
  - Military and Police key personnel
- Aim is:
  - To provide guidance on the most common and overarching activities, duties, tasks and skills to perform while working in the UN environment
- Learning Outcome:
  - To increase officer’s capabilities to carry out duties within the UN Peacekeeping mission

**Situation in Turkey**
(Requirements, selection process and training of the peacekeepers in Turkey.)

90 percent of our selected police officers have university degree and there is no educational incapability in Turkey. UN and Turkish National Police Authorities apply their selection criteria to deploy Police officers to UN missions. There are 10 selection criteria to be deployed to a UN mission for Turkish Police Officers:
1. To have 5 years of work experience on active police duty
2. (To have minimum score of 40 points at KPDS) (Turkish Civil Servant Language Examination).
3. (Not to have a serious disciplinary punishment and not to be subject to internal and criminal investigation)
4. To take permission of the Director of City Police Department or Head of Department
5. To work in Turkey at least for a half period of his/her previous abroad work if exists
6. To pass English examination by having at least 60 scores from each part (Reading Comprehension, Listening, Report Writing on Police Matters, Oral Interview) done by UN officials.
7. To pass shooting examination.
8. To pass driving test
9. To have good condition of health and to document his/her health condition that is suitable for UN missions
10. Not to have a serious disciplinary punishment in UN system if they served in UN Missions previously.

After the selection process, 5 days pre-deployment training is held by Turkish Police Trainers for those who pass the examination in order to prepare them to mission environments.

In order to attend the pre-deployment training, participants should have all the requirements to be peacekeepers and already passed the SAT exam. Training materials based on “The Standardized Generic Training Modules” (SGTMs) prepared by DPKO and our national training documents.

Mission experienced and qualified officers are selected as an Instructor and Specialists from Ministry of Foreign Affairs also participate in this training. Curriculum consists of a number of lessons such as UN System, UN Peace Keeping Operations, Human Rights, Cultural Awareness, General Information about Mission Areas (history, culture, risks), Stress Management, Attitudes and Behaviour, Code of Conduct, Prevention of Sexual exploitation and abuse, Personnel Security etc.

Turkish National Police believe that UN has to establish a new cell in the ITS consists of professional peacekeeper trainers, and they have to be involved in all kind of regional training partnership activities together with local authorities which are held in the contributor countries.

Finally, CIVPOL missions as integral part of peace operations, requires well trained, skilled and experienced officers from countries for each stage of the mission. Turkey has always showed her willingness and support in providing qualified personnel to the peace keeping operations.

While helping local people and police to build rule of law in a mission area, Turkish officers have also found opportunity to be benefited from new experiences of a multi-national organization.
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES
In the modern international system, the armed forces usually function as an instrument of the territorial state. They are formed, paid for, and utilized in the name of the state’s security. In this context, security means primarily sufficient military strength in order to deter any possible aggressor from penetrating the state’s territory or to defend the territory in case of an attack from the outside. This defensive role has been complemented by an offensive role: Armed forces have been used in order to expand the political and economic weight of a state and to gain or exercise regional hegemony. Throughout the 20th century, the offensive function has by and by lost its legitimacy. This did not and does not impede the offensive use of organized violence in different forms, by different actors (many non-state actors among them), and with different political (or other) motives and goals.

We can call these two main functions of the armed forces traditional functions. These functions converge in the capacity of waging war. The organization of the armed forces, their structure, strategic doctrines, and tactics, their armament and equipment changed considerably over the last centuries. One cornerstone of the perception of the military and the military self-perception has remained unchanged: Armed forces are created and sustained in order to fight, to go to war. They strive for victory in the name and interest of the state (nation state or multinational state) to which they have pledged their allegiance.
During the years of the East-West conflict and with a special dynamism after the end of that bipolar international system, other forms of organized violence occurred. The process of globalisation decreased the role of the state. According to some observers, the transformation of the international system also causes a “transformation of war” (van Creveld, 1991). The notion of sovereignty is losing some of its former relevance. In some areas of the world, governments are proving themselves less and less capable of running their state. Failing states are becoming a security problem not only for their inhabitants. Local conflicts and wars are developing a considerable spillover effect into the zones of peaceful everyday-life elsewhere. In short, local wars always have a global dimension.

In order to prevent the negative effects and to contain local violence, the international community has developed some concepts of humanitarian intervention, peacemaking, and peacekeeping missions. These missions usually comprise civil and military elements. With regard to the long history of warfare and military actions, the roles of the military in such missions are not completely new, but they are in many respects different from the military roles we usually think of when dealing with modern armed forces. This is of special relevance for the North Atlantic theatre of the East-West conflict after 1945.

The armed forces of the states in this area (some of them number among the leading actors in the international system) are thus dismissing part of their traditional functions and missions. They are challenged by the necessity to take over new and non-traditional functions and missions. This concerns not only the armed forces of the great and middle powers but also those of smaller states which are trying to redefine their place in the international order in an affirmative and constructive way.

In this paper, I shall first look more closely at the ongoing political and academic debates about the changing nature of war and the consequences of this development for the armed forces, mainly in the Western world. The second part is dedicated to one of the new and non-traditional function of the military, the reconstruction of liveable socio-political structures after the more or less successful de-escalation of a local conflict by the armed forces of a multinational coalition. My main focus here is on the provincial reconstruction teams in which the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, are involved.

1. The Transformation Debate
1.1 Political Framework

Before looking more deeply into the consequences of the new or at least recently re-emphasized changes in military affairs, it is useful to think about the structural changes in the sphere of politics. The range of missions for the armed forces are determined by the political system of a state or by the political head of a non-state actor. Even in conflicts where paramilitary and private actors prevail, the classic observation by Clausewitz (1989, p. 605) “that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means”, has not become obsolete.

In nearly most cases, the organized use of force fulfils political goals or goals, which can be easily translated into political goals. These goals differ according to the historic, geographic, and cultural context. Societies, organized as states, and the international system are two principal sources of change in the military, the third one being, of course, military technology.
The nature of politics has certainly not changed. However, this is probably the only stable continuity we can build upon, as all three of the principal factors of change in the military have, indeed, changed themselves. Military technology has rapidly advanced over the past decades. The end of the East-West conflict is more than just the end of one specific conflict between great powers and their respective alliances. It is the beginning of a post-modern interlude in world politics. The current international system is different from the bipolar system we lived in during the second half of the 20th century. The number of actors, as well as the number of categories of actors in the international system has grown considerably. States seem to be losing a certain part of their structural strength in politics.

In order to have a name for these dramatic changes, some scholars of International Relations use the term “end of the Westphalian system”. This system developed in Europe in the 17th century. At its core is the sovereign state, defined by territory, borders, population, and internal order. The state has the monopoly on legal physical violence and is, among other things, responsible for law making, the settlement of disputes, and law enforcement. The international system is mainly an inter-state system. It is anarchical insofar as there are no political authorities above the state. States can rely on their power and on their leaders’ ability to make rational use of it. The national interests of states dominate international politics and the methods of best realizing these interests. Conflicts between states are settled by power either in a diplomatic or, if regarded as effective and comparatively cheap, in a military way.

The actors’ attempts to mutually balance their power, political and military alliances to provide for collective defence, and a minimalist set of binding rules for the behaviour of states characterize the Westphalian system.

The principles of this modern state system have frequently been disregarded in the centuries following the peace treaty of Münster and Osnabrück in 1648. Still, it makes sense to analyse the expansion of this system from Europe all over the globe with the help of this model.

During this century, however, the structures and principles of the globalizing Westphalian system changed deeply. Towards its end, the key pillars of the Westphalian system seem to be cracking. The main reason for this development is the growing difficulty of (most) states to effectively organize their societies, to remain the central institution of their citizens’ loyalty, and to provide sufficient protection against risks and threats from beyond the borders. National economies are becoming more and more interdependent which diminishes the ability of a state bureaucracy to plan and implement a national economic policy. Ecological problems can only be dealt with on a macro-regional or global scale: states as single actors are mostly incapable of ecological problem solving.

This development comprises optimistic and pessimistic aspects. A bleak outlook into the future stresses the anarchical and disorderly features of the current international system, where violence remains a most important ingredient of power (Kaplan 2000). On the other hand, optimists among political science experts point to the wave of democratisation after the end of the East-West conflict. They claim that democratic societies would have serious problems mobilizing their citizens for the purpose of waging war if the military enemy were also a democratic society. They conclude that the risk of war among authentic democracies is close to zero.
Even if it is still too early for the assumption of a universally valid ‘law’ of democratic peace (Russett 1993) it is hardly contestable that inside some macro-regions of the planet (like North America since the 19th century or Western Europe since the end of World War II) inter-state war is no longer a meaningful political option for policymakers.

This is, however, only part of the overall assessment of future violence. In some regions, organized violence and war will accompany humankind into the next millennium. Even in Europe, border conflicts and inter-ethnic wars continue to occur. On some continents, internal wars have become quite ‘normal’, as have military coups and periods of military dictatorships.

1.2 New Wars

In his historic overview on the development of war in modern times, Kalevi Holsti (1996) distinguishes three kinds of war. Institutionalized war occurred in the 18th century between the states of the expanding European international system and was a rather domesticated, highly professional form of war. Then, with the French Revolution, the flush of victory of nationalism as the most forceful mobilizing ideology for modernizing societies began. One of the consequences of this development was the formation of mass armed forces. Wars between mass armed forces developed the tendency to become total wars, a term already used by Clausewitz, albeit with a quite different meaning. The first half of the 20th century witnessed two world wars, which represent the terrible climax of this development. The second half of this century is characterized by the rise of yet another form of war, called “peoples war” or “wars of a third kind”. These wars are also total wars in a certain sense, but on a restricted level. The indigenous people fought the liberation wars of the decolonisation era in order to create a political community against the colonial power.

The purpose of such wars is often to politicise the masses, to turn them into good revolutionaries and/or nationalists. Civilians not only become major targets of operations, but their transformation into a new type of individual becomes a major purpose of war. Since the distinction between combatant and civilian is blurred or indistinct, it is not surprising that the brunt of casualties are suffered by the inhabitants of villages, towns, and cities. (Holsti, 1996, p.39)

This typology is certainly helpful, not so much because it offers clear distinctions, but because it makes us aware of the hidden continuities between these forms of war. We ought not forget, for example, that not only the decolonisation era saw many wars of the third kind as described by Holst. Some centuries before, the colonial wars of the European powers in the Americas, Africa, and Asia displayed similar features (and similar cruelties).

In an attempt to give an overview of the various names and concepts of the military conflicts that fall into this “third kind”, Roger Beaumont (1995) lists among others: dirty war, guerrilla war, insurgency/counterinsurgency, limited war, proxy war, surrogate war, and low-intensity operations. These wars are, to a large degree, intrastate conflicts between comparatively weak governments and comparatively strong opponents, and they are, indeed, predominantly small wars. They may, however, easily escalate into major threats for third parties, in either the neighbourhood or elsewhere.

Small wars are usually local wars. Territorial control plays an important role in these wars, but mainly on the level of official war aims and the motivation to fight. The fighting
itself can be transferred into other regions, e.g. into the urbanized parts of the world. There are enough examples, which illustrate this horizontal escalation such as the struggle between radical Kurds and Turks in Germany and acts of terrorism in Western Europe in the 1970s etc.

The literature on guerrilla warfare of the past few decades provides a vast array of empirical material to study their tactics and strategy. They combine primitive warfare and cruelty with high-tech sophistication and hyper-modern propaganda. Their intensity ranges from sporadic terrorism to secretly prepared genocide.

The current discussion about war in the post East-West conflict era is structured around the notion of “new wars” (Kaldor, 200; Münkler, 2002; Herberg-Rothe, 2003). Some features of the new military missions, like fighting insurgents (stability operations), have a tradition of their own. They formed a less visible but always present part of conventional modern warfare. There are, indeed, many similarities between guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare in the decolonisation era of the 20th century and today’s “new wars”. However, the different political framework and the so-called “revolution in military affairs” are demanding “fundamentally new military doctrines and organizations” (Sloan, 2002, p.16.)

A different political framework is of salient importance for the shaping of the “new wars”. This is important to note in order to remain sensitive to the impact of political factors on the outbreak, the waging, and eventually the de-escalation of those violent conflicts that fall into the category of “new wars”. They originate in zones with weak or failing states. Holsti (1996, p. 40) argues that they will continue into the future because in many parts of the world states are not strong enough to successfully monopolize the means of organised physical violence. The conflicts in question do not become militarized because of the strength of a state, but because of its instability and weakness. When a state is unable to integrate the interests of different groups, when it lacks the ability to contain internal tensions and to sustain law and order, the consequence may well be the outbreak of internal clashes and civil wars.

Mary Kaldor (2000) insists on the category of “new wars” because wars like those in former Yugoslavia or in many parts of Africa are distinctively different from “old wars” with regard to their goals, the usage of violence, and their financing. Ideological and geopolitical confrontations are less important than the clash of collective identities. This implies a fight against every single member of the other ethnic, religious or otherwise defined group. Forced migration, mass violation, ethnic cleansing, and genocide belong to the methods of violence in such new wars. Financial resources for the participants of such wars come from different sources – a considerable part through a symbiosis of the war fighting groups with organized crimes (drug trafficking, smuggling, kidnapping, prostitution).

Herfried Münkler (2002; 2003) regards asymmetry as one of the salient features of the new wars. Asymmetric warfare is not a completely new phenomenon. “In a sense, all warfare is asymmetrical as there are never identical belligerents” (Pfanner, 2005, p. 151). In today’s world, the differences between belligerents are more dramatic than ever before. The U.S.A. dispose of a high tech military which can be rapidly deployed all over the planet. In recent wars in Africa and on other continents, the decisive factor was not high tech weapons, but second-hand small arms. Acts of terrorism have become an integral part of asymmetric warfare. As Münkler (2003, p. 9) states, greater material resources and a more advanced technological development alone will not automatically tip the scale between victory and defeat. The militaries of the rich Western countries may be the winner in an open battle (like
the U.S.A., which won the Gulf war in 2003 without much resistance from the Iraqi troops). The fundamental aim of asymmetric warfare “is to find a way round the adversary’s military strength by discovering and exploiting, in the extreme, its weaknesses (Pfanner, 2005, p. 151).

The main weakness of complex societies is their infrastructure. Striking against non-military targets often causes spectacular damage. The “new wars” at the fringes of the Western world are comparatively cheap for those who wage them.

Most of these wars are not fought by well-equipped armies but by the hastily recruited militias of tribal chiefs or heads of clans, plus the armed followers of warlords and the like. Above all, the weapons used in the new wars are cheap – small arms, automatic rifles, anti-personnel mines and machine guns mounted on pick-up trucks. Heavy weapons are only rarely used and, when they are, consist mostly of remnants from the stockpiles of the Cold War. That wars of this type can be fought – and even fought successfully – is mainly due to the fact that they are not decided on the battlefield between two armies but drag on interminably in violence directed against the civilian population. (Münkler, 2003, p.15)

A second salient feature of new wars is their partial privatisation. The emergence of warlords and their privately recruited militaries (often including child soldiers) in zones with failing or failed states is no surprise but a logic consequence. The war economies in these zones are able to tap into the flows of capital and goods in the world market. “Apart from oil and strategic raw materials such as ores and minerals, gold and diamonds, the warlords use above all illegal or fraudulently certified goods to finance their wars and frequently to accumulate enormous fortunes.” (Münkler, 2003, p.17)

1.3. Revolutions in Security Affairs

It is quite normal today, to use the terms ‘revolution’ and ‘revolutionary’ with regard to current changes in warfare. We should be aware that these terms have two different (although not mutually excluding) meanings. Generally, they characterize the enormous technological developments in military technology, like in “revolution in military affairs” (RMD). However, they also refer to strategic, operational and tactic innovations in two quite different political frameworks: first, the anti-colonial wars of the mid-20th century within the East-West conflict (see, among other: Beaufre 1972) and secondly in the turbulent post-East-West conflict era.

Until 1990, the threat perceptions of Western countries had been dominated for more than four decades by the anticipation of a nuclear and/or a non-nuclear (conventional) aggression from the Soviet Union and its allies. Even the decolonisation wars in Africa and Asia were always connected with the main threat of a Soviet or communist inspired aggression. Within this political framework, a first revolution in security affairs occurred. The rapid development of nuclear weapons and carrier systems with a global reach brought about a kind of strategic stalemate. After the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the nuclear ‘superpowers’ U.S.A. and Soviet Union built their defence against each other on the concept of mutually assured destruction. Nuclear peace was an uneasy phenomenon, but it seems to have worked. The main task of the protagonists of the East-West conflict’s armed forces was to demonstrate a credible deterrence. In the case of deterrence failing, NATO troops in Western Europe had the mission to defend the territory against the aggressor. The capacity to do so, however, was necessary in order to make deterrence more credible. The virtualisation of war in Europe and between the ‘superpowers’ was a first and rather dramatic revolution in security matters for it
guided the adversaries towards a kind of antagonistic co-operation – as expressed in a whole range of arms control agreements from the 1960s to 1990.

In this period, the armed forces of the Western countries became more of a bureaucratized organization, and military leadership implied more managerial skills than in the past. Before the East-West conflict was about to enter its last phase, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Charles Moskos (1981, p. 11) stated bluntly: “In short, the military profession as a whole has become similar to large bureaucratic, non-military institutions. It has, in effect, become civilianised.” In the same year, Michel Martin (1981) described the development of the French military establishment since 1945 as a passage from “warriors to managers”.

This trend was sustained by technological change, as well as by the intricate nuclear strategic “balance of terror”. Underneath the nuclear level, the armed forces of many Western countries (although not all of them – the German Bundeswehr being the most prominent exception) were engaged in wars. Most of these wars were a mixture of guerrilla war and conventional war. For these wars, the armed forces needed warriors more urgently than managers.

At the same time, the international community started to regard the containment of violence in local or regional conflicts as a high-priority goal – not in all cases, but in those where violence appeared to be especially dangerous for the neighbouring countries or especially evil.

In the 1950s, the United Nations developed the instrument of international peacekeeping.

A peacekeeping force consists of “military components from various nations, operating under the command of an impartial world body and committed to the absolute minimum use of force, which seek to reduce or prevent armed hostilities. The more generic term peacekeeping operations includes not only peacekeeping military forces but also such diverse and usually smaller peacekeeping enterprises as observer groups, truce commissions, investigatory missions, and the like. The peace soldier is, therefore, one who serves in a military capacity under a command authorized by an internationally accepted mandate and who adheres to impartiality while subscribing to the strictest standards of absolute minimal force functionally related to self-defense. (Moskos, Jr., 1976, p. 4)

These are definitions of the traditional kind of peacekeeping. During the East-West conflict, the Security Council of the United Nations initiated a whole range of what we now call traditional peacekeeping operations. Moskos Jr. who had looked more closely into UNFICYP peacekeeping operations contended the necessity of special training for peacekeeping soldiers. “Contemporary standards of military professionalism must undergo fundamental redefinition to meet the requirements of the peacekeeping role” (Moskos Jr., 1976, p.10). This role implied a neutral and status quo oriented stand by the military. “The interposition of UN forces came only after the belligerents had separated of their own accord” (Hillen, 2000, p. 86).

A famous saying, attributed to Dag Hammerskjöld and to Charles Moskos, stated that peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it. The peacekeeping role combined the traditional image of the soldier as warrior with the non-traditional image of the soldier as a constable. Under the auspices of the East-West conflict, peacekeeping was mainly a business for smaller and middle powers, neutral and non-aligned countries or countries (like
Canada, for instance) which developed a generally acclaimed political preference for mediation and brokerage in international politics.

After the end of the East-West conflict, the nuclear balance of terror ceased to be a point of reference for the maintenance of armed forces. In addition, grand scale conventional warfare between big powers or alliances became quite an unlikely scenario. Instead, small wars with different degrees of asymmetry and of different intensity, peacekeeping, and a whole range of military missions other than war fighting seemed to occupy the fantasy of the military planners. The enormous pace of the military technological development in some countries, mainly of course, the United States, generated a revolution in military affairs. The increasing demand for military intervention in nasty fringe wars (from Somalia to Bosnia, from Rwanda to Chechnya, from East Timor to Haiti) and the unprecedented growth of international terrorism generated a revolution in the perception of security.

Both processes had and continue to have a remarkable impact on strategic, operational, and even tactic thinking in the military. An impressive reflection of this most recent revolution in security affairs can be found in the official security strategies of the United States and the European Union.

1.4 The Security Sector and Military Transformation

This document reflects clearly the structural change in the international system. It is based on a more comprehensive approach to security and security policy. One of its implications is the necessity to redefine the functions and structure of the security sector and especially the armed forces. This necessity is, with a different emphasis, also present in the often-quoted September 2002 National Security Strategy of the U.S.A.

The term “security sector” is comparatively new in the security discourse. Experts in security sector reform use it either in a broader or in a more limited sense. The latter definition comprises armed organizations like the regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, police forces, and the intelligence agencies. The broader definition widens the scope and integrates private security firms, other non-governmental actors with certain interests in security matters, and even the judiciary in the security sector (see: Edmunds, 2003, p.15).

Security sector reform refers mostly to post-communist countries and those of the former Third world, which undergo a transition process and want to democratise. A well functioning democracy is hardly thinkable without successful democratic control of the armed forces and other security agencies. The complex transition process should be based on a comprehensive security approach. The necessity of a comprehensive approach does not only stem from political factors. The impact of economic and cultural globalisation, the re-emergence of ethnic and religious militancy, international terrorism, in short the very nature of the new threats and risks demand a thorough security sector reform not only in new democracies, but also in the well-established Western democratic societies.

For the Americans, the Somali intervention in the early 1990s, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the 2003 Gulf war against the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein are painful
examples for the problems the stronger military party will meet without a well-adapted security sector.

In the information age, it’s not just smart weapons that win wars. It’s the total package – the total information picture that is important. Even with long-range precision weapons, you still need a network that gets you inside your opponent’s decision cycle. Aidid beat the Army in Mogadishu and Al Qaeda bet the Navy in Yemen because, in both cases, they had better information about us than we had about them – exactly the same situation that existed on September 11, 2001. (Berkowitz, 2003, p. 117)

These are also telling examples for the necessity to adopt a comprehensive approach to the political, economic, social, religious, and security aspects of the country, where the intervention takes place in the name of democratization and disarmament.

In the future, the armed forces of the Western countries will often be engaged in new missions. They will have to create peace between civil war parties. They will control truces in traditional peacekeeping missions, but they will also have to protect the population against attacks by insurgents in robust or strategic peacekeeping missions. They will have to fight the troops of ruthless warlords in the name of the international community.

These new missions in violent conflicts and new wars demand, with special pressure, a cautious redefinition of the functions, mental and physical condition, range of capacities, and, last but not least, of the professional self-perception of the soldiers serving in the armed forces. The catchword for this process in Western armed forces is transformation. Transformation of the security sector is complex and far from approaching its end.

1.5 New Missions

The changes in the ways to wage war and the enlargement of the concept of security have led to new security strategies with a new canon of security threats and risks. The response to these new threats and risks is partly a military one, partly a civil one. In order to prevent and contain the horizontal escalation of conflicts and crises, the international community introduced crisis response operations (CRO).

This kind of military human intervention has had many different names in the past decade. It is part of an international crisis management, which is mainly, but not only organized in the framework of the United Nations. NATO uses now the term crisis response operations instead of the older term peace support operations (PSO).

There are many slightly different definitions of PSO in related literature. A representative example is the 1997 definition by the Swedish armed forces:

PSO is the military term used to cover both peacekeeping (PK) and peace enforcement (PE) operations. PSO differ from war in that they are complex operations that do not have a designated enemy but are designed as part of a composite approach involving diplomatic and generally humanitarian agencies to achieve a long-term peace settlement. Military activities in PSO will be, without exception, part of a wider strategy in support of political goals. (Schmidseder, 2003, p. 26)

A 1999 definition in the British Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 is a little broader:
PSO was a term first used by the military to cover peacekeeping (PK) and peace enforcement (PE) operations, but is now used more widely to embrace not only PK and PE but also those other peace related operations, for example, conflict prevention, peace making, peace building, and humanitarian operations, which are principally the preserve of civilian agencies.

PSO are increasingly in response to complex intra-state conflicts involving widespread human rights violations as opposed to more traditional PK, which was generally conducted in the aftermath of an inter-state conflict or war. (Schmidseher, 2003, p. 27)

Instead of PSO, the United States used in their manuals and directives the term military operations other than war (MOOTW).

NATO differentiates between six kinds of PSO or CRO:
- conflict prevention (CP): preventive deployment, early warning, surveillance, sanctions and embargoes, non-combatant evacuation operations;
- peacemaking (PM): mainly diplomatic activities like good offices, mediation, conciliation, diplomatic pressures;
- peacekeeping (PK): observation, interposition force, transition assistance, arms control;
- peace enforcement (PE): enforcing sanctions and embargoes, protection of humanitarian operations, establishment and enforcing of no-fly-zones, establishing and protecting safe areas or exclusion zones;
- peace-building (PB): military aid to civil authorities, assistance to refugees or displaced persons;
- humanitarian operations (HUMOPS): humanitarian aid, disaster relief, protection if human rights.

These operations are not always, but mostly ‘operations other than war’. However, even when they include fighting, they are categorically different from traditional war fighting operations. This is the reason why these new missions demand a new profile and a renewed professional self-understanding of the soldier.

2. Peace-Building and the Military

The ‘Defence Policy Guidelines’ of May 21, 2003 by the German Defence Minister is currently the most authoritative document describing the goals for the missions and structures of the Bundeswehr. This document re-affirms that the concept of security of the German government is multi-dimensional and comprises civilian and military components. It also emphasises the changing nature of the threats to Germany’s security that calls for a security and defence policy that is geared toward the prevention and containment of crises and conflicts. Here are some key statements of the document:

- The Bundeswehr focuses on operations in the context of conflict prevention and crisis management as well as in support of allies, also beyond NATO territory…

- Multinational preventive security measures are one of the basic factors determining German defence policy. With the exception of evacuation and rescue missions, the Bundeswehr will conduct armed operations only together with allies and partners in a UN, NATO and EU context.
- Traditional national defence against a conventional attack, which previously solely determined the structures of the Bundeswehr, no longer corresponds with the actual security policy requirements. The capabilities that had been kept available solely for this purpose are no longer required. However, it must be ensured that the ability to conduct national defence operations against a conventional attack can be reconstituted within a foreseeable, albeit prolonged period of time.

- In view of the changed security situation, the tasks of the Bundeswehr will be reprioritised. In view of the new international environment, capabilities solely designed for traditional national defence against an adversary using conventional means are no longer needed.

- The Bundeswehr, as an instrument of a comprehensive and proactive security and defence policy,
  - safeguards the capacity for action in the field of foreign policy,
  - contributes to stability on a European and global scale,
  - ensures national security and defence and helps defend allies,
  - supports multinational cooperation and integration.

2.1 Risks after the De-Escalation of a Local Conflict

The usual but somewhat misleading term for the attempt to re-build a society with a suitable political order after the de-escalation of a violent conflict is post-conflict reconstruction Brzoska, 2006, pp.1-13). In fact, the manifest violence may have been stopped, but the conflict that has led to the outbreak of violence has certainly not evaporated after the de-escalation of the violence. Any reconstruction process is always threatened by the resurgence of violence. Brzoska (2006, p. 9) identifies six more imminent risks for post-conflict reconstruction processes: politicisation, militarization, ethnicization, informalism, corruption and favouritism, and lack of professionalism. Klingebiel and Roehder (2004, p. 6) argue that a closer co-operation of development policy agencies and the armed forces in post-conflict situations may enhances the possibility of mission creep when the armed forces take on a growing number of civil tasks on the ground. Civil-military co-operation is necessary, but it can be organized quite differently. Germany has a tradition of emphasizing the distance between civil and military actors in post-conflict situations like, e.g. Afghanistan. Other countries are more inclined to use civil-oriented development policy as a supportive instrument for strategic military goals.

2.2 Multinational Peace Operations (Survey)

The following table gives an impression of the broad range of missions with German participation. The current number of German soldiers participating in multinational missions in different parts of the globe amounts to 7560.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>Female soldiers</th>
<th>Reservists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Security Assistance ISAF in Afghanistan</td>
<td>2728</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo Force KFOR</td>
<td>3143</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union Force EUFOR in Bosnia &amp;</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herzegovina</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sudan UNMIS</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan AMIS</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in Georgia UNOMIG</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea UNMEE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom OEF</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Active Endeavour OAE in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand by troop for the air lift of injured soldiers STRATAIRMEDEVAC</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Support in Pakistan</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://bundeswehr.de (April 3, 2006)

The two most important missions - ISAF and KFOR – occur in typical post-conflict situations. The war is over, the violence is de-escalated, and the reconstruction phase is under way. In spite of this, the social and political fabric of the deeply wounded society is still very much impregnated by latent violence which may make itself manifest at any given moment.

Conclusion

Around the turn of the century, military sociologists debated what some of them called (to the chagrin of their colleagues) the postmodern military.

The Postmodern military is characterized by five major organizational changes. One is the increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, both structurally and culturally. The second is the diminution of differences within the armed services based on branch of service, rank, and combat versus support roles. The third is the change in the military purpose from fighting wars to missions that would not be considered military in the traditional sense. The forth change is that the military forces are used more in international missions authorized (or at least legitimated) by entities beyond the nation state. A final change is the internationalisation of military forces themselves. (Moskos, Williams, Segal, 2000, p. 2)

Postmodernity and/or postmodern features of current history were widely discussed in the 1990s. Today, this quasi-ironic perspective on the time we live in has somehow lost much of its aggressive freshness. In spite of this, the diagnoses of the authors Moskos, Williams and Segal which were collected in order to depict the changes in the organisation of the armed forces in such different countries as Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and, of course, the United States, converged. The political environment of the armed forces generated new challenges for them, and they had to respond by adapting their structures and skills to meet the new requirements.

The profile of the new soldier thus combines military and non-military competences:
- The armed forces will have to fulfil mainly functions of prevention, intervention, and restoration of order. Deterrence and traditional combat will not disappear. They will, however, become of secondary importance.

- Military intervention by third parties in a local conflict is the first step towards a reconciliation process. The ‘enemy’ is not to be defeated and destroyed, but his actions have to be stopped in order to prepare him for a kind of re-education.

- The motivation, and the moral and political basis of the soldier’s professionalism is no longer or not solely his or her allegiance to the nation state, but a kind of cosmopolitan perception of the necessity to defend human rights, prevent genocide and other atrocities, and to keep or enforce peace. To balance a strong military patriotism and a more cosmopolitan perspective is not always easy.

- As crisis response operations (CRO) are in nearly all cases a reaction of the international community, military units will have to get used to serve more and more in multinational frameworks (Kretchik, 2003).

- The military will no longer seek military victory. Instead, the soldiers will have to create and protect suitable conditions for comprehensive and stable peace settlements, which integrate former enemies.

- War criminals will have to be caught by the armed forces which will act as a police force. These individuals will be brought before an international criminal court and will be held personally responsible for their violations of the law.

- The soldiers are not allowed to think and behave according to purely military norms and rules. At least among the officer corps, a genuine ability to think in political and diplomatic terms will become part of their education and training.

- Flexibility and multi-functionality are becoming as important on the battlefield as fire and mobility.

- The armed forces will have to build up special forces against especially dangerous threats like terrorism by extremist groups and the their backers. Soldiers in these kinds of forces are, indeed, warriors. They will have to fight both on the level of sheer physical violence with ‘primitive’ weapons and on the level of a highly advanced network-centric warfare model (Berkowitz, 2003, p. 113).

- Military activities within CRO often overlap with paramilitary police activities. A certain constabularization of the military is probable.

- It is important to keep in mind that these elements of the armed forces’ functions do not replace their traditional missions (deterrence and defence) but complement them.

- The role of the classic “mud soldier” (Wilson, 1989) tends to be underestimated in the military establishment. In some militarys, a certain gap may develop between a spirit of strong commitment to the warrior aspects of the soldier’s role among the rank and file and
younger officers on the one side and more positive attitudes toward crisis response operations among the military establishment on the other (for the U. S. A. see: Rinaldo, 1996/97; Franke, 1997).

Do these elements form a coherent picture of the new military? Probably not. In military circles, there is no consensus about the weight of the different elements in the future role of the soldier.

New wars, new missions, new militaries – there are many valuable arguments which create a case for a deep structural change in the profession of arms. On the other hand, the closer we look into the empirical evidence presented by the various authors, the more we develop a slight scepticism. Edward Newman (2004) contended that the ‘new wars’ debate needs a historical perspective. The same is certainly true for the ‘new missions’ debate and the ‘new’ or ‘postmodern military’ debate.

Two strands of research seem to be especially necessary. First, we need some more and conclusive information on the impact of globalisation, the changing role of the state, and the emergence of sub-state violence markets on the concept of security. Secondly, we shall have to investigate the consequences of the strange process of asymmetrization of war and organized violence.

There is also the need for a third cluster of research. In most Western societies the relatively unproblematic balance of civil-military relations and the different ways of securing democratic control of the armed forces are perhaps endangered by a growing gap between civil society and the military. Will the armed forces of the future become a small, highly professionalized fringe group, the guardians of a society, which does not really care for them? This is not a probable scenario, but not unthinkable.

As the threats and risks of our security will continue to infringe on our everyday life, we should emphasize the possibilities of early warning, prevention, and early containment of violence. This is now a global task.

Bibliographical References


Abstract

This article evaluates the concept of security sector reform (SSR) with a special focus on United Nations (UN) peace operations. The issues that SSR raises are pertinent for the way the term security pursued in building peace during any peace operations. These issues which are related to main generic SSR areas are democratisation, post-conflict rehabilitation, good governance, individuals as a part of security, professionalisation of armed and security forces, internal and regional dimension of security, and socio-economic stability and development. It is argued that while the reform of security sectors along the lines of UN principles provides an important opportunity to improve regional peace and security, sustaining it requires an effective co-operation and co-ordination between international organisations. Consequently, this article also offers some recommendations for achieving a successful SSR as a part of conflict prevention and peace-building efforts.

Introduction

During the Cold War, the term security was conceived as a means of resolving disputes by fighting wars rather than a source of underdevelopment problems like absence of
democratic governance, politicisation of security institutions, human rights abuses and violation of the rule of law by security forces. With the end of the Cold War, the meaning of the concept of security has been broadened by moving from the military sector into more normative dimension of security studies. The pioneering work in this area is Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde’s Security – A New Framework for Analysis, which classifies security into five broad sectors: military, environmental, economic, societal, and political. This epistemological categorisation of different sectors of security is deriving from the alternative security analysis to traditional military analysis of security threats. The rapidly emerging alternative sectors of security studies have its roots in development, democracy, governance, and human rights studies. Therefore, it became increasingly visible in the 1990s that neither individuals nor the state they live in could achieve democratic consolidation, poverty reduction or sustainable development without producing adequate alternative security solutions to underdevelopment problems.

The UN peacekeeping operations were traditionally carried out on the basis of the consent of the parties, the impartiality of the peacekeepers, and non-use of force in most circumstances. Although these three key principles are still central to any UN peace operations, the way of approaching these principles has undergone some significant normative and ethical changes. While the role of UN peacekeepers during the Cold War was restricted to military, militias, and their superpower supporters in the expense of local democratic consolidation and sustainable economic development, peace operations after the 1990s began to focus on the interrelationship between development and security and that armed forces and police forces can play a significant role in the processes of democratisation and development. Therefore, one of the important tasks of UN peace operations is to provide an adequate and a stable security conditions by promoting to legitimate and democratically accountable security forces in order to achieve democratic consolidation and sustainable economic development. As an important part of any UN peace-building mission, SSR in theory and practice became the crux of all these relatively new developments in the post-Cold War era. To this end, it is important to understand the composition of the security sector as a whole and its significance for UN peace operations.

This article will first cover the definition and the growing significance of SSR in the sphere of good governance and its relevance to post-conflict peace-building peace operations. The second section will focus on seven main generic areas of SSR: democratisation, post-conflict rehabilitation, good governance, individuals as apart of security, professionalisation of armed and security forces, internal and regional dimension of security, and socio-economic stability and development. The third section will be devoted to recommendations in five main fields in which fulfilling them would lead to a robust SSR. Finally, the conclusion will sum up the foundations of SSR and its indispensable place in UN’s ‘modern’ peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building peace operations.

The Growing Significance of SSR in Peace-building

In view of the fact that the task of administering a territory during the post-conflict transitional stage is endowed to the UN with the Charter, the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) of the UN began to play key roles in building national capacities and supporting the role of civil society with the help of specialised UN agencies. UN peacekeeping forces have become increasingly involved in assisting, or even exercising, certain governmental functions in states, for example, in support of institution building
including judicial and legal systems, armed and police forces), disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) as well as in security sector reform (SSR).

The debate on SSR and its relevance to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace-and nation-building began a few years ago and gained high level attention with the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report of 2002. In this report, the UNDP makes a strong case for ‘democratising security to prevent conflict and build peace’ as well as stresses the crucial role of democratic control of the military, police, and other security forces for human development and human security. In the last decade, there has also been a growing awareness that building nations and states are key factors in the process of democratization especially questions concerning weak, contested and failed countries. In many parts of the world, such countries that aim to turn into ‘modern’ nations and ‘modern’ states (two overlapping, but different institutions), the process of nation-building and the construction of statehood are strongly influenced by the indigenous armed forces. However, neither theoretical nor practical conceptualisation of ‘the modern nation’ and ‘the modern state’ as monolithic and unchanging is unlimited when in most Western countries ‘the modern nation’ and ‘the modern state’ are more often multifaceted and continually evolving. While the financial aid in the Cold War was offered by wealthy countries of each block for the purpose of developing the military sector, the financial aid in the post-Cold War era is made conditional by democratic donor countries to developing the civilian sector during the nation- and state-building process in any post-conflict transitional society. In fact, more fundamental reforms in the security sector will usually not be possible until conflicts have been shifted from the military to civilian political authority and until basic institutional capacity in the area of planning and implementation of policy has been restored. Moreover, growing Western interest in conditionality has been further reinforced by the self-generated aspiration of many post-communist sates in central and Eastern Europe to first democratise their political, security, and economic establishments and then join to Western institutions especially NATO and the EU.

Even so, the dilemma in the nation-building process is about the choice of either investing in the military or the civilian sector. However, at the core of SSR is the concept of civilian security, democracy, good governance, and human rights that are closely related with the national political, economic and social development. The term ‘security’ in the SSR is defined by actors in the civilian sector as the democratic civilian control of state’s armed forces, which is putting civilian-centred security (civilian supremacy in law enforcement) above military-centred security (military supremacy in law enforcement). However, the officials in the UNDP argues that the term ‘security’ extends much beyond the definition done by actors in the defence sector and is included justice and SSR as a prerequisite for any sustainable peace and development. Concurrently, there has been a growing recognition on the side of donor countries, development agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that their projects would not be successful in any corrupt security structure or in lawlessness. Therefore, a basic level of security or a stable environment (including some functioning judicial and legal systems) is needed to maximise the benefits of projects in a successful peace-building mission.

The SSR debate on the relationship between the armed forces, the state, and the rest of society has also relatively recently begun to be conceived in UN circles. Furthermore, there are differing interpretations in the academic literature as to what exactly the civil-military co-ordination means within the scope of the security sector. However, the following definition is used for the term ‘civil-military co-ordination’ in UN peace operations: ‘UN Civil-Military
Co-ordination is the system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military elements and humanitarian organisations, development organisations, or the local civilian population, to achieve respective objectives. By and large, the co-ordination between the civilian and military elements is defined not only as fulfilling the primary task of ensuring security and stability through police forces, but also as contributing in the most effective manner to non-security tasks, specifically those related to humanitarian and development activities.

There is no doubt that security contributes to enhancing stability and promoting law and order, thereby strengthening the rule of law. Financing the development of good governance as to providing security for civilians, consolidating democracy and promoting development is one of the core elements of security sector reform as well as a precondition for a sustainable economic and social development. Good governance refers to effective, efficient and legitimate use of resources by democratically elected rulers, who are under the scrutiny of parliament, and implies that the security sector is guided by the principles of democratic governance and takes a peace-building approach to security. However, excessive military spending, inefficient allocation of resources, poor democratic performance, and politicisation of the security sector are the situations persisting as serious obstacles to democratisation, good governance and economic progress. The endemic problems like social inequalities and injustice, poor democratic performance, patronage and corruption in security sector are not only causing to the emergence of wealthy local elites, mafia and bribery but would likely lengthen violent conflict and reward ‘warlordism’. Therefore, wealthy countries and development agencies are unwilling to donate financial aid to countries that have problems with their security sector, good governance and democratisation programmes. The logic behind of this unwillingness is that directing this aid to military-centred security by local authorities will likely exacerbate conflict and insecurity.

In order not to waste the money intended to be donated for development, in words of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the financial assistance must be a ‘reward of sound governance’. These words are the manifestation of the importance of security sector reform, which have been rapidly gaining a wider recognition, particularly in such debates about individual freedom, social participation in political life, and increasing the efficiency of economic assistance to developing nations. These and similar reform tasks in the security sector have deliberately been assigned in ‘modern’ UN peacekeeping mandates with the aim of contributing to post-conflict peace-building. SSR is a core component of successful post-conflict transition, of consolidation of democracy, of prevention of renewed armed conflict, of possible rehabilitation of damages in the social fabric, and of promotion of sustainable development. In past few years such reforms have been concluded by UN peacekeeping missions in East Timor and Bosnia, as well as on-going efforts in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the DRC are good examples to comprehensive peace-building tasks that have been assigned to UN peacekeeping mandates.

**Seven Main Generic Areas of SSR**

The UN as an active organisation in multidimensional peacekeeping operations has currently important responsibilities in the SSR. The objective of the UN is to gain a thorough understanding of security sector problems, of reforms, and of what further support could be given in co-operation and co-ordination with other regional and international organisations. Therefore, SSR is an important measure for a successful UN peacekeeping mandates and the
following efforts at least in seven areas in particular are underlying some important principles in order to achieve the overall security in any post-conflict peace-building process:

(1) **National Responsibility and Democratisation:**

The responsibility for the efforts of improving SSR and DDR belongs to the national governments, which are given a legitimate power to play its part on these matters in consultation with the target groups as well as with the national and international partners. However, democratisation of a state is impossible without a democratic transformation of its national institutions and effective check and balances within the political system. They provide necessary mechanisms to ensure that armed forces are constitutionally regulated, under civilian and democratic control, and its members are depoliticised. The security forces should operate within a clear legal and institutional framework where their roles, mandates, and the hierarchy of authority are governed by legislature and executive branches of a state. These could be made possible by making security forces accountable to the democratically elected civilian authorities and respecting to the rule of law both domestically and internationally.

As a matter of fact, politicised or ineffective security bodies and justice systems are themselves a source of instability and insecurity that can not only accelerate corruption, social inequalities and injustice, criminality, bribery, and ‘warlordism’, but also undermine the economic and political capacity and democratic consolidation. Therefore, donor countries and development agencies purposefully support the democratisation process through justice, police and various other internal security reforms and activities designed to demilitarise society. The post-conflict transitional administration should begin functioning in co-operation and co-ordination with the UN peacekeeping forces and should also pay attention to the SSR, recovery and rehabilitation of the society, and enhancing the capacity of civil management bodies in order to remove the deep feeling of insecurity between the civilian and the military sectors.

(2) **Significance of a National Programme on Rehabilitation:**

This would be made possible by the application of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) project upon the security forces of transitional societies. The national programme on DDR is a process and based on a schedule comprises three distinct and successive phases:

- disarmament is referring to the voluntary act of handing-over of weapons by combatants to the qualified military authorities;
- demobilisation is referring to the administrative act in virtue of which combatants change their statute from soldier/militia to that of civilian;
- reintegration is referring to the process by which demobilised soldiers/militia once again begin to be reintegrated into the social and economic life of the country.

The reintegration of combatants into the civilian-centred security institutions could be facilitated by the unification of various armed formations into national security structures. This would not only contribute to the sustainability of a regional peace process, but also strengthen the restoration of a local political stability. However, a sustained policy of disarming and demobilising combatants and reintegrating them into society requires the
financial assistance of development programmes in order to support the national economy to be capable of absorbing large numbers of former armed personnel into the society.

The UNDP is a valuable platform for the establishment and the enforcement of programmes in the DDR sphere. Experts in UNDP programmes are dealing with one of the crucial balance between the two contradictory issues in the SSR: while professionalisation is implying a reduction in the actual size of the armed forces as an important element of the demobilisation process, a successful post-conflict rehabilitation programme is indicating the value of education of former combatants by their reintegration into the national security structures. The process of institutionalisation is also important in the rehabilitation process of post-conflict transitional societies. The strong argument behind this is that individuals would have a voice in a secure legal environment and be reintegrated into civilian life, if conflicts are managed and channelled successfully into these institutionalised structures.

(3) Establishment of Good Governance, Transparency and Rigour:

Good governance means maintaining a rule of elected representatives over all military and security institutions, making representatives accountable to the society and political institutions functioning in a transparent manner. The efforts to develop good governance in the context of the specificity of the recipients (of the armed groups) and of the political nature of its objectives (stabilisation and peace) is a very significant. The idea of good governance is also associated with the co-ordination of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, monitoring, supervising and conducting elections during peace-building missions. Elected representatives should be able to maintain balance between various interests of social and political groups, free from corruption, organised crime and human rights abuses, as well as providing the security of all citizens. The idea of good governance in the security sector is one of the important elements of creating a safe and secure environment for individuals and states. Good governance in SSR is about building capacity within and a favourable environment for civilian government and civil society to be able to participate without any restriction in security matters. For this reason, a transparent and rigorous definition of the national rules and norms prove to be fundamental in three levels:

- in the definition of a legal framework for demobilisation, which defines the target group, the methods of demobilisation, as well as the opportunities offered by the programme;
- in the establishment of a robust and reliable method of management of the target group, based on exhaustive and individual examination of all the candidates for the programme and on the use of the coherent and credible procedures of identification;
- in the establishment of a method of management independent of the financial resources of the programme. The importance that the inter-ministerial committee will give to these managerial principles in any post-conflict country is in fact a decisive factor.

Hence, transparency is the cornerstone of good governance in all sectors. In a post-conflict transitional system, a ground for an independent legislative capacity must be established in order to ensure some executives and legislators to have access to confidential information about the security sector (i.e. the number of soldiers under arms, the type of weaponry in a country’s arsenal, and the share of the country’s defence budget) through relevant mechanisms so that they can review, analyse and debate proposals before adopting them.
(4) Respect for the Human Rights and Roles of Individuals in Security Sector:

In a country which suffered from big crimes against humanity, the democratisation efforts in progress must be reorganised so as to ensure respect for the basic human rights and for related international charters as well as to guarantee their insertion into any post-conflict states’ constitution-making process. Undeniably, every individual is a part of security sector and security sector involves every single sector in the society, including the individuals in civil society organisations, the media, religion, ethnic groups, trade unions, and the individuals in parliament, military, intelligence community, police, customs officials, and those involved in the penal and correction systems. Therefore, a basic level of physical security of individuals is a necessary element in SSR for the success of development and democratisation programmes. In the meantime, improving civic awareness of security issues would not only help reducing the lack of confidence between the general public and the security forces, but also create a national consensus on a SSR programme, and building political coalitions to sustain the process.

It should be emphasised that not only just the security forces, but elected civil authorities and civil society must also adhere to democratic principles and the rule of law. While security forces are usually seen as the responsible party for human rights violations, they work in many cases on behalf of civilian authorities who seek to maintain or acquire power. By the same token, both civilian authorities and security force personnel must respect human rights. Nevertheless, elected civil authorities must be capable of monitoring security sector policies and activities and, therefore, they must be kept accountable to democratic principles and the rule of law both domestically and internationally. Moreover, civilian review boards like ombudsman and national audit offices must exist and function effectively as watchdog over the civil authority and the security sector. Obviously, this collective understanding at the individual level would facilitate removing insecurity between different sectors in the society.

(5) Professionalisation of Armed and Police Forces:

Reunification and restructuring of armed and other security forces (armed and police force), through a process of integration of the principal militant groups into the armed forces or police force (at the end of a process of selection of the combatants most suited for this task) and of reorganising the chains of command and, finally, through the gradual reduction of the number of armed forces and the introduction of professionalisation, is in reality a challenging task. It is important to note that manpower of the armed forces (and, thus, the corresponding expenditure) will grow first (because of the integration of various groups into the armed forces) before their number reduced.

Professionalisation of armed and security forces are providing clearly defined roles and functions to each of these institutions, which are functioning on the basis of rule of law. While armed forces are responsible for protecting the state against outside attacks, security forces are responsible for protecting individual citizens against internal security problems. The rules and laws should make clear to that of who has external and internal roles respectively, and how internal responsibilities are apportioned. To this end, not only the armed forces need to be professionalised, re-integrated, and put under civilian control, but also similar processes have to take place within police and paramilitary formations, as well as in secret security services and border guards. Professionalisation of armed and security forces should address to
doctrinal development, rules and social norms, internal democratisation, skill development, and technical modernisation. Within this perspective, the prominent activities of UN peacekeeping forces involved in the SSR are advising, training, and assisting in the reconstruction of governmental (civil-military) and police (civil-police) functions.

SSR also contributes to limiting the negative impact that a state’s armed forces can have on its own people. Therefore, through the process of professionalisation, SSR provides an important normative barrier to military intervention in politics (coup d’état), contributes to minimisation of corruption, prevents the punishment of crimes by members of the armed forces and human rights abuse. Professionalisation of armed and security forces as a part of SSR aims to enhance security in three principal ways: (a) it reinforces the supremacy of civilian-centred security over the military-centred security through strengthening the civilian institutions such as parliaments and judiciaries; (b) it may become a strong bastion of democracy and secularism – a positive characteristic particularly in states that have little experience of liberal democracy; (c) it provides professional forces to the UN and other organisations for carrying out their peace-building tasks in an effective and efficient way in peace operations.

(6) Internal and Regional Dimension of Security:

The regional dimension of conflict implies that its resolution must also be done on a regional basis: progress in the SSR in any case will support the restoration of a climate of confidence which will in turn contribute to stability. Arriving at an agreement on the matter of the foreign militia, which operate internally on the soil of conflict-torn region, and achieving the goals of the programme will be important since that national government and international supporters will have to work in partnership with each other: the complementary between institutional reforms (which are the off-spring of a strong national government) and investments (which will have to be supported by the donor countries) is crucial and only a co-ordinated action between these two domains will be able to make it possible to achieve the goals indicated above. The following paragraphs aimed at defining the priorities for each one of these domains, but it is important to stress that the anticipated result could not be obtained if one of the two domains suddenly fails.

Internal and regional conflict prevention efforts bring to security sector a liability to facilitate the implementation of complex peace agreements by an effective co-operation and co-ordination between a range of political, military, and civil actors. SSR also includes building internal and regional capacity for reconstruction activities and eliminating the causes of conflict through, such as de-mining, control of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, disarmament, demobilisation of former combatants, encouraging armed forces to play a role in promoting regional stability through defence diplomacy, improving the capabilities of the UN personnel in peace-building missions during peace support operations, and etc.

The main aim behind building internal and regional capacity is to successfully managing internal and regional conflicts. Justice, transparency and arms procurement are important for any confidence-building measure during intra-state group and inter-state relationships. As a part of strengthening regional confidence-building measures and reducing regional instability, providing neighbours with access to information on military strategy, force size, equipment, and procurement plans through regional and sub-regional confidence-building dialogues and
structures will improve security sector governance. However, for successful internal and regional conflict prevention, any effective SSR initiative should be launched before or after a military conflict, not during the case of war.

(7) Socio-Economic Stability and Development:

Economic development needs a financially stable, socially predictable, and politically favourable environment. Therefore, accurately calculating the real internal and external needs of the state and the security sector operating on a transparent budget under parliamentary scrutiny is indispensable. Miscalculation of the internal and external security needs and priorities of the state, insufficient transparency and misallocation of scarce resources risks undermining economic stability and social development. This economic and social development includes:

- the information and counselling services for the demobilised should be provided in order to scan the appropriateness of reintegration offered within the framework of the programme;
- the technical and professional training activities;
- the generating activities of employment (work with high intensity of labour, etc.);
- the projects of socio-economic integration (return to the school, promotion of employment, reintegration into the public or private sectors, etc).

As security sector use a substantial share of the state’s budget, it remains essential that parliament monitor the use of the state’s scarce resources both effectively and efficiently. Therefore, parliament must study and assess the financial burden of arms procurement in comparison with other public needs and social priorities, so as to prevent imbalances affecting the economic development and social stability of the country. It is very important to make the security sector adhere to the same principles of financial management and transparency as other forms of public expenditure in terms of planning, preparation, and legislative approval.

Moreover, economic development can not be realised with short-term aid programmes, at the same time with an expectation of long-term sustainable development. Economic developments in post-conflict transitional societies require well planned long-term aid programmes with an expectation of a sustainable development. This must also be supplemented by specific programmes for which the support of the donor countries is necessary, in direction of particularly vulnerable groups and/or from which the needs are different from those of the other combatants. This is including such as the children associated with the armed groups (for which the strategy is centred on the family reunification and the contribution of psychosocial help and economic aid, in particular the protection of children through the reinforcement of the existing structures), the chronically handicapped people, patients, and etc.

Institutional Priorities for a Successful SSR

The urgent requirements for institutional reforms in the sphere of SSR are multiple. However, in a situation where the political context is in transition and institutions are weak, no reforms could be concluded in short-term. It is thus important to be selective to avoid dispersion and to concentrate only on the efforts in some key actions (at least in an initial phase). Within this framework, the priorities have to be selected on the basis of criteria of
impact (for example, measurements which aimed at resolving situations) and of realism (possibility of launching them or of concluding them within a reasonable time).

In order to mark the need of concentration of efforts, five priority measurements are put under the focus in this process; but, it is clear that well of other actions will also be necessary. Nevertheless, the effective implementation of these five priorities would require an enormous effort from the national government side in order to allow substantial improvements for the situation.

(1) **Partnership and Operational Flexibility in Peacekeeping Activities**

The complexity and the scale of the DDR programme require the participation of a significant number of partners. The partnership and co-operation will have to be materialised through several levels with the aim of strategically meeting the nature of financial, technical, operational, etc., needs. An understanding of these particular needs and abilities of various indigenous entities in the post-conflict transitional society, peacekeeping operations require co-operation and co-ordination with these entities for comprehending the political, cultural, ethnic, and social circumstances that are in flux. Therefore, the policies, plans, laws, principles, and structures designed during the transformation of society into a stable nation with the nation-building process must be rooted in the country’s history, cultural, legal framework, and institutions. Therefore, benefits of co-operative and well-coordinated approaches to the governance of the security sector include the development of common cultures of democratic governance, which can provide opportunities to develop better standards for ‘normative’ peacekeeping and peace support operations.

Every peacekeeping activity must also generate a political will in the society in order to transform commitments into action. For better answering the stakes and contingencies, it will be essential to show a considerable operational flexibility, at the same time on the level of planning and implementation. Will this make it possible to adjust the efforts with the political and security evolutions? While local elite must play the central role, experience suggest that well designed and delivered external support can encourage and bolster domestic efforts to transform the security sector. There is, however, little chance of conducting DDR as a part of general SSR programme without a rudimentary security framework and the agreement of parties to the conflict. This is necessary for the execution of SSR and DDR and must be able to adjust itself at both strategic and operational levels to different, sui generis, national circumstances in which the national security sector has to function. Both of these programmes must adopt a principle of decentralised implementation in order to ensure the institutional proximity with the target group and the effectiveness in the decision-making. Additionally, successful implementation of SSR and DDR programmes require a robust co-operation and co-ordination between local and international security actors, development and financial actors, and non-state actors.

(2) **Human Resources and Financial Needs**

As a result of uncertainty which continues to prevail in some of the key elements of SSR and DDR programmes (such as the exact number of ex-combatants to be reintegrated, in particular among the most badly controlled militia, the available equipment or the localisation of the armed forces), the financial needs are subsequently prone to important modifications during the implementation of these programmes. These programmes will act primarily, to
make sure firstly that reorganised government structure has the authority and the necessary means particularly in terms of human resources and equipment for concluding its mission and, secondly, to ensure that in the first months of peace support operation it receives the support and ‘piloting’ necessary to be able to develop its operational capacities in a satisfactory way. This support is intended to facilitate the return of demobilised and its dependent units into a community on their choice; their physical reintegration into this community; their basic needs during the phase of transition; and, the acquisition of information and counselling for allowing to maximise the impact of the programme of reintegration. However, all these SSR related needs require experts, experts require training and education, training and education requires funding, and funding requires substantial involvement of the international financial institutions. Experts both in the IMF and World Bank have stated that excessive defence spending in developing countries is a major barrier to development and democratisation. However, in some cases, the short-term increase of defence spending might be necessary in order to create a secure environment for a long-term sustainable development. The demand for increasing the defence spending is at least related to make sure that the regular payment of the military service and the wages of the police officers throughout the country are met. The national government shall act:

- first of all to ensure the payment balances and the wages in a regular way in all the provinces, including the remote regions (by a gradual widening of the regions in which the wages are paid);
- to ensure revaluation of the amount of wages of the key personnel. This is essential to avoid the disorders and mutinies which were in the past the consequence of non-payment of the balances and wages.

Financial inducements and the offer of future employment, either in a reformed security sector (including defence) or as part of the local economy (following civilian training), are often used to promote participation in a DDR programme. Moreover, within the framework of the national program on DDR, the needs for investments for the actions of disarmament and demobilisation primarily require financing the following operations:

- the support of the DDR for the co-ordination of the overall SSR process;
- supply of required technical aid;
- production of certificates of disarmaments and acts of demobilisation and establishment of the corresponding files;
- the ad hoc support for the operations (which will be led by the national government under the observation of the UN; for example, disarmament and/or with the possible assistance of the international community).

Given the complexity of tasks to be undertaken in a conflict-torn territory, the implementation of the national programme on DDR represents a formidable challenge. The experiment to date led to a certain number of partner countries and institutions (of which the World Bank, UNDP) to consider that the implementation of the programme which is described above must be realisable and the constraints of implementation should thus be a factor limiting neither for absorption, nor for the mobilisation of the external resources. The Post-Conflict Peace-building Unit of the UN was also established within the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) as a central agency mechanism in 1998 to lead the World Bank’s financial assistance. Given the leading role that the UNDP often plays in the economic, political, and social spheres in nation-building, contributing to a more internal coherence during state-building would certainly help to a more concerted strategy from the World Bank.
Nevertheless, in order to maximize the impact of the resources available, the donor countries and institutions must be encouraged to pay attention to the above mentioned subjects. These activities and extra units exert a significant burden on the UN’s financial and human expertise and thus its organisational system has become seriously overstretched.

(3) Any Plans on SSR should not be Dictated from Outside, but must be Locally Initiated

One of the important tasks of the SSR is to reach a self-sustaining security through contributing the creation of a legitimate, democratically accountable and effective indigenous security sector in conflict-torn societies. In practical terms, SSR varies substantially according to the specific reform context. There is a general agreement that no common model of SSR constitutes a special case and hence a different reform context. This would mean that there could be outside assistance for strategic and operational co-operation and co-ordination to improve civil-military and civil-civil relations. However, any SSR efforts that are launched and implemented from outside would have negative consequences if states do not initiate, develop, and implement their own national projects. Moreover, SSR is usually facing with severe reaction from local elites due to it is seen as a part of agenda for democratisation imposed by the West through making financial aids conditional to the implementation of Western-oriented ‘liberal’ reforms. Imposition of reform programmes of liberal democracy associated with SSR, which entails the privileging of demands for political and civil rights at the expense of those for socio-economic and cultural rights, may foster instability and violence by harming the patrimonial basis of a society that binds many states together. Therefore, any plans on the SSR process must be initiated by local government:

- to arrive at an operational translation of the agreements fulfilled on the principles of this process (in terms of procedures, responsibilities, etc.);
- to finalise a precise calendar on which a consensus among the parts for the implementation of the various stages of this process;
- to define the principal elements of the process of professionalisation of the armed forces (internal measurements, formation, technical aid, equipment), including the questions of calendar and responsibilities on the basis of already committed reflection;
- to make operational the military structure of integration.

Internalisation and local ownership of SSR programmes would be much more effective if the relevant local security forces and civilian authorities are committed themselves to the value of generating home-grown projects. Imposition of foreign agents’ reform projects locally would be self-contradictory, as once John Stuart Mill had argued, ‘democracy not won by the people would be malleable’. Instead of drawing the post-conflict society into a sea of foreign reform projects, the process must be locally initiated and the role of outside actors shall be one of support and facilitation of home-grown demands. In order to be effective and successful, trained and educated local political forces – according to real indigenous needs – must participate in the preparation process of these reforms.

(4) SSR is a Long-Term and Controversial Process

The reform of security sector is a never-ending process. To begin military reforms, establishing democratic and civilian control of armed forces, and adjusting the relationship of the military institution to broader democratic society requires appropriate timing since SSR is a long-term and difficult process. For a successful move towards national unity, the time-
scale must not be measured in months or years, but in generations. One of the main reasons for the need of generational change is that it takes much longer to change the mentalities of people. For example, the completion of the process of reintegration and the reorganisation of the commands of the armed and police forces are long-term processes which include: (i) the long-term process of appointment of the principal chiefs of military and police forces (at the level of the staffs, but also at the levels of provincial and local), so that a satisfactory balance between the various parts is assured without reducing the professionalism or the effectiveness of these command structures; (ii) the effective re-establishment of the chain of command and in particular adhesion and effective integration in this new system of the subalterns and the warrant officers.

During the democratisation process of any developing states, leaders are more receptive to the idea of good governance in the security sector than those authoritarian states whose leadership maintain a dogmatic mindset. In many cases, fundamental institutional reforms are not possible in authoritarian states until there have been changes to dogmatic mindsets and authoritarian political values of leaders. Therefore, a successful reform of the security sector depends also on the desire of local elite to replace past repressive policies with more participatory one through a significant institutional transformation process. The following mechanisms should be established in order to check and monitor regularly the development and the implementation of these reform steps:

- a legal framework respecting rule of law consistent with both democratic domestic law and international law;
- a civil management and oversight mechanism;
- legitimate security bodies, capable of providing security for the state and individuals that are democratically accountable.

(5) Co-operation and Co-ordination between International Organisations

Many international organisations are still hesitant to be involved in the propagation of, and assistance in, the democratic transformation of national security sectors. They are arguing that the well-known UN norm of non-intervention into the internal matters of states is an obstacle. Moreover, donor countries, development agencies and NGOs vary widely in mandate, outlook, approach, and in degree of integration into the humanitarian co-ordination system to dealing with civilian and military personnel in peace operations. Therefore, the DPKO of the UN is responsible and well placed to undertake such an important initiative alone or together with other international organisations for facilitating the effective co-operation and co-ordination between donor countries and NGOs. The DPKO also developed bodies like the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Country Team, primarily to facilitate co-ordination with donor countries, NGOs and Specialised Agencies of the UN in the context of UN peace operations. They are also providing technical aid and acting primarily:

- to help to prepare and implement the reforms;
- to reinforce the institutional capacities at the provincial levels;
- to bring to a successful conclusion of the training schemes of the police officers and the members of the armed forces (including on the questions of humans right and responsibility compared to the civil authorities);
- to define specific needs in a precise way as the reforms progress, in close co-operation with the donor countries and the local government.
The civilian-military training centres in the UN, NATO, EU, OSCE and other international organisations must co-operate and co-ordinate their efforts. The Training and Evaluation Service (TES) of the DPKO is an important training and education centre under the UN umbrella and maintains close liaison between active operations and the lessons learned process. TES carries out its training and education task within the Military Division in close consultation with the Civilian Police Division and the Personnel Management Support Service (PMSS). For an effective training and education, both the UN and its member states started to use the UN’s Standardised Generic Training Module. A robust support from national and international peacekeeping training centres and institutes to UN-led joint training activities is essential for a successful SSR. The US found an Expanded International Military Education and Training Programme (E-IMET) in 1991; Turkey established a Partnership for Training Centre (PfP) in Ankara in 1998 for training and education of civilian and military experts; and the UK created similar training programs – first, the Defence Diplomacy Courses on ‘Managing Defence in a Democracy’, which train civilians and military officers in developing and transitional countries, and later the Defence Advisory Team (DAT) in 2001.

Conclusions

SSR, as includes democratic security governance, in developing and post-conflict transitional societies has become a major issue for the analysts in the last decade. At the same time, a multi-faceted response to conflicts that has resulted in military and civilian police capability being deployed as a part of UN multidimensional peace operations, involving political, economic, electoral, humanitarian, human rights and other elements of the security sector, has also changed considerably. The interdependency between security/stability and development/investment, along the rising importance and relevancy of good governance to the security sector, all became the essential parts of democratic governance in SSR. It should also be noted once again that SSR is very much concerned with norms, values, and practices of Western society. Therefore, the increasing interaction between civilian and security/military actors on the one hand, and civilian and NGOs on the other must be complemented by looking at the local needs of the society and initiating a locally developed and externally sponsored SSR projects afterward. Only by carrying out such recommendations that SSR could contribute to the building of democratic peace through reflecting and promoting liberal democratic values in developing and post-conflict transitional societies.

To conclude, we are all part of the security sector. This is absolutely fundamental to the whole concept of human security. Understanding and appreciating that each of us has a role, not only in the reform of the security sector, in maintaining the security sector and control of the security sector, but also in conflict prevention and peace-building, is one of the biggest developments in the whole debate on SSR and an essential requirement for the UN to maintain international peace and security.

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The Role of OSCE in Peacekeeping

The role of OSCE in peacekeeping operations is taking place against the larger background of the discussion about the changing European security environment. It is commonly remarked, and is in fact true, that since the end of the Cold War, the definition of security, security architectures and actual alliances around the world have been undergoing significant changes. September 11th added another layer of complexity and accelerated this re-evaluation and restructuring process. Such significant changes are especially true of the European security architecture, which includes NATO, the EU and the Organization for Security and Co-operation or OSCE.

What Makes OSCE Unique

In a world, full of multi-national organizations it is worth taking a moment to examine both where the OSCE currently fits and does not fit into the European security architecture.
OSCE is part of the European security architecture triangle with NATO (an existing collective defense alliance) and the EU (or the European integration process) making up the other two corners of the triangle. OSCE is the world's largest regional security organization; it is comprised of 55 states from Europe, Central Asia and North America. The OSCE’s definition of Europe is much broader than either NATO’s or the EU’s membership and it contains members that aren’t a part of the EU or NATO.

The OSCE was born out of a Cold War dialogue process and was originally designed to facilitate equal dialogue and collective decision-making. It is not a treaty-based alliance and is therefore not grounded on legally binding commitments; its agreements are binding only to the extent that its members determine to implement their commitments. OSCE relies—except in rare circumstances—on the basis of consensus for all major decisions. Consensus driven by the underlying concept of co-operation, is, however, it also services as a double-edged sword; it becomes either a mechanism for successfully combining national interests, or an institutional nightmare/roadblock which prevents OSCE from making difficult decisions. Unfortunately, modern day peacekeeping operations (PKO) require difficult decision-making around which the consensus of nation-states is often difficult, if not impossible to achieve, especially in an organization comprised of 55 members.

OSCE originally had three baskets of issues: security concerns; economic, scientific, technical & environmental cooperation; and a vague humanitarian dimension (i.e. human and minority rights). Since the end of the Cold War, OSCE has added the following issues to its portfolio of responsibilities, creating a growing and ill-defined basket of increasing and inevitably overlapping concerns: democratization (to the consternation/dismay of some members); conflict prevention; and post conflict rehabilitation or conflict management.

In the past, OSCE’s basket of issues was more comprehensive than NATO or the EU’s. The EU’s continued integration has led to it encroach on OSCE’s areas of involvement. Similarly, as NATO has sought to reinvent itself, it too, has begun to encroach upon the OSCE. As a result, OSCE has increasingly found itself squeezed between the two. At the same time OSCE has been developing deeper links with NATO and EU. To address these baskets of issues on the ground, OSCE engages in a wide-ranging variety of activities, including: ever-popular democratization activities, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, combating terrorism, status of minority rights and many others.

Within the specific basket of security, depending on the situation, OSCE has the following broad tasks. It is a forum or mechanism for: a Pan-Euro multilateral diplomacy with issues related to security and cooperation; promoting and codifying shared values and standards; continuous monitoring of human rights; promoting military transparency and lastly, providing early warning, diplomacy and crisis management.

Even a brief moment of reflection would lead one to realize that OSCE is currently overlapping with the EU and NATO on many—if not all—of these issues.

Four Different Types of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

There are four potential types of PKO operations. The first is traditional “hard power/hard task” armed PKO of the “blue-helmet” type—OSCE has no experience in this realm. The second is “soft task” unarmed observer/monitoring PKO, an area in which OSCE
has considerable experience and has arguably developed a certain level of expertise. Third is a combination of the hard power and unarmed observer monitoring. The fourth is multi-institutional PKO operation conducted with other international organizations (such as NATO, the EU and/or the UN).

Simply put, OSCE isn’t designed for nor is it capable of traditional PKO. OSCE lacks enforcement powers. Traditional “hard power” PKO is beyond the ability or the will of OSCE’s expanding membership. While this does not preclude OSCE from playing a role in PKO, it makes it a secondary or minor player at best. Today’s PKO often involves compelling belligerent actors to cease activities. Often the actors refuse to withhold their consent. The initial stage of PKO often requires hard force (which NATO can provide, however it transforms in the future), while soft power often serves an ancillary function for maintaining the newfound peace.

How did OSCE reach its current PKO capabilities?

In 1992, in its “Helsinki Document” OSCE placed PKO alongside other OSCE activities—early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes. Furthermore, OSCE placed PKO next to fact-finding and rapporteur mission of one of the prime OSCE instruments of conflict and conflict management. Some commentators saw this an attempt to raise the profile of OSCE in regard to PKO. Such missions would require consensus and would not be undertaken without an effective ceasefire. Finally in admission to reality, OSCE ultimately admitted that it might benefit from the resources, experience and expertise of other organizations including the UN, NATO and EU among others. Seven years later, after a series of setbacks, OSCE was already retreating from its overly ambitious and wholly unrealistic PKO goals. In 1999 OSCE, “decided to explore options for a widening role of the OSCE in PKO.” This is a distinct downgrading from the idea of OSCE PKO to recognition of the fact that OSCE—at best— had a secondary or supporting role to play in PKO.

In fact, the Helsinki Document was never put into practice. There are many reasons that OSCE never followed up on the grand designs of the Helsinki document. Five reasons stand out: 1) a series of setbacks in the Balkans; 2) the UN, NATO, and EU became more active with PKO, particularly in Europe; 3) OSCE was sidelined from PKO by its major members for various reasons including a lack of funding by its members, a burdensome consensus format - PKO often demands hard choices and the consensus model simply couldn’t accommodate that lack of agreement among OSCE members; 4) OSCE often become as proxy battleground the EU/US vs. Russia battles or EU vs. US appointment battles, and 5) PKO generally requires a third party with carrots and sticks but OSCE has no sticks (compared to NATO) and not particularly less than compelling carrots compared to other international organizations (such as the UN or the EU).

So it is clear that OSCE simply is not fit for “hard power” PKO. It lacks enforcement power. It lacks the manpower. It lacks the equipment. It lacks the desire of its members to procure any of the above. OSCE lacks will or ability to plan, put into action and maintain ongoing PKO operations.

NATO is the premier “hard power” organization and is perhaps inexorably of moving into conflict prevention and management. NATO is developing closer links with Central Asia and Caucasus while EU is developing new partnerships with neighbors. Meanwhile, OSCE is
slowly being squeezed by EU/NATO capabilities and agendas and is also being financially squeezed. Consequently it is in a position where it must redefine itself in terms of these two organizations.

Indeed, OSCE options are defined by two distinct parameters: 1) it’s members—EU makes up half of OSCE’s members and 70% of its budget and 2) the activities of NATO and the EU and to a lesser extent the UN. Therefore, it seems reason to believe that in the future the EU will most likely be in the driver’s seat regarding the behavior and direction/future of OSCE. Nevertheless, many members of the EU are preoccupied with the European integration process and NATO’s transformation/reinvention. The OSCE runs a distant third.

PKO will always revolve around hard power, but ancillary activities “described in some quarters as “peace consolidation” will continue to grown in importance. Such activities will include institution building, reconstruction efforts and policing—the type of tasks that OSCE already undertakes.

The challenge before the OSCE is to find away to find relevance for its peace consolidation efforts to supplement NATO and/or the EU as the European security architecture evolves in the future. This search for relevance is complicated by the fact the OSCE’s consensus structure prevents any single nation or subset of nations from acting as an engine of ideas or direction. It is inevitable that the future relationship of OSCE to the European security architecture – PKO will change.

OSCE should concentrate its efforts on election monitoring and building institutions (activities that NATO doesn’t do) and facilitating dialogue amongst its members. In doing so, it needs to redefine its relationship to the heavyweights in the PKO arena, the UN and NATO and concentrate on developing a complementary role. OSCE is a mildly interesting organization and it engages in interesting activities. However, it is unclear whether that is enough in the post-cold, post September 11th security environment.
SESSION 5
THE ROLE OF THE UN AND NATO IN THE STABILISATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ
Introduction

In my opening speech, I focused on the evolving nature of challenges we face today. Now, after my introductory remarks, I will elaborate more particularly on the challenges to peace operations. Then I will share with you my views on NATO’s perspective and specifically, Afghanistan, as I consider our mission there a unique case that highlights both the difficulties we encounter today, and the challenges we come across while devising an integrated approach for an effective peace mission, in the post-conflict environment of the 21st century.

The post cold war era has brought new challenges to global security: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, illegal trafficking of arms and drugs. Terrorism is certainly one of the most difficult and problematic. The event of 9/11 has been the turning point in the perception of terror and terrorism.

While, terrorism existed prior to that tragic event, 9/11 has pushed terrorism to the forefront of the challenges to security in the 21st century. The global response to terrorism needs a concerted and integrated approach to its definition so that joint adequate military and non-military means can be used to fight against it and, finally, eliminate it.
Terrorism is a complex issue that exploits numerous causes: weak democracies and its weak state institutions, ill-defined perception of religion, ethnic divisions, disappointment over poverty, and lack of vision for a better future and many others. Terrorism is often connected to and fed by organised crime as well as drug and weapons trafficking. This connection makes terrorism an even more serious threat to stability.

The fact that the terrorists have the will and capacity to carry out asymmetric strikes urges every democratic state to seek to maintain peace and stability in a more conscious and sensitive manner. This is mostly the case, since we all feel the need to prevent the terrorist groups from reaching weapons of mass destruction.

**Peace Operations**

Peace operations are one of the major tools for rebuilding the post conflict environments. In the case of failed states, collapse of state authority prompts destruction of physical infrastructure and the social fabric. Illegal militia takes hold of the void created by the chaos. Economic productivity reduces to a level near zero or worse yielding to illicit activities. Sense of justice disappears and arbitrary, misbehaviour dominates the society.

The sophisticated nature of these challenges requires a sequential approach in terms of planning and executing our modern day peace operations. Peace operations include not only military means but also diplomatic stabilising and reconstruction efforts in order to restore stability in the affected or as we say, host countries.

Today, peace operations are not only confined to stabilisation of post-conflict environment. These efforts include: coordinating actions of the international community to reintroduce the rule of law, human rights, provision of social and economic development, and creation of job opportunities, the fostering of national reconciliation, subsequent reconstruction and improvement phases. These efforts also comprise measures to give an increased ownership of the key issues to a host country.

The new challenges also require a radical change from the classic sense of peace operations. Civil-military cooperation is essential from the outset till the end product is obtained. In other words, civil expertise has acquired an invaluable standing, by merit of providing an indispensable contribution from planning to execution of all peace operations, both in decision making cells and the field headquarters.

Unpredictable nature of the emerging conflicts also requires a forward looking planning with respect to development of early warning systems. Fielding human resources often bring in alternate manning methods like outsourcing, secondment and extra curricular voluntary contributions. Budgetary adjustments require utmost flexibility in view of previously unforeseen necessities. Regional expertise and a good understanding of the local needs are assets both for the civilian and military components of the peace operations. Finally, execution of information operations or maintaining public diplomacy stand alone as the most important element to ensure continued public support for peace operations both at home and the expeditionary front.

**Afghanistan**

Now I would like to move on to Afghanistan since it is the unique showcase of the post cold war challenges.
We should not forget that Afghanistan’s Taliban regime harboured terrorists and Afghanistan nearly became a terrorist state against the will of its people. We also should not forget that 23 years of war destroyed the economic and social fabric of the country. Again, we should not forget that Afghanistan’s population is tired with war and looks forward to a better future.

As you know I have been serving in Afghanistan for more than two years as the NATO senior civilian representative. I have witnessed Afghanistan’s achievements firsthand: the successful implementation of the Bonn agreement, emergency and constitutional loya jirgas, a democratically elected president, an appointed government, parliamentary and provincial elections, the establishment and growth in capacity of Afghan national security forces.

Efforts to improve governance, basic services and infrastructure such as health care and education in the provinces, as well as activities aimed at the larger economic reconstruction and development of the country continue. Afghanistan is working on its own national development strategy.

Nevertheless, Afghanistan, as with some other post conflict environments, still has many challenges: terrorism, insurgency, drugs problem, porous borders, limited reach of the central government to the provinces, presence of illegal armed groups and their links to some political figures and to drug trafficking, deep rooted corruption, poor judicial mechanisms, slow pace of reconstruction and many difficulties in managing the expectations of the population. Moreover, Afghanistan’s national security forces are not ready yet to provide security in the country. Still a lot needs to be done.

Security in Afghanistan cannot be achieved solely through military means. Afghanistan’s example shows us that security, development, reconstruction and confidence building measures with neighbouring countries are strongly interlinked and interdependent and that security in Afghanistan cannot be looked at without a broader perspective of the entire region.

The international community, through the Bonn agreement of 2001 and the recently launched Afghanistan compact of January 2006, is on stand by to assist Afghanistan on its way to stability and development. NATO takes an active part in these efforts.

**NATO’s response in Afghanistan**

The presence of NATO in Afghanistan is not accidental. The NATO mission in Afghanistan constitutes a significant response to the new challenges of the 21st century and proves NATO’s determination to transform and adapt to the new global reality.

NATO will assist the Afghan government in extending its authority across the country, conducting stability and security operations in close co-ordination with the Afghan national security forces, assisting the Afghan government with security sector reform, mentoring and supporting the Afghan army, supporting the government’s programmes for disbanding of illegal armed groups. NATO/ISAF will also support the Afghan government in its counter-narcotics efforts and, on request, will help in humanitarian assistance operations.

NATO’s tasks will be complementary to the bilateral and multilateral efforts of other international actors operating in Afghanistan. Due to the fact that the response to the Afghan
case was global and relatively well coordinated among all the parties involved, we can already talk about achievements in Afghanistan, despite continuous challenges. Nevertheless, if we want to keep this momentum, we have to maintain our commitment; otherwise the stabilisation process will stall.

In addition to the NATO/ISAF efforts, NATO is aiming at more activities to contribute to the peace building in Afghanistan. Recently, Afghan minister of defence visited NATO headquarters to initiate talks about the future of relations between NATO and Afghanistan. Most Afghan leaders believe that this will not only contribute to building the capacity of Afghan forces but will also provide a deterrent effect across the region.

NATO’s activities in Afghanistan are not the only ones that show NATO’s transformation. NATO started its adaptation to the new realities much earlier. Let me provide some insight.

**NATO’s Transformation**

NATO has evolved both internally and externally since its strategic concept was adapted to rise to the challenges of the new security environment. NATO, as you know, currently has 26 nations and 20 partner nations. NATO has an open door policy on enlargement. Its NATO response force will reach full strength by the end of 2006 and will encompass 25,000 troops that will be able to deploy within 5 days notice.

NATO will thus be more mobile and better able to perform missions worldwide across the whole spectrum of operations: evacuations, disaster management, counter-terrorism, and acting as ‘an initial entry force for larger, follow on forces. This shows that NATO has evolved from conducting territorial defence missions to an expeditionary alliance.

NATO has been building dialogue and cooperation with numerous countries. Its initiatives, such as its partnership programmes, the south east Europe initiative, the Mediterranean dialogue and the Istanbul cooperation initiative have been contributing to confidence building measures in the world. All the NATO activities are done in close coordination with other actors to avoid duplication.

NATO is working hard and continues its efforts to reach consensus, through its transformation processes, on how effectively to respond to the 21st century challenges. NATO has been learning through its own missions and has been evolving.

In the case of Afghanistan, I believe that NATO has responded through a well-organised and robust mission that clearly shows NATO’s determination and willingness to play a greater role in stability building. It goes without saying that we encounter similar tasks to deal with, in other post-conflict environments; we still need a common approach how to jointly tackle them.

**Summary**

- Peace operations are fast coming under the limelight of the international political thinking.
- They are increasingly viewed as a useful tool to prevent escalation of tensions in zones of conflict.

- However, more importantly, they have now become an integral part of our collective effort for state and nation building.

- In an ever more dynamic world, we are compelled to think in a creative fashion to identify and address the changing nature of crises. Since the challenges are diverse and numerous, we should not be tempted to adopt a “one size fits all” approach, for this could be deceptive.

- Therefore, peace operations require a careful thinking, intelligent devising, backed by a determined and lasting political will.

- Peace operations increasingly rest on civil-military cooperation. This has now become the basic feature of all peace operations where a cross expertise is essential with a view to provide comprehensive analysis and achieve desirable results.

Now I would like to underline some points we need to follow:

- First, we need to reassure our populations about the wisdom of our actions (towards peace missions). We have to fight with the imbalances and unfair practices that generate resentment or atrocities against our mission. This should be the main pillar of our ethical approach.

- The peace operations established to fight against a terrorist organisation should strive to identify and address the root causes of terrorism. This should be the rational component of our policy. Then, we also have to make clear that our fight against terrorism is not set against any particular religion. We should employ collective wisdom to prevent any deviation from this policy. This principle, I believe should constitute the philosophical dimension of our policy.

- We need to prepare well our input towards peace building, with all the necessary mandates, means and capabilities to perform our missions.

- We also have to promote confidence building measures between the affected or host countries and their neighbours

- Then we should ensure that a peace mission takes into account the cultural and historic traditions of the country where the mission is taking place

Furthermore, we need to encourage NATO nations for more pro-active economic roles through bilateral and multilateral means towards the affected countries from broader perspective, we need:

- to take into account that security cannot be achieved through military means only. security, development and reconstruction are interrelated,

- to ensure the unity of coordinated efforts between international actors and the domestic structures of affected countries during our missions,
- to provide strong involvement of civilian elements during the missions,

- to reassure the host nation that there is long-term commitment to peace building in their country.

**Final Conclusion**

Peace operations will remain to be a major tool for creating a secure and stable environment for the people and nations in the areas affected by war and its consequences. Despite all the challenges faced during peace missions, most missions have proven necessity and value. I believe that all nations should demonstrate their sense of unity by helping those in need.

The new security challenges, particularly terrorism, require a global and concerted response. We need to learn from one another and increase our knowledge. Unity of effort by the international community and clear labour division on “who is doing what” between various organisations could become the key for a successful peace and stabilisation mission.

We should spare no courage and skill, deviate from our noble cause to serve suffering human beings and remain focused to achieving our goal. Challenges, then, will not matter how intimidating they might seem at the first sight.
REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE TO UN PEACE OPERATIONS – I
MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS THROUGH COOPERATION AND COORDINATION – A PERSPECTIVE ON THE REGIONAL DIMENSIONS

Ambassador Michael SAHLIN,

Folke Bernadotte Academy

Presented by Annika HILDING NORBERG

Folke Bernadotte Academy

Introduction

It is a great pleasure to be here in Turkey again. It is also an honor to speak on behalf of my Director General, Ambassador Michael Sahlin, who due to a prior commitment unfortunately could not take part in this very important event hosted by the Izmir University of Economics in cooperation with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division and the Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Centre for Strategic Research.

Given the complexity and the ever-changing nature of the challenges of peace operations; research, studies and seminars are undertaken around the world by numerous scholars, practitioners and policy-makers to find ways in which to enhance our collective peacekeeping ‘cause and effect’ knowledge.
One such example of a non-political process is the multinational project ‘Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century’, which the Folke Bernadotte Academy is privileged to coordinate, and as part of which, we are equally honored to enjoy the valuable partnership of the Centre for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and its Associate Partners here in Turkey. On behalf of the Challenges Project Partners, I would like to express our appreciation to our Turkish Partners and Friends in the Challenges Project, in particular, to Ambassador Bilhan and Ass. Professor Hürsoy for the timely and most relevant initiative to host this conference and for kindly inviting us to address the topic of regional dimensions to peace operations, which is also the topic of one of the chapters in the Challenges Project Phase II Concluding Report 2006. I would also like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the very fruitful Ankara Challenges Seminar that our Turkish friends hosted in 2003. It was an important contribution to our joint effort, the results of which were consequently published, widely disseminated and greatly appreciated.

Over the next twenty minutes or so, I will first make some brief remarks about the Challenges Project itself, before spending most of my time discussing some of the recommendations regarding the regional dimensions of peace operations that was made in the Challenges Report. Finally, I will mention a selection of other recommendations on Rule of Law, and Education and Training respectively, which I believe is equally relevant to be considered as part of the regional challenges or dimensions of peace operations.

**Challenges Objective**

The objective of the Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century Project, which was initiated in 1997 with a first seminar in Stockholm, is to contribute to the further enhancement of the global dialogue on the planning, conduct and evaluation of peace operations, to generate practical recommendations and to encourage action for their effective implementation.

**Concluding Report 2006**

The Challenges Project Concluding Report 2006 “Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination” was presented on behalf of the Project Partners by the Foreign Minister of Sweden to the UN Secretary-General at a high level event in New York on 19 January this year. The report focuses on essentially four areas under the overarching theme of cooperation and coordination:

- The Dynamic Nature of Peace Operations and the Challenges of Change
- Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations
- Rule of Law
- Education and Training

**Call for Action**

In late March, the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations finalized its 2006 report and it was rewarding to see that that report, which is a report by all Member States of the United Nations, both mentioned the Challenges Report and had arrived
at a number of conclusions and recommendations that were made earlier in the Challenges Report.

Key to any report and its recommendations is that effective implementation takes place. Thus, the report is structured as a call for action in meeting the challenges of cooperation and coordination in the areas mentioned:

- Action by governments to think imaginatively and act cooperatively in providing resources, facilities and assistance.
- Action by secretariats, training centres, agencies and programmes to improve effectiveness by agreeing on common standards and adopting joint approaches to common problems.

As a possible point of departure, I would encourage you to examine Annex 1 of the report, which is in essence, a practical work plan one can refer to when seeking to promote or ensure implementation of the recommendations in the report.

**Challenges Project Partners**

Primarily as a result of the Challenges International Seminar Series that began in 1997 with a first seminar in Stockholm, the Challenges Report is an independent report developed by peacekeeping experts, academics, diplomats, police and military, from around the world. Project Partners come from six continents and are all major contributors to peace operations.

Challenges of Modern PKO – Overstretch, The ‘Squeeze’, The Brittleness of the International System

So what are the Challenges of Modern Peacekeeping?

As pointed out by Chris Donnelly, our British Challenges Partner and Head of the Advanced Research and Analysis Group at the UK Ministry of Defence, peacekeeping conducted by the United Nations faces primarily three major challenges regarding its effectiveness: overstretch; the squeeze on member states’ resources; and, the brittleness of the current international system. He goes on to elaborate on the three as follows:

1) Overstretch – The UN system is overloaded by the current surge of mission activity. In the past 4 years the commitment has grown from 12 missions and 30,000 personnel deployed to 17 missions with 70,000 permanently deployed. To support those operations an annual turnover rate of 120,000 peacekeepers, half a million supporting staff movements and half a million tonnes of freight is needed. The UN runs 14 hospitals and 120 clinics in the most hostile environments on earth. Although the UN Secretariat’s capacity to manage Peace Operations has improved – quicker finance, rapid supply, better airlift - and the UN has expanded its ability to do non military functions – police, prisons, demobilization and disarmament etc. – the system as it stands today cannot meet the current growth in demand.

2) The ‘Squeeze’. The competing demand on Member States’ resources is caused by shrinking defence budgets, increased demand, and armed forces structured inappropriately for new operational requirements. For the world’s most capable armies commitments are rising. NATO’s commitments are rising, and many regional organizations are now engaged in
peacekeeping operations for the first time. It is becoming harder and harder for the UN to find the troops (and police, etc.) that it needs to meet increasing commitments.

3) The Brittleness of the International Security System. The system as it is, was created for the cold war. It has not yet evolved to meet the new challenges. The divisions exposed over the war in Iraq have weakened the system further. It can no longer be assumed that the world’s major powers will necessarily support the UN in crisis, because they may no longer consider that it can provide a solution. The whole international security system is at risk of disintegration in the face of a new major crisis. As we speak, given the current international political turbulence regarding the nuclear issue and Iran, this point is one that is of real concern.

As also pointed out by the UN Under-Secretary-General for PKO Mr Guéhenno, the challenges are complex, peacekeeping is over-stretched and resources are scarce. Making the best possible use of the resources that are available is therefore a very high priority. In the Challenges Report, we recommend several measures that are aimed at that challenge, and including such issues involving regional organizations and their contributions to peace operations.

To realize the vision of an “interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities”, a number of measures could and should be taken by States, working in cooperation with the UN Secretariat as well as the secretariats of their respective regional organizations. The report reviews major issues and obstacles to better UN-regional and regional-regional cooperation and coordination and makes recommendations with regard to ways in which those obstacles may be overcome, cooperation and coordination improved, and operations made more effective and thus less costly in the long run.

There are naturally several perspectives to the regional dimensions of peace operations – economic, social, cultural etc. We have focused our work on the perspectives of the military, police and the broader concept of ‘civilian’ taking a primarily generic approach.

Key functional elements of cooperation and coordination in the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations and arrangements are identified and addressed: issues of consensus and complementarity; memoranda of understanding; early warning, liaison and information sharing; conflict prevention and peacebuilding; and procedures and guidelines for mission handover. To actively promote capacity-building and enhancement in regional organizations, recommendations are put forward to address shortages related to headquarters and planning structures; guidelines, doctrines, and strategies; sustaining operations; financing operations and financial assistance.

**Challenges Report – a Selection of Regional Dimensions Recommendations**

For example, we urge that the UN, regional organizations and their respective Member States should establish a regular process for developing and exchanging benchmarks as measures of effectiveness for -not only the military- but also the civilian and police components after a mission is completed or steady state achieved.

Another recommendation is that the UN and regional organizations need to facilitate the development of compatible guidelines and standard operating procedures for effective
transitions between UN and non-UN peace operations in close consultation with states and organizations that have relevant experience, and by building on lessons learned and best practices. For example, recent experiences with “re-hatting” of this nature, in Sierra Leone, Liberia, the DRC, Burundi and Haiti, have demonstrated continuing gaps between equipment levels and logistic support practices of many regional organizations and the different, sometimes higher, standards provided and expected in UN missions.

Further, to support the idea of synergy and complementarity of UN and regional organizations activities, the full contributions of military, police and civilians and other support by States to UN-authorized regional peace operations should also be reflected in relevant statistics and any general compilation of national contributions.

In peace operation matters, the links established between the UN and regional organizations and arrangements are growing, but are still fairly limited.

Improving liaison should be a priority. The exchange of military, but also and in particular, civilian and police staff and liaison officers, between the UN and regional organizations, and between various regional organizations, is an important aspect of transparency, a practical way to implement cooperation, and should be encouraged at various levels and in a systematic manner. Such exchanges need to be properly funded. Lessons should be drawn from recent models of liaison between secretariats as well as within actual operations.

At the working level, the linking where practical of early warning arrangements through communication and computer systems would allow the exchange of unclassified background data and evolving information about a developing crisis.

For cooperation and coordination in peacebuilding, the report welcomes the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Regional organizations are urged to actively engage with the Commission on issues of common concern.

A major conclusion arising from reviews of peace operations over the last few years is that not only does the UN experience a serious challenge in seeking to meet the needs for peace operations today, the ability of most regional and sub-regional organizations to respond rapidly to urgent demands for peace operations, and to conduct operations effectively once deployed, is quite limited. In particular, the capacity for such organizations other than NATO and the EU to plan, mount and sustain operations without a lead nation providing the core of the deployed resources is still limited. Furthermore, where regional organizations have deployed, they have often quickly (within a few months) sought significant support or replacement by the UN or other providers or donors. The report points to several areas where improvements might be made.

For example, each regional or sub-regional organization undertaking peace operations should have a permanent strategic headquarters or secretariat that can prepare peace operations policy, guidelines and procedures for future regional operations as well as plan, command and administer any deployed mission for the regional executive. Particular attention should be directed towards multifunctional missions, and the still relative weaknesses in the civilian dimensions of peace operations. To accelerate the development of effective headquarters staffs of developing regional organizations; states, the United Nations, and regional organizations need to intensify its assistance in training essential planning and other
staff elements and to assist in the creation of appropriate regional standby procedures to complement those being developed in the UN civilian, military and police standby arrangements.

Another subject area addressed in the report is that of guidelines, doctrines and strategies. An institution’s doctrine for peace operations derives from its strategic aims and is highly dependent on the range of tools at its disposal, which vary from organization to organization. To achieve confidence and consistency between contributors to peace operations, a set of guidelines could outline an approach to common activities, laying out the fundamental principles, practices and procedures normally to be followed in meeting the mandates of such operations. The UN, in cooperation with its Member States and with Regional Organizations, needs to further refine the guidelines, doctrine and policy for multifunctional peace operations, and then seek to distribute the products widely in the UN official languages. Regional organizations involved in peace operations should contribute to UN efforts and to review such guidance and, where appropriate, adjust and develop their own guidance so as to support the capacity for compatible operations with the UN. To this end, regional organizations and arrangements should hold regular consultations and seminars on doctrine with the UN.

Yet other areas to be improved include the different aspects of gender issues in peacekeeping and the problems related to the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse. UN guidelines should be considered as the minimum standards applicable universally and should be incorporated in the doctrines of all regional organizations intending to carry out peace operations. Regional organizations should accelerate efforts to fully implement UNSCR 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security.

The greatest impediment to enhanced involvement in peace operations of many regional and sub-regional organizations, particularly in Africa, has been the lack of capacity to launch such operations, which involves more than just the technical training and equipping of individuals and light infantry forces for peacekeeping. Particular challenges are faced when conducting multifunctional missions, with one or more civilian components. Important complementary aspects are the provision of essential enabling capabilities, heavy unit equipment and the logistics to allow rapid and efficient deployment, as well as the maintenance of effective administrative and logistic support to contingents in the mission area. Developing regional organizations should consider their own personnel and equipment policies, with the UN standards and reference documents that have been developed from experience, as a good basis.

Once initiated, the further sustainment of logistic support to field operations is expensive and complicated to manage. The UN has increased its resource efficiency through standing systems contracts with commercial suppliers and by promoting cooperation between peacekeeping operations deployed in the same geographical region. Other systems of logistic support exist based upon military and civilian support experiences. The report suggests that the UN needs to discuss various logistic support options with regional organizations so as to optimize complementary and effective sustainment of responses. In this context, it has been suggested that Member States should agree to allow the UN to provide equipment support from UN owned resources to regional operations and encourages the early implementation of the UN making strategic deployment stocks available for operations conducted by regional/African organizations.
Funding is another area in which more cooperation and coordination between regional organization, the UN and donors is needed. Where regional operations are authorized by the UN Security Council, under the rules of the United Nations peacekeeping budget, the UN should move to early implementation of the Member States decision to, on a case-by-case basis, make funds available for these operations by assessed contributions. It has been suggested that States, working through the appropriate UN bodies, should seek agreement on mechanisms to allow regional organizations to draw on the UN assessed budget to carry out peace operations mandated by the Security Council, on a case by case basis. This option must, of necessity, entail a certain degree of conditionality and external oversight on the use of the funds for those regional arrangements that will want to take advantage of it.

Regarding the rule of law and peace operations - an effective establishment and maintenance of the rule of law is a keystone to success in modern peace operations. The Challenges Report discusses means of operationalizing rule of law objectives and achieving rule of law outcomes, particularly in relation to the key aspects of policing, prisons, judicial capacity and law reform. It also addresses aspects of accountability and peace operations.

The Challenges Reports recommends that states, the UN and Regional organizations should consider developing rapidly deployable capacities in all fields of expertise relevant to the successful conduct and outcome of peace operations, not only military, but also and in particular, police officers, lawyers, judges and corrections personnel to mention a few.

In the report we argue that “an international operation must develop a visibly holistic approach to managing rule of law objectives, in order to ensure the coordination of law enforcement, judicial reform, law reform and human rights, and coordination of the many partners engaged in addressing these issues.” This is as true for the UN as for regional organizations and others wishing to contribute in a meaningful way to peace operations.

Among other issues, the report points out that attention needs to be paid to the institutionalization of performance safeguards to ensure that public security entities and overall judicial processes actually serve the public interest, respect minority rights, dispense justice equally, and maintain their autonomy from corrupting forces.

Regarding accountability within peace operations, States, the UN and regional organizations should develop more effective and efficient measures to enhance the accountability of all contributors to peace operations, and not least that of, international contractors who provide services to peace operations.

States should ensure that the issue of accountability in peace operations is integrated into their doctrinal development as well as fully integrated into relevant curricula for pre-deployment training and education of military, police and civilian peacekeepers.

In order to rectify the current international lack of civilian capacity, States should seek to contribute to peace operations in an effective and efficient manner by developing a comprehensive human resource generation plan for peace operations.

There are also many suggestions for cooperative action by States to work with the UN and regional organizations, using UN standardised training modules, common training concepts, integrated training strategies, and common performance benchmarks emphasizing
the principles and techniques of cooperation and coordination across organizations and disciplines.

**Looking to the Future**

Following the presentation of the Challenges Project Phase II Report at the UN HQ in NY, the Project Partners agreed to continue their cooperation on the Challenges of Peace Operations. Building on the results and achievements of the Challenges Project and its unique network of partner organizations, representatives of international and regional organizations and other key actors, it was decided by Challenges Project Partner Organizations to establish an International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations. In order to serve the cause of international peace and security and to fully realize the potential of a longstanding partnership and joint effort, the forum will provide the international community with a dynamic, strategic, broad-based and stable platform for a regular discussion on the challenges of peace operations among policy-makers, practitioners and academics.
THE CYPRUS CONFLICT AND THE UNFICYP

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ahmet SÖZEN

Cyprus Policy Center

Introduction

It is generally accepted that any peacekeeping force is organized around the following six principles:

1. neutrality (impartiality in the dispute and nonintervention in the fighting)
2. using light military equipment
3. use of force only in self-defense
4. consent of the conflicting parties
5. prerequisite of a ceasefire agreement
6. contribution of contingents on a voluntary basis.

These principles determine the size, composition, and limits of the mission. Given these principles, in way constraints, peace keeping organizations (PKOs) usually perform the following missions:

1. preventive deployment to zones of conflict
2. verification of cease-fire agreements, safe areas, and troop withdrawal
3. disarmament and demobilization of combatants
4. mine clearance, training, and awareness programs
5. providing secure conditions for humanitarian aid and peace building functions.
Within this framework one can analyze whether PKOs are effective solutions for protracted conflicts. However, there are different opinions on this point. “Some feel that, though the solutions offered by PKOs may not be complete, in many situations they are the best that can be hoped for. One author argues, however, that according to the general framework of criteria for PKOs most have been failures.” The mission of the UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) which was created in 1964 is a good example to demonstrate how difficult it is to evaluate a peacekeeping mission.

The Cyprus conflict is one of the unresolved and long-lasting issues of the international community. This conflict has cost both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, in terms of lives, orphaned children, economic loss and psychological destruction. The conflict began in the 1950s, erupted violently with bloodshed at the end of the 1950s and in December 1963. The conflict culminated in 1974 with the interventions of Greece and later Turkey that led to the island’s current de facto division as the Greek Cypriot SOUTH (Republic of Cyprus) and the Turkish Cypriot NORTH (TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). The Cyprus issue has been addressed over the past four decades by dozens of UN Security Council resolutions that have proved to be futile thus far.

The most recent and comprehensive solution proposal, a UN blueprint known as the Annan Plan included internationally endorsed parameters for a Cyprus solution and was put to separate and simultaneous referenda among Greek and Turkish Cypriots on 24 April 2004. The plan called for the reunification of the island, as the United Cyprus Republic, in a bi-zonal federal structure comprised of two constituent states, the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State. The settlement plan was supported by 65% of the Turkish Cypriots, yet voted down by 76% of the Greek Cypriot community.

The Cyprus Conflict

The Republic of Cyprus was created after long and arduous negotiations especially between the two “motherlands” – Greece and Turkey – in order to find a compromised solution between the two ethnic communities in Cyprus after the British colonial rule. The 1959 London and Zurich Agreements were the international treaties that led to the creation of the Republic of Cyprus.

By the end of 1963, the republic collapsed due to the inability of the two ethnic communities, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, to work together. The ethnic clashes, actually, started in the 1950s due to the debates on the future political form of the island when the British would withdraw as the colonial power from the island. The clashes erupted frequently, and culminated in 1963, 1967 and lastly in 1974 when a military coup d’état engineered by the then military regime of Greece tried to overthrow the Greek Cypriot government and unite the whole island with Greece. This resulted in the landing of Turkish troops in Cyprus, in order to prevent the Greek coup from actualizing Enosis – union with Greece.

Today, the two communities - the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities - who were the co-founders of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus live separately, each community in its own geographically separate territory. What is known as the Republic of Cyprus has come under a totally Greek Cypriot administration since the end of 1963 which is recognized internationally
and still maintains its seat at the UN general Assembly as a sovereign state. The other co-founder of the 1960 Republic, the Turkish Cypriot community, since 1963 has been living under a separate Turkish Cypriot administration. Since 1983, the Turkish Cypriots have been living under their self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which has all the characteristics and the organs of a small nation state in accordance with the modern state system since the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Yet, it is not recognized internationally, except by Turkey.

Therefore, in reality there have been two nation states in Cyprus since 1963. One (Republic of Cyprus) is recognized as the de jure state of the whole island and it claims the sovereignty of the whole island. However, in fact it has de facto sovereignty only on the two-thirds of the island on the southern part of Cyprus. On the other hand, there is a de facto republic, the TRNC, which, just like Taiwan, is not recognized internationally, but has the de facto sovereignty with the help of some thirty thousand Turkish troops on its territory in the north.

It is clear that while the two communities had developed their respective separate governing institutions, since 1968 the leaderships of the two communities have continued to negotiate – on and off – under the UN auspices in order to find a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. Although the two political governing bodies in the island have evolved and operated independent from each other and that they are deeply divided since 1963, all the proposals of a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem called for some degree of cooperation, power-sharing and integration of the two communities and their respective governing bodies.

The UNFICYP

The emergence of the ethnic violence in Cyprus in December 1963 spilled over to 1964. “On 4 March 1964, the (UN Security) Council unanimously adopted resolution 186 (1964), by which it recommended the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The Force became operationally established on 27 March 1964.”

The UNFICYP mandate was defined as: “…in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. This mandate has been regularly extended by the Security Council in most cases for every six months.

After the Greek coup d'état in July 1974 and the successive Turkish military operations in July and August, the Security Council adopted several resolutions which have modified the functioning of UNFICYP. In that regard, the UNFICYP was required to perform certain additional functions such as “the maintenance of the ceasefire. Following the de facto ceasefire, UNFICYP inspected the deployment of the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces, and ceasefire lines and a buffer zone were established between the areas controlled by the opposing forces.”

The ceasefire lines extend approximately 180 kilometers across the island. The buffer zone between the lines varies in width from less than 20 meters to some 7 kilometers, and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land. Strict adherence to the military status quo in the buffer zone, as recorded by UNFICYP at the
time, has become a vital element in preventing a recurrence of fighting. UNFICYP maintains surveillance through a system of observation posts, and through air, vehicle and foot patrols.

The task of UNFICYP is significantly complicated by the absence of a formal ceasefire agreement. As a result, UNFICYP is confronted with hundreds of incidents each year. The most serious incidents tend to occur in areas where the ceasefire lines are in close proximity, particularly in Nicosia and its suburbs. The Force investigates and acts upon all violations of the ceasefire and the military status quo. Its reaction in each case depends on the nature of the incident and may include the deployment of troops, verbal and written protests and follow-up action to ensure that the violation has been rectified or will not recur. In addition to maintaining the military status quo, UNFICYP must also preserve the integrity of the buffer zone from unauthorized entry or activities by civilians. As a result, UNFICYP has from time to time become involved in crowd control.

**Civilian Police**

The UN civilian police cooperate and are in liaison with the Greek Cypriot police and the Turkish Cypriot police regarding the matters which are intercommunal in nature. The UN civilian police, together with the line units, contribute to law and order in the UN buffer zone. In addition, they participate in investigations and in the UNFICYP’s humanitarian activities.

**Humanitarian Activities**

The UNFICYP tries to maintain normal civilian activities in the buffer zone as much as possible. “For example, it facilitates the resumption of farming in the buffer zone; assists both communities on matters related to the supply of electricity and water across the lines; facilitates normal contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; provides emergency medical services; and delivers mail and Red Cross messages across the lines.”

In addition, the UNFICYP undertakes certain humanitarian functions for the Greek Cypriots and a small Maronite community who live in the North Cyprus. In the same logic, the UNFICYP pays regular visits to Turkish Cypriots who live in the South Cyprus and provides assistance to them in maintaining contact with their relatives who live in the North Cyprus.

**Civilian Police Component Strengthened**

The UN Secretary General in his report to the Security Council on 27 May 2003, recommended an increase in the number of the UNFICYP civilian police component (UNCIVPOL) by up to 34 officers. The Secretary General argued that the increase was necessary “because as of 23 April 2003 several crossing points were opened by the Turkish Cypriot authorities for visits in both directions, resulting in an average number of crossings per day of approximately 13,000 people. Ensuring safe and orderly passage within the buffer zone was essentially the task of UNCIVPOL. Furthermore, due to the increased number of
incidents in the UN buffer zone, more UNFICYP involvement outside the buffer zone became obligatory for which the UNFICYP does not have the sufficient resources.

**Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices**

By and large, the situation in Cyprus has remained calm, in spite of occasional small incidents that increased the tension between the two sides. “Both sides have generally respected the ceasefire and the military status quo. But, as the Secretary-General has repeatedly stated, the continuing quiet should not obscure the fact that there is only a cease fire in Cyprus, not peace.” The UN Security Council has frequently stated that the status quo in Cyprus is not acceptable.

After 1974, the UN Security Council asked the Secretary General to carry out a new mission of good offices with the representatives of the two communities in Cyprus. Since then, the successive Secretaries General and their Special Representatives have tried to find a modus operandi that would be acceptable to both sides in Cyprus.

During the period between 1999 and 2004, a very intensive effort was spent on the negotiations between the two sides under the auspices of the UN. This effort had produced the UN blueprint, known as the Annan Plan, which included internationally endorsed parameters for a Cyprus solution. It was put to separate and simultaneous referenda among Greek and Turkish Cypriots on 24 April 2004. The plan called for the reunification of the island, as the United Cyprus Republic, in a bi-zonal federal structure comprised of two constituent states, the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State. It was, however, rejected by the Greek Cypriots by a margin of three to one while it was approved by the Turkish Cypriots by a margin of two to one. Hence, it did not enter into force.

In his report to the UN Security Council on 28 May 2004, the Secretary General stated that there was “no apparent basis for resuming the good offices effort while the current stalemate continues.” Kofi Annan, however, indicated that it was time for a review of the full range of United Nations peace activities in Cyprus.

Following a review of the mandate, force levels and concept of operations of UNFICYP, the Secretary-General, in his report dated 24 September 2004, recommended that the Security Council reduce the military component of the mission to 860, down from the current 1,224, while extending its mandate until mid-2005 to foster conditions conducive to a comprehensive settlement. He also proposed a more mobile and efficient concept of operations. The Secretary-General also called for a boost in the number of civilian affairs officers working in the mission, noting that their work had grown qualitatively and quantitatively as they interceded on behalf of members of one community or the other to ease specific situations.

**Report of the UN Secretary General on the UNFICYP**

The UN Secretary General on 29 November 2005 submitted to the Security Council his regular report on the activities of UNFICYP which covered the period from 21 May to 24 November. According to the Secretary General “the situation in Cyprus remained stable, with calm prevailing along the ceasefire lines. The opening of additional crossing points and small
increases in trade between the two sides enhanced the opportunity for people-to-people contact, yet progress towards a political solution was “negligible at best”.”

The Secretary General reaffirmed his belief that only a comprehensive settlement would end the Cyprus conflict. Hence, the UN Secretary General stated that, in the absence of a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus conflict, the presence of UNFICYP on the island is necessary. So, Kofi Annan recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of the UNFICYP for a further period of six months, until 15 June 2006.

**Cyprus Today**

Today, public opinion polls show that the two sides by and large maintain their referenda positions. President Papadopoulos, the Greek Cypriot leader, enjoys significant public support for his “no” policy. On the other hand, President Talat, the Turkish Cypriot leader, converted support for the Annan plan into successive electoral victories. On 20 February 2005, Talat’s party, CTP-BG, became the winner of the parliamentary election in North Cyprus. Moreover, on 17 April 2005, the Turkish Cypriots, this time in the Presidential election, once again demonstrated their continued commitment to a comprehensive solution in Cyprus and integration with the EU by electing Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat as their President.

The two election results show a clear victory for the pro-EU and pro-solution (Annan Plan) policies in North Cyprus. The EU and the US also interpreted the results in this manner by showing their pleasure at Talat’s victory who swiftly offered an olive branch to Greek Cypriots in his post-election victory speech.

I want to call on the Greek Cypriot’s side leadership to take our hand which we are extending in peace to them. We will continue to put our best effort for reconciliation and a solution to the Cyprus problem.

The international community has acknowledged the democratic will of the Turkish Cypriots. According to the EU Commission, “the results indicate a clear desire of the Turkish Cypriot community to continue preparations for their full integration into the EU.” Furthermore, “the results also show that the Turkish Cypriots are committed to the reunification of Cyprus.”

The current Greek Cypriot political leadership under President Papadopoulos, however, has neither the intention nor the motivation to accept a compromised solution based on power sharing with the Turkish Cypriots. Alvaro De Soto, the previous UN representative to Cyprus, recently confirmed the Greek Cypriot position by arguing that the Greek Cypriot economic position and their EU membership left no motivation for them to accept a compromised solution such as the Annan Plan. Even Greek Cypriot former Foreign Minister, Nikos Rolandis, indicated that the current Greek Cypriot political leadership was not interested in a solution in Cyprus.

Given the intransigence of the Greek Cypriot leadership regarding the resumption of peace negotiations, it is up to the international community to find ways to motivate the Greek Cypriot leadership to return to the table. The international community can make a good start by simply honoring its pre-referenda promises and lifting the restrictions and isolation on the Turkish Cypriots. This may suggest to the Greek Cypriot leadership that their current policy
would lead to the permanent division of the island and would enhance the role of the moderates in the Turkish Cypriot community who supported the UN blueprint. So far, the US has been the most active actor in trying to ease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. Recently, a delegation of the American businessman and a delegation of the American Congressman arrived at North Cyprus through Ercan airport. Most recently, the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice invited President Talat to the US. Though an average Turkish Cypriot has not perceived these steps as concrete openings on the ground, nonetheless they are symbolically very important indicating that it is indeed possible to erase the isolations on the Turkish Cypriots. This is also compatible with the UN Secretary General’s 28 May 2004 report on Cyprus, in which he observed

The decision of the Turkish Cypriots is to be welcomed. The Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey have made clear their respect for the wish of the Turkish Cypriots to reunify in a bicomunal, bizonal federation. The Turkish Cypriot vote has undone any rationale for pressuring and isolating them. I would hope that the members of the Council can give a strong lead to all states to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies, to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development.

After the referenda the Turkish Cypriots who voted for the compromised solution and the reunification of the island are still out in the cold. They are under isolation and restrictions, despite the pre-referenda promises of the EU and other countries that the Turkish Cypriots would not be punished for their YES vote to the solution.

**Conclusion**

Morris argues that UN peacekeeping activities in Cyprus have not been successful in reaching a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus conflict. Although the UNFICYP does not have the mission to produce a political settlement, it has been unsuccessful in mobilizing the two opponents even to normalize the situation in Cyprus. Morris argues that by enforcing the de facto territorial divisions on the island for over thirty years, peacekeeping activities have made a return to one state in Cyprus very unlikely.

We can agree that the goal of PKOs is admirable. We can also agree that even partial successes in intractable conflicts are desirable. However, it is not clear that PKOs have the ability to succeed in most conflicts. The goal of any PKO should not be to establish a marginally stable peace that lasts a few years, as is the case with Liberia or Zimbabwe, but to establish a lasting peace in which liberal institutions can be built, gain legitimacy, and guarantee peace, as is happening in Mozambique. The only hope for success in peacekeeping operations requires sustained interest from the international community, along with detailed plans for state building after the core goals of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and reconstruction. These ideals have been clearly set out in Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace as a matter of policy, but have yet to be realized as a policy in practice.

Since the ground is currently not suitable for a comprehensive solution in Cyprus, some CBMs (confidence building measures) can be adopted to play a catalyzing role towards a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem. In that regard, the UN’s creative and balanced CBMs proposal of 1993 should be re-tabled. According to the UN proposal, it was proposed to simultaneously open the fenced area of Varosha as a free trade zone between the two sides in the island under the UN administration to the resettlement of its inhabitants and open the Nicosia International Airport in the buffer zone under the UN administration to the cargo and civilian passenger traffic of the two sides in Cyprus. Here, the EU administration
can also be utilized for the two CBMs. In that way, it will be possible to integrate the two economies in Cyprus that will have a huge positive impact on the necessity to find a comprehensive solution in Cyprus. Moreover, such steps would make it possible for both the EU and the UN to honor their pre-referenda promises to the Turkish Cypriots.

It is such concrete steps which can motivate the Greek Cypriot political leadership to resume the peace negotiations towards a comprehensive solution. Otherwise, the Greek Cypriot side would be more than happy with the continuation of the current status quo where they continue to hold the title of the “legal” government of the Republic of Cyprus (without the Turkish Cypriot presence) and that the Republic of Cyprus under a purely Greek Cypriot participation is a full member of the EU. It should be noted, however, that the above mentioned steps to lift the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots should not be taken just for the purpose of motivating the Greek Cypriot leadership to resume the peace negotiations. Moreover, these steps should be taken primarily on humanitarian grounds.
REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE TO UN PEACE OPERATIONS – II
POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS TO THE COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF CRISES AND THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY

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The UN must repeatedly face the contradiction between its enforcement incapability and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. As the experience of the recent years has often demonstrated under the prevalent conditions of the contemporary collective security system, the actions taken by “coalitions of the willing” can be the most effective responses to threats to or the breach of international security as preventive or enforcement measures against the eruption, the escalation and recurrence of violent conflicts. Crisis management operations – various forms of interventions, security assistance and peace support missions – through the involvement of combined and multinational forces either as “ad hoc formations” or as the mobilised potential of “regional arrangements” appear to be the only effective and applicable remedy for the symptoms and consequences brought about by internal violence, ethnic conflicts and civil wars.

1. United Nations framework for co-operation with regional organisations: Chapter VIII of the UN Charter

Although Article 24 in Chapter V of the Charter clearly trusts the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the Security Council, the Charter provides a role for regional organizations and arrangements in the maintenance of peace and
security in their respective regions. Under Chapter VIII, Article 52(1) states that nothing in the Charter should be understood to preclude "the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action."

The priority of peaceful settlement of "local disputes" through regional arrangements or agencies by the members of such organisations before referring it to the Security Council is not solely recognised, but actually prescribed by the Charter. As for coercive measures, the second sentence of Article 53(1) clearly determines that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council". Although no priority is granted to regional organisations in the course of enforcement actions, the Security Council is expected to rely upon regional arrangements or agencies where appropriate. It can be argued that the employment of regional structures of cooperation are not solely recommended as optional tools at the disposal of the United Nations: "the Charter expressly directs the Security Council to utilise the regional arrangements or agencies covered by Chapter VIII for enforcement action where appropriate." Some other authors stress the discretionary power of the Security Council to contemplate to take coercive measures itself pursuant to the provisions of Chapter VII. Even these views admit: "After all, the recent resolutions practice of the Security Council clearly shows that today the Council is fully aware of the need for, and benefits of, a closer interaction between universal and regional crisis management."

The proliferation of conflicts in many parts of the world and the explosive growth in demand for peace operations prompted an extended role for regional organisations – "arrangements and agencies" as usually referred to in the texts of UN resolutions – in their peace-making, peacekeeping and enforcement capacities. Many of the regional and subregional organizations faced the same resource constraints in the conduct of their peacekeeping activities, thus highlighting the importance of matching resources to mandates, irrespective of which organization has been assigned to implement those mandates. The situations in various pockets of violent conflicts in the Balkans, West-Africa, Central-Asia and South East Asia all focused attention upon potential partnerships between the universal collective framework, the United Nations and continental formations, regional arrangements and subregional organisations - in particular the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) transformed into the African Union (AU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU), Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) - in resolving complex emergencies as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

2. The elastic contours of regional formations/associations

No official definition of "regional arrangement", "agency" or, with the more frequently and generally applied reference, "regional organisation" has been adopted by either political organs of the United Nations. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognises their existence, determine the main contours of their position and possible role in the UN system, but does not propose any exact or even approximate definition. By the use of a more transparent taxonomy of conventional categories, regional arrangements can be classified as treaties or treaty regimes of regional character, regional agencies are perceived as international agencies established by regional arrangements.
In order to come to grips with a more comprehensive and systematic notion, the following tripartite of raison d’être are suggested for regional organisations within the context of the United Nations system:

- functional organisations with their focus on regional economic integration or transnational community building such as the British Commonwealth, the Commonwealth of Independent States or the ASEAN
- multilateral defence organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or the ANZUS Pact against external threats
- “genuine regional organisations” against intra-regional threats arising among the members such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Organisation of American States (OAS) or the Arab League

The literally understanding of the term “regional” refers to the regional proximity of members as the territorial cornerstone of association. More importantly, the rationale underlying the creation of permanent institutionalised structures of co-operation within certain geographical areas can be more aptly identified on the ground of political affinity, security motives and shared sense of community, rather than on the basis of simple juxtaposition on the map. Consequently, the activities or the competencies of regional organisations are not necessarily confined to the area of its membership or one exclusive geographical region.

Some publicists may define the profile of a regional arrangement or agency as “the union of states or an international organisation based upon a collective treaty or a constitution and consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the UN, whose primary task is the maintenance of peace and security”. The security vocation as their defining feature is presumed to be focused “internally” which is the essential aspect of differentiation from “externally focused systems of collective self-defence under Article 51”. It vividly indicates one particular understanding of regional institutions as structures adequate for discharging locally the primary responsibility of the universal organisation of collective maintenance of peace and security. It can be reasonably argued that the reference to regional organisations in Article 53 does not contain any element that would confine the range of potential partners and possible frameworks for regional action only to formations with distinct security profile. As a matter of sheer political will, some regional institutions (most prominently the ECOWAS) proved to be fit to provide its members with the necessary forum for co-operation, decision-making and guidance beyond their usual responsibilities, and serve as the linchpin for regional collective action by temporary coalitions of interested and available countries.

The scope of action by regional arrangements and agencies are not restricted to their members. Suitable institutions at local, regional or continental level of interactions dealing with matters of security governance can be mobilised to wield their tools in response to crises “as appropriate for regional action” without the constraints of membership considerations. Interestingly enough, only the obligation of peaceful solution of localised disputes with the assistance of regional organisations seems to be limited to those states which are parties to regional arrangements or members of regional agencies. Article 52 (2) and (3) prescribe for them the duty to “make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies” and make these attempts a mandatory preliminary stage before these local disputes could appear on the agenda of the Security Council.

3. Implementation of Security Council resolutions by a group of Member States or regional arrangements
In cases of so called “failed” or “nascent” states (Somalia 1991, Albania 1997, East-Timor 1999-2002, Afghanistan 2001) when a government either ceased to exist or not yet come into existence, the (re)establishment of political authority and legitimate sovereignty with its indispensable functional attributes has emerged as one of the necessary goals to prevent the recurrence of the situation – internal violence, civil war and serious breaches of the fundamental norms of humanity - triggering the initial international action. To provide at least a relatively secure environment for the operation of the international political, civilian and humanitarian presence facilitating post-conflict reconstruction, protection and assistance by multinational security forces of various magnitudes became the pivotal condition of success for these initiatives.

Such demand for international military operations quickly revealed the need for the active involvement of regional organisations or “the coalitions of willing states”. The advent of complex and prolonged international efforts to create and restore internationally responsible political entities of collective security and at least elementary legality internationally and domestically heralded the dawn of a period of increasing relevance for regional organisations of security potential. The implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning “peace support” or “peace-building” operations with authorisation for forceful measures depend on the active participation of States or regional arrangements due to the lack of independently deployable military forces available to the United Nations.

Thus the efficiency and enforcement of Security Council decisions, by other words, the maintenance of international order and collective security has to rely exclusively upon the contributions and commitments of the Member States either individually in ad hoc coalitions or through of “regional arrangement or agencies”. Without Member States or arrangements, which consider themselves responsible for the implementation of measures agreed upon either in the Security Council or at local level among the parties to a conflict, the means and vehicles of international crisis management remain hollow instruments.

4. Regional organisations and conflict management

Exactly for the above reason, regional and sub-regional organisations are increasingly called upon to lead international efforts – alone or in tandem with the UN – in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict peace-building. However, regional and sub-regional organizations cannot simply be treated as convenient substitutes and alternatives for the inaction of the UN and the larger international community in violence-prone regions. Few regional arrangements or agencies have the capacity to live up to the expectations as the source of regional security in cases of internal violent conflicts moving up on the escalation ladder. The need for co-ordinated efforts for conflict prevention by the UN system is far greater than ever before, due to the complex nature of conflicts – violent and overwhelmingly intrastate – and their potential for damage and destruction in the social fabric of affected societies.

During the 1990s, regional organisations have played an increasingly active role in regional security affairs, not only in the realms of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace-building, but in peace enforcement actions. Most regions do not have organisations with capacity to carry out major peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. The relationship between the United Nations and those regional organisations - NATO, ECOWAS/ECOMOG already and EU progressively - which are endowed with the necessary capabilities and policy
co-ordination mechanism has been complex, but often successful. The UN Secretary-General warned against the possible shortcomings of sometime difficult co-operation: “conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacemaking must not become an area of competition between the United Nations and regional organisations”. Ideally and primarily, regional organisations should seek the authorisation or the approval of the Security Council before their preventive or enforcement action, unless the lack of consensus in the Council becomes evident resulting in the failure to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. Regional organisation – some significant differentiation

From the outset, Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter envisaged the possible and desirable co-operation between the United Nations as a universal organisation and regional arrangements not only in peaceful resolution of disputes but also for “enforcement action under the Security Council’s authorisation. Only a few regional organisations have capabilities for military enforcement in any case. Even if when and where regional - security and political - arrangements are strong and capable of effective action, still “more needs to be done to strengthen their ties with the United Nations and to build durable global/regional partnership”.

Regional and subregional organisations tend to have a greater stake in the prevention of instability and insecurity among their member states. The regional organisations most frequently referred to in connection to regional conflict prevention – Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Organisation of African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU), Organisations of American States (OAS), Association of South Asian States (ASEAN) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - are counted as actors of mediation, inquiry, confidence building and other measures of preventive diplomacy within the circle of their membership. Acting outside the geographical region of the territory of their constituent members and in conflicts not directly affecting any of their member states is not considered to belong to the characteristic competencies of these organisations.

These features of regional organisations have to be remembered when the significance of European regional organisations with security responsibilities and capabilities - either already active (NATO) or currently building up its own identity in this dimension (EU) – come under examination. Their legal self-definition, existing or fledgling military capacity and political intention to act outside the territory of their member states (“out of area”) by force, if and when appropriate, distinguish fundamentally these institutions of Transatlantic and European security from the regional arrangements known generally in this class.

Most regions do not have organisations with the capacity to carry out substantial and decisive peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations. During the last decade, the regional arrangements – the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe - have played active, but differentiated roles in regional security affairs on the periphery of Europe in the Balkan and in the Caucasus. These organisations acted according to their respective capacities and competencies along the whole spectrum from preventive diplomacy, through peacekeeping, observer missions and confidence building to peace-enforcement and humanitarian intervention.

Their relationship with the United Nations has been complex, evolving and sometimes difficult. As the 1999 Annual Report of the United Nation’s Secretary-General on the Work
of the Organisation articulated the most important lesson from recent experience: “First, it is imperative that regional security operations be mandated by the Security Council if the legal basis for the international security system is to be maintained. Frequently, such operations will also need the wider political support that only the United Nations can provide and peace settlement will often require United Nations involvement under Security Council authority”.

6. Enforcement power of regional arrangements

The delegation by the Security Council of its Chapter VII powers in the form of mandates for the use of force (by “all necessary means”) ensures though that in the absence of a standing UN force, enforcement measures can only take place if and when perceived national interests of potential participants - countries with the necessary military capacity - are involved and understood to be threatened by a given crisis or its broader implications.

The prior authorisation to use force (Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Albania, East-Timor) or the ex post facto approval of forcible (armed) measures (Liberia, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Kosovo) can be granted in three different forms.

In one case, the authorisation is generally addressed to “Member States” of the United Nations and provides a broad mandate for the international community as a whole to respond to the breach of peace or the threat to it. It has been illustrated by the Security Council resolutions concerning the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the second possible case, the mandate is either handed over to a member state explicitly authorising it to undertake action – operation Turquoise by France (with Senegal) in Rwanda in 1994 - on behalf of the Security Council or the mandate is open for broad participation but welcomes the offer made by a particular state to take the lead – Italy in Albania in 1997 and Australia in East-Timor in 1999 - in organising and commanding the international action.

The third scenario may be quite confidently determined as the most significant course of developing practice. In this case, prior authorisation or ex post facto endorsement is granted to a “regional arrangement” (regional organisation or alliance) to carry out forceful collective security responses. Since this option is specifically provided for in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Article 53), delegation of enforcement powers to a regional arrangement can be, in formal sense, less questionable than delegation to member states.

Coercive capabilities to enforce, deter or protect are needed to various extent at almost any stage or in any variation - with the exception of the traditional peacekeeping mission – of military conflict management missions. Regional organisations generally do not possess these means. It must be emphasized that no other regional organization has the same capacity as NATO in this regard. None of them is even comparable to the fledgling EU military operational potential though it is legally distinct, still hardly separable technically from the capabilities of the North Atlantic Alliance for the time being. This simple fact explains why the actual enforcement competence of the NATO or the prospective capacity of the EU to deploy - up to 60 000 at its best - troops to implement the military aspects of the ESDP are rare and very much valued assets in the international community.
The two organisations of the European and the North Atlantic regions represent the exceptions to the general limits of regional security or political arrangements. Consequently, in the course of their efforts to prevent, contain or terminate deteriorating violent crises the acts of these European/Transatlantic organisations could not only employ unusual military force, but carry exceptional legal significance. The NATO already is and the European Union is going to be increasingly able to play such an instrumental role in the formation of reference examples of collective security actions and in the implementation of coercive security measures which no other regional organisation or even occasional “coalition of the willing” could match.
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF PEACE OPERATIONS
In this presentation, we are going to concentrate on the legal dimensions of peace operations. "Peace operations" is an umbrella term, which covers various types of UN forces. As UN functions, peace operations are designed to restore or to maintain international peace and security. Under this broad heading, I would like to limit the topic to types of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. My aim is to illustrate main legal parameters, dimensions and other legal points of these two types, by using some emplacements of military forces under UN authority.

From the legal standpoint, international deployments of military troops should firstly be authorized by international law. Among other sources of international law, the UN Charter, known as the constitution of the international law, is the top basic legal document which permits peace operations. Under international law, legislative attempts to control use of force fall broadly into two categories. These are the circumstances in which force may properly be used and the manner in which hostilities are conducted. The former remains within the scope of general international law, especially deals with the UN Charter. But the latter is enshrined by international humanitarian law and human rights law. Even though international humanitarian law may be applicable to some kinds of peace operations, I like to limit my speech to legal aspects remaining within sphere of general international law.
According to their legal dimensions under international law which is mainly shaped by the UN Charter, peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations are very different from each other. Peacekeeping is a non combatant, non enforcement and consensual military activity. While, peace enforcement is a combatant, coercive military activity, like a war. And, that is why; peace enforcement is expressly authorized under the UN Charter Chapter VII. On the other hand, peacekeeping, not being clearly enshrined, even not being mentioned in the Charter, gradually emerged from UN practices. Despite the fact that peacekeeping is not expressly authorized under UN Charter, there in, Security Council and General Assembly have enough legal capacity to establish peacekeeping operation, as a means of pacific settlement of conflict. Therefore; today, there are not any doubts about the legality of peacekeeping.

Legal and practical differences between peace enforcement and peace keeping arise from the UN Charter's system. This system postulated that states ought to settle their disputes peacefully and never use force subject to the exception of self defense. In this context; UN Security Council would act as a world police and enforcement agency. According to the UN's system based on the Charter, the initial responsibility for the pacific resolution of conflicts rests on the parties to a dispute. They are forbidden to use violence but must instead try to find pacific solution without endangering international peace and security. If the parties cannot reach to a peaceful solution and the disputes may endanger international peace and security, the parties have to bring the dispute before the UN Security Council or General Assembly. If so, among other means of pacific settlements, such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, the UN Secretary-General could also be instructed to establish a peacekeeping force as a peaceful means.

If fighting has actually broken out, the UN Charter gives the Security Council powerful coercive means to counter aggression and other threats to peace. If there is fighting, the Security Council will have authority to go beyond recommendations and to make binding decisions to restore and maintain international peace and security. In order to do so, the Council should decide that a threat to or breach of the peace exists. Such a finding implies that subsequent Council decisions have the quality of a legal obligation. Only in those situations, a peace enforcement military action pressure may be initiated against violators of the Charter by the Security Council. In this context; aggressor state could be punished until its aggression is reversed. Under the Charter, Security Council may take action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace or security. Under this collective security system, peace enforcement kinds of military actions remain under the strict responsibility and solely authority of the Security Council.

On the other line, as being a very different approach, peacekeeping technique has been emerged as a tool of pacific settlement of disputes between states. Because they lack any constitutional basis in the UN Charter, peacekeeping forces are to be sent only with the consent of country or countries in which they are stationed. Consent should be obtained from the government concerned. In its more recent peacekeeping operations, the UN has tried to gain the consent of all factions in some civil war. This has been the approach in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If the consent of the government is not given or withdrawn, then the peacekeeping operation cannot remain on that state's territory, unless the UN is prepared to change its mandate to enforcement. For example, UNEF I was withdrawn by the UN after Egypt had taken back its consent in 1967.

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Despite the possibility of a peacekeeping force being converted into an enforcement action, the likelihood is slim. First of all, contributing states to a peacekeeping force would have to give permission for their troops to be used in enforcement action. Thus making drastic changes of mandates is unlikely. Secondly, the force would have to be rearmed and would have to be considerable expanded if they were to become an effective unit. Finally, such a conversion in mandate would make it less likely that states would willingly accept peacekeeping forces in the future. Consent is required not only for the operation's establishment, but also for its mandate.

In peacekeeping operation, the parties concerned are supposed to cooperate for smooth functioning of the operation. If there is cooperation the logistic, infrastructure, communication, transportation and supply can depend upon the good will of the local authorities. As an UN peacekeeping force located in Golan Heights, UNDOF headquarters maintained close cooperation with the Israeli and Syrian authorities. At the local level, the commanders of the UNDOF units kept liaison with one side or the other side through liaison officers designated by the parties. This was one of the reasons of UNDOF's success. UNIFIL, another UN peacekeeping force in southern LEBANON, was not able to carry out its mandate because the parties did not cooperate with it.

In peacekeeping operation, it is a key principle that the operation must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host countries and must not favor one party against another. This requirement of impartiality is fundamental to ensure that the operation is effective. In the case of UN Irak-Kuveyt observation mission, UNIKOM kept its neutrality in peacekeeping, although UN was charged with being a party to the conflict.

Another important aspect of peacekeeping which distinguishes it clearly from the enforcement action is that the peacekeeping forces are only authorized to use force in self-defense. The peacekeepers have no rights of enforcement and their use of force is limited to self-defense as a last resort. But that is not to say that peacekeeping forces should not be strengthened. This limitation on the use of force does not hinder the work of inter-state peacekeeping forces, when these states have consented to the force. But it presents problems in the intra-state situation when only the host government has given consent, or the leaders of the factions in the conflict agree to the force but unable or unwilling to control their forces. The problem was acute in the case of UNPROFOR. The force was agreed to Croatia and Serbia to oversee a cease-fire between them. In this task, the force was successful. But after it was involved in the conflict in Bosnia, this cease-fire was breached by Serbs, putting the lives of the force at risk. This situation led to the Security Counsel to take some forceful measures on the borderline between peacekeeping and enforcement.

In this respect we may conclude that peacekeeping troops are established, sent or stationed only with consent, cooperation and coordination. It should be noted that peacekeeping forces, unlike enforcement combat units, are not designed to create the conditions for their own success on the ground. These conditions must pre-exist for them to be able to perform their role. For that reasons, these general legal parameters which I have tried to explain, are to be clearly defined in the relevant resolution of the UN.

Before concluding my presentation, I believe it would be useful to give you a brief explanation of some key legal documents controlling and limiting the whole peace operations. First of all, establishing peace operation depends on a mandate enshrined in a resolution of the
Security Council or General Assembly. The resolution authorizes and defines the basic nature and characteristics of the operation. Mandate in a resolution, provides international legal authority for the operation. Besides the UN, international regional organizations may establish peace operations only in peacekeeping character. The UN Charter encourages these kinds of function of regional organization in accordance with the Chapter VIII. In this case, mandates of operations usually result from treaties, agreements, resolutions or accords evolving from these organizations. Content of mandate should of course be the same as the UN mandates.

Mandate is the first top level authority under which an operation is conducted. Role, mission, size, organization, appointments and other administrative points are enshrined in the mandate. Mandate may subject to periodical renewal on the course of operation. Preparation of a mandate involves a great deal of diplomatic negotiation and compromise. Political expediency usually takes priority over military operational requirements. Mandate, in this context, should remain acceptable conflicting parties and contributing military troops to the operation. Mandate should be flexible enough for military troops to have freedom of movement.

In line with the resolution, the legal authority defines the parameters of the operation. Operation is conducted under the control of legal authority. In this context, the duties, responsibilities, privileges and immunities of the peace force are laid in the relevant international agreement and other legal documents. The second key legal document that defines legal authority and responsibilities of a force and force personnel participating in a peace operation is Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). SOFA may be a treaty or memorandum of understanding. This is an agreement negotiated between the UN and host countries. It details rights, privileges, immunities and the nature of services to be provided to the force and its personnel, as well as their responsibilities and obligations. Participating states provide input to the UN secretariat on details in the SOFA, but the secretariat and host nation may, however negotiate agreement. A key subject enshrined in SOFA is the exercise of jurisdiction. Unless SOFA says otherwise, force will be subject to local law. Ordinarily, SOFA grant limited immunity to force and its personnel performing official duty from host nation jurisdiction. In this respect commander should discuss jurisdictional provisions with their servicing staff judge advocate. Participating states may individually negotiate a memorandum of understanding with host nation concerning specific items not covered in the SOFA. SOFA does not require renewal because being a standing agreement.

In an addition to mandate and SOFA, force and its personnel must be familiar with or have a working knowledge of other applicable directives and regulations that further define and provide legal authority for conduct of operation. In this respect, the Secretary General of the UN, upon appointing force commander, issues a formal written directive to him, outlining the Terms of Reference. Secretariat General also issues subsequent direction in supplementary directives. Upon receipt of the UN regulations, the force commander prepares more detailed regulations and operating procedures for the force. All key members of the force must understand these procedures, since operation is to be conducted in accordance with them.
I. Introduction

The second international conference on security was held between April 5-6, 2006 with the attendance of many scholars, professionals from the field, government officials, international organization representatives and students at the Izmir University of Economics. The two-day affair gave participants an opportunity to hear about the challenges of peace operations in the 21st century along with the rewards of accomplishing peace in post-conflict societies and contributed to the increasing literature and academic studies in the area of peacekeeping. The participants all agreed that after the Cold War the traditional peacekeeping operations of the earlier years had now been replaced with multi-dimensional peace operations including state-building responsibilities for those involved in the process. State-building in and of itself is a multi-faceted term encompassing such issues as establishing human rights, the rule of law, protection of women and children and the monitoring of elections. As can be understood from this wide array of responsibilities, military personnel trained only in combat are no longer sufficient in providing peace operations with success.

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The new peace operations of the 21st century require adequately trained military and civilian personnel and this in turn requires a significant amount of funding from member states that engage in and contribute to peace operations.

On the first day of the conference, we heard from speakers with field experience along with experience in managing peace operations for the international organizations of NATO, UN and OSCE. Later in the day scholars gave their academic perspectives on the contributions of different international organizations in peace operations along with security sector reforms necessary in post-conflict societies. A special emphasis was also made on Turkey’s contributions to such operations.

On the second day, a more detailed discussion of the role of the UN and NATO in the stabilization of Afghanistan and Iraq were analyzed along with case studies of different regional peace operations. The legal dimensions of peace operations were also discussed in detail and the second day of the conference concluded with the student panel on the challenges to peace operations.

II. Review of the Presentations

The opening speech and subsequent presentation by Mr. Hikmet Çetin, the Senior Civilian Representative of the Alliance in Afghanistan, discussed Turkey’s very special role in restoring peace in Afghanistan and gave vivid accounts of his own experiences in trying to rebuild the war-torn nation. Mr. Çetin commented on the comeback of history to different regions of the world after the Cold War causing new ethnic conflicts in regions such as the Balkans and the Caucasus. The new world order, marked by advances in technology does not always end up in the right hands and the rising threat of terrorism is the prime example in this area. According to Mr. Çetin, terrorism is attacking our identity, values of sanctity and dignity of human rights, democracy, freedom and kinship among different peoples. What then is the solution to this rising threat upon the world? Mr. Çetin supplied us with several different answers, but in reality they reflect upon the need to have equitable redistribution of world resources, closing the ever-growing gap between the North and South in an effort to eliminate the reasons why hopeless people turn to becoming terrorists in the first place along with the need to have a cross-cultural dialogue among the different peoples of the world. As NATO invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its history after the September 11 attacks on the USA and led a multi-national military campaign against terrorists in Afghanistan, Mr. Çetin was able to give examples from his own experience in the area on how to accomplish eradicating violence in this deprived and poverty-stricken nation. He recounted the many accomplishments of Afghanistan after the NATO invasion such as the successful implementation of the Bonn agreement, the democratization of the country with its democratically elected president and parliament and the establishment and growth of Afghan national security forces. Yet, Afghanistan is still not free from the problems that plague many war-torn states such as terrorism, insurgency, drug trafficking, the limited reach of the central government in peripheral areas, poor judiciary and corruption. These are areas that the newly forming security forces of Afghanistan are not adequately and timely able to address yet. This is one of the main reasons that NATO is assisting the Afghan government and its security forces in dealing with these overwhelming issues. Mr. Çetin used Afghanistan as a case study to demonstrate the transformation of NATO from a military alliance to an organization that is becoming more and more involved with non-military issues such as post-conflict reconstruction. Mr. Çetin feels that as this transformation is taking place there are many new challenges and considerations that NATO should evaluate such as the need to get
to know the society in which operations are taking place, taking into account the cultural and historic traditions of the country along with the need to coordinate civil and military actors.

Commenting on the role of the UN in peace operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Deputy Director for the UN and International Organizations commented on the increasing diversity in both the content and regions of peace operations. Each one of the operations encompass different challenges and vary as in the examples of Haiti where the UN trained police forces, to direct involvement in active policing as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to election monitoring in Afghanistan to simple interposition forces in Cyprus. The military and civilian aspect differs from operation to operation and increasingly a humanitarian aspect encompassing such issues as the handling of refugees and internally displaced persons is also increasing. The number of actors involved in operations are also multiplying to include numerous international and regional organizations, international financial institutions, NGOs and different nation-states which also complicates their interactions and coordination on the field. Mr. Lacroix also commented on a growing chronic problem of all peace operations: the lack of resources. Financial and human resources are extremely limited for these operations and funding new operations has become a major challenge. This requires member states to dig deep into their pockets, something that most states are reluctant to do. A larger question, however, according to Lacroix is the question of what peace operations are about. The definitional vagueness of peace operations affects their very success and the aim of “bringing back durable stability” is just not precise enough. Not only do peace operations lack resources but they lack time as well. Since many of the states where operations are carried out have not been stable for many years, Mr. Lacroix posed to the audience the question: Is it plausible to expect peace operations to be successful in only a couple of years? This is one of the reasons why these operations can take longer than expected and that any future operations should be regarded as long-term endeavors. Contrary to public opinion, Mr. Lacroix argued that peace operations are a cheap alternative to military hostilities. The $5 billion cost of UN peace operations per year is slightly more than 1% of US annual military spending and the absence of these operations would not only be more financially straining but would also cause significant civilian deaths.

In addition to having coordinated actions among civil and military actors during peace operations, Michel Soula of the Crisis Management Policy Section of the NATO Operations Division mentioned the need to have coordination among the different international organizations like the UN, the EU, OSCE, NATO and other NGOs as each one of these organizations has a specific role along with expertise in different aspects of operations. They can all contribute within their specialized roles as resources to fund peace operations are scarce and the need to pool all possible resources arises. The joint action of these organizations can serve to double their capacity and can serve to enhance the success of the peace operation taking place. Mr. Soula also emphasized that the role of NATO is temporary in such societies, as NATO will inevitably leave the state where the operations are taking place. The ultimate goal is to leave behind a self-sufficient democratic state capable of internal and external security.

Outlining Turkey’s contributions to NATO, Nilüfer Narlı of Bahçeşehir University expanded upon Turkish participation in peace operations. In an era of growing terrorist threats, Turkey’s geostrategic position coupled with its commitment to NATO make it a very important regional actor. The Turkish military, one of the largest in the world, can also be of great assistance in NATO operations. Emphasizing the growing contribution of Turkey to NATO operations in diverse geographic areas such as Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and the
As a regional actor growing in size and importance, the EU constitutes a special concern for peace operations. Increasingly the borders of the EU and NATO are beginning to coincide, calling for the EU member states to cooperate with other regional actors and states in different peace operations. The conflict in the Balkans, in the very backyard of the EU, called attention to the need for a common security and defense policy for its member states. EU’s contributions to these operations and its transformation to a global actor in the area of security was the focus of Thierry Tardy’s presentation. Dr. Tardy of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, argued that the EU is better equipped than most other regional organizations in carrying out peace operations. In fact, according to him only the NATO and the UN have better capacities in this regard, however, the EU is developing itself in areas such as rapid reaction capabilities, movement control, intelligence, medical and logistic units which Dr. Tardy feels the UN is lacking. In essence, there is significant potential for the EU to grow in the area of peace operations. This growth however would also bring about the need for the EU and the UN to work together in the operations which could lead to complications as the EU would like to maintain its autonomy of decision and action and employ a more flexible approach. The relationship between the EU and the UN is an evolving one that will be shaped by the different operations they are engaged in in the future.

A growing need in future peace operations is the training and education of personnel involved in operations. Both Ambassador Murat Bilhan of the Center for Strategic Research of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and Beyhan Uğuz of the Turkish National Police gave detailed presentations about the training of personnel. The civilian contribution of policing as part of peace operations is a recent phenomenon. The responsibilities of police in these operations range from promoting law and order, to ensuring local police and criminal justice functions according to international standards and ensuring that elections are free and fair. Ambassador Bilhan, referring to the Turkish contribution to the peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, stated that Turkey’s contributions to UN operations has been growing steadfast in different areas such as Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Burundi, and the Ivory Coast just to name a few. In fact, as of October 2004, Turkey ranked third after Jordan and the USA in providing police officers to peace operations. This vast contribution of Turkey in this respect, according to Ambassador Bilhan outlines the importance Turkey gives to the civilian component of peace operations. Describing the Turkish police training program, Ambassador Bilhan noted that Turkish police academies also train foreign police. He also noted that the Turkish gendarmerie, though seen as a military institution, is actually administered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (and in essence is a civilian body), is ready to contribute to peace operations. The gendarmerie has the advantage of being an essentially police unit with military structures that allow for it to carry out more complicated endeavors such as law enforcement, intelligence gathering, investigation of cases and assisting in the immobilization of terrorist organizations.

Giving a more detailed perspective of the Turkish National Police and the United Nations Civilian Police (CIVPOL), Superintendent Beyhan Uğuz argued that there is a growing need for professional peacekeeper trainers as the number and scope of peace operations has increased. As CIVPOL officers are currently active in 13 operations around the world, Standardized Training Modules (STMs) have been prepared by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to train national trainers who then train their personnel for deployment in peace operations. STMs can be used during the different phases of
operations and serve as guidelines for peace officers and allow for officers involved to provide the necessary assistance to the societies where they are stationed. Mr. Uğsuz then outlined the stringent criteria necessary for Turkish police officers to join these operations such as proficiency in English, work experience, and a clean track record. The high qualities sought by the Turkish National Police in their recruitment of police officers for peacekeeping efforts outlines the importance Turkey places on these operations.

In a more theoretical view of the changes in armed forces in the new global order, Wilfried von Bredow of Philipps University in Marburg discussed “new wars, new missions, new militaries” that have created structural changes in the military institution. The traditional role of the armed forces, namely, fighting wars, has been transformed with the process of globalization which brought about new challenges such as the decreased role of the state and transformation of war. More and more, Prof. von Bredow argued, we are seeing failed states and local conflicts that have greater implications for the global dimension. Peace operations, created with the need to contain local violence, are comprised of military and civilian components. The military is involved in these operations, but in a quite different respect than its traditional role. This transformation of the armed forces is challenging to big and small states alike as actors are trying to re-define their place in the new global order. The post-modern military, which has been internationalized, used in “international missions authorized by entities beyond the nation state”, fighting in wars and missions out of line with traditional military combat, with increased internal differentiation in terms of service, rank and combat versus support roles and the growing interdependence of its civilian and military aspects, now has more and not less responsibilities with the onset of globalization. These changes also call for increased research “on the impact of globalization, the changing role of the state, and the emergence of sub-state violence markets” along with the impact of these processes on war and organized violence.

Expanding further on the changes in the security environment, Siret Hürsoy and Nesrin Ada of Ege University evaluate the concept of security sector reform (SSR) with a special focus on UN peace operations. Dr. Hürsoy and Dr. Ada argued that SSR raises important issues related to building peace during peace operations as SSR concentrates on diverse areas such as democratization, post-conflict rebuilding, good governance and many other socio-economic and security issues. Although regional peace and security could benefit from these reforms, the authors argued that only with cooperation and coordination between different international organizations can we hope to make peace sustaining. There is also a need to evaluate the local norms, values and practices of the conflict-torn societies where the operations are taking place as SSR is based on the norms of Western society.

Studying the role of OSCE in peacekeeping operations, Brian Colbert of the International Relations and the European Union Department of Izmir University of Economics discussed what makes the OSCE unique; its much broader definition of Europe, its non-treaty based alliance structure without legally binding commitments and its lack of hard power. Mr. Colbert argued that OSCE is a forum for a Pan-Euro multilateral diplomacy promoting shared values and standards, military transparency and monitoring human rights. He feels that OSCE is not designed for, nor capable of, traditional peacekeeping operations requiring hard power and should concentrate its efforts on certain activities that the “hard power organization” NATO does not, such as election monitoring and building institutions.

Project which was originally initiated in 1997. The report, focusing on the dynamic nature of peace operations and challenges of change, regional dimensions of peace operations, rule of law and education and training stated that modern peacekeeping had three major challenges: “overstretch” of the system leading to a need of more and more peacekeepers, other key personnel, funding and other supplies which is becoming more and more difficult to meet; a “squeeze” of national defense budgets which have declined since the end of the Cold War leading NATO and UN with difficulties in finding the troops it needs to man the operations, and, the “brittleness of the international security system” which was originally created for the Cold War and which has not yet evolved to meet the new challenges of the post-Cold War era. Ambassador Sahlin’s group recommends several different measures such as: the establishment of a regular process for developing and exchanging benchmarks as measures of effectiveness by the UN, regional organizations and their respective Member States; and, the development of guidelines and standard operating procedures for transitions between the UN and non-UN peace operations, building on the experience of previous peacekeepers. Ambassador Sahlin also argued for the need to improve relations and interactions among the different actors involved in peace operations, ranging from civilian and military personnel on the ground to UN and regional organizations. This would go a long way in improving transparency within the system as well. In response to the findings of the Challenges Project the partner organizations have decided to establish an International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations which Ambassador Sahlin feels will go a long way in providing a platform for discussion among policy-makers, practitioners, and academics on the dynamic challenges of peace operations.

Providing us with an in-depth analysis of the peacekeeping operations in Cyprus, Ahmet Sözen, Director of Cyprus Policy Center, traced the conflict in Cyprus between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and gave us a history of the UN operations in the area. In response to the ethnic violence that began on the island in late 1963, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to establish a UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in March 1964. The UNFICYP has faced several modifications since 1964, especially after the Greek coup d’etat in July 1974 and the subsequent Turkish military operations to bring security to the island which resulted in the partitioning of the island into two separate ethnic areas. The UNFICYP maintains a buffer zone among the two sides and tries to maintain a ceasefire, and carry out humanitarian activities with increased usage of UNCIWIPOL after the opening of several crossing points in 2003. Basing his arguments on the Cypriot situation, Dr. Sözen argued that although peacekeeping operations are admirable, they are not clearly marked for success. Cyprus has been a long-lasting endeavor and a solution to the problem is still not likely in the near future. Dr. Sözen argued that the goal of peacekeeping operations should be to establish a lasting peace in which liberal institutions can be built, gain legitimacy, and guarantee peace. Voicing his disappointment with both the EU and UN over their failed pre-referenda promises to the Turkish Cypriots, he gave examples of how these two organizations can work to bring the Greek Cypriot leadership back to the bargaining table. In essence, building long-lasting peace requires more than just the presence of peacekeepers on the ground.

Discussing the possible contributions of regional organizations to the collective management of crises and the maintenance of security, Csaba Törö of the International Relations and the European Union Department of Izmir University of Economics argued that the escalation of conflicts in different regions of the world and the consequent growth in demand for peace operations prompted a comprehensive role for regional organizations in their peace-making, peacekeeping and enforcement capacities. Yet, Dr. Törö underlined that
most regions do not have organizations with the capacity to perform substantial and decisive peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations and regional organisations generally do not have means of coercive capabilities to enforce, deter or protect except NATO. He emphasized that along with NATO, only the EU has an increasing military operational potential although still hardly independent from the capabilities of the former and argued that only these two regional organizations will be able to play an instrumental role in collective security actions in the years to come.

In the final paper, Orhan Nalcıoğlu discussed the legal dimension of peace operations. Colonel Nalcıoğlu stated that in their legal dimensions under international law and shaped by the UN Charter, peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations vary from one another. While the latter activity is a consentual, non-combatant activity the former requires coercive military involvement. Mr. Nalcıoğlu claimed that this is the reason why peace enforcement is authorized under the UN Charter Chapter VII while peacekeeping is not even mentioned. However, due to the Security Council and General Assembly decisions, sufficient legal bases have been established to make peacekeeping operations legal. The lack of constitutional basis of peace operations in the UN Charter has meant, however, that peacekeeping forces should only be sent with the consent of the country in which they are to be stationed. In more recent activities the UN has tried to gain the consent of all the parties involved in the conflict. All of this means that if the consent is not present or withdrawn, then peacekeeping operations must leave the country in question. An example of this is the withdrawal of forces from Egypt in 1967 after the Egyptian government rescinded its consent. Mr. Nalcıoğlu feels that peacekeeping forces, unlike enforcement combat units, are not designed to create the conditions for their own success on the ground. Their success requires clearly defined resolutions of the UN so that they may have the legal parameters to operate in a conflict region.

III. Conclusions

After an intense two days of the Conference, the papers presented by our speakers gave us much-needed insights into peace operations, some reflecting on their necessity, while others analyzed the challenges and future of these operations. Reflecting upon the presentations of our valued speakers, we can identify the following issues:

Firstly, there is a need to further alliances and cooperation among the different actors involved in peace operations. Michel Soula and Michael Sahlin argued in their papers for the needed cooperation among the different international organizations such as the UN, the EU, OSCE and NATO and participating member states and NGOs that would inevitably lead to a more successful mission because of the synergies that could be created by such joint efforts. It is a reality that when parties work in isolation they also work with limited intelligence, limited capacity and limited know-how. One way to overcome the financial and capacity burden of these operations is to have cooperative efforts. Siret Hürsoy and Nesrin Ada go so far as to argue that the only way to make peace sustaining is through inter-organizational cooperation.

Secondly, the EU is a possible major actor in the area of peace operations. The EU’s role is currently not what it could potentially be, according to Thierry Tardy and Csaba Törö, however, it certainly has not only the capacity to carry out successful operations but it can also enhance its own security and defense policies with joint EU member-state participation. In fact, the EU, in Tardy’s view is better equipped to carry out peace operations when
compared to other regional organizations due to its strengths in areas such as intelligence, rapid reaction capabilities and medical and logistical units.

Thirdly, as the role and mandate of peace operations has changed in the 21st century, there is a need to also have better training of personnel involved in these missions. The training and education of not only the military but also the civilian and administrative staff stationed in post-conflict areas requires a thorough and case-by-case training methodology with certain standard guidelines. The training of civilian personnel is also of the utmost importance as the scope of peace operations is now more and more revolving around the civilian aspect of rebuilding shattered societies.

Fourthly, peace operations are not magical solutions to rebuilding shattered societies. These operations are only temporary and need a significant amount of time to bring some modicum of order to the society, however the longer the operations are, the more likely they lead to the continuation of the status quo. Outlining one of the longest peacekeeping operations of the UN, Ahmet Sözen discussed how the UN forces in Cyprus since 1963 have served to consolidate the division of the society with their prolonged presence in the buffer zone between the Turkish Greeks and the Cypriot Greeks on the island. Hikmet Çetin, though optimistic in his presentation of the situation in Afghanistan, also states that Afghanistan is far from being free from all of its problems and drug trafficking, insurgency and corruption still runs rampant. The bottom line is that the presence of a peacekeeping effort in a state does not turn a weak and shattered society into a self-sustaining democracy overnight.

Finally, Turkey’s growing participation in peace operations, as outlined by our speakers Hikmet Çetin, Nilüfer Narlı, Murat Bilhan, and Beyhan Uğsuz point to a new pro-active Turkish foreign policy whereby Turkey is trying to strengthen its position as a major regional actor. In addition to places like Bosnia and Afghanistan, where Turkey has a socio-cultural connection, Turkish forces can be seen in many post-conflict areas around the world. Turkish police academies are also training foreigners as well. This pro-active approach is perhaps telling of the future of peace operations in the world where Turkey will likely have more visibility and participation due to its vast supply of military and civil-military personnel, like its police force and gendarmerie, which are not fully utilized by these operations currently, in different capacities not only on the ground but as trainers for future peacekeepers.

Peace operations are comprehensive missions that require a case-by-case handling of each different endeavor. Societies differ from one another in terms of their culture, history, gender relations, economies, and many other diverse issues. A one-size-fits-all training system along with a Western value-oriented mindset in these operations can only set the organizations involved in the missions up for failure. Societies need to be understood and assisted through the stages of democratization, establishment of rule of law, human rights and the fight against insurgency, terrorism and corruption. There is a growing need for area specialists trained in these civilian aspects of peace operations. This requires the pooling of the resources of the different international and regional organizations and NGOs that engage in these missions. Cooperation will also help to battle the resource bottlenecks that confront these operations. Although expensive with regards to personnel, equipment and other financial needs, peace-missions do serve an important role: to deter warring factions from going back to the battle field and wreaking death and destruction on innocent civilians, weak economies and regional peace. A failed state is a liability to all nations and peace operations that keep fragile states from deteriorating give war-torn states the chance to flourish and
CONFERENCES PROGRAMME

5 April 2006
Opening speeches by:

Prof. Dr. Attila SEZGİN,
Rector, Izmir University of Economics
Ambassador Murat BİLHAN,
Chairman of Centre for Strategic Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Turkey
Yeter YAMAN-NAUCODIE,
Information Officer for Turkey, NATO Public Diplomacy Division
Hikmet ÇETİN,
NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan

Time: 10:00 – 11:00

Morning Session
Session 1:
Time: 11:00 – 12:30

Chair: Michel SOULÁ, Head, Crisis Management Policy Section,
NATO Operations Division, Belgium

contribute to the ongoing peace of the world which will hopefully become the hallmark of the 21st century.
Challenges to Peace Operations

Speakers: Hikmet ÇETİN, NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan
Jean-Pierre LACROIX, Deputy Director, Department for United Nations and
International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

LUNCH BREAK

Afternoon Sessions
Session 2:
Time: 14:00-15:30

Chair: Ambassador Murat BİLHAN, Chairman of Centre for Strategic Research,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey

NATO’s Contribution to UN Peace Operations

Speaker: Michel SOULA, Head, Crisis Management Policy Section, NATO
Operations Division, Belgium

Turkey’s Contribution to UN Peace Operations

Speakers: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI, Head, Department of International Relations,
Middle East Technical University, Turkey
Prof. Dr. Nilüfer NARLI, Vice Rector, Bahçeşehir University, Turkey

Session 3:
Time: 16:00 – 17:30

Chair: Michel SOULA, Head, Crisis Management Policy Section,
NATO Operations Division, Belgium

EU’s Contribution to UN Peace Operations

Speaker: Dr. Thierry TARDY, Director – European Training Course, Geneva Centre
for Security Policy, Switzerland

Discussion Session

Training and Education of the UN Personnel
Speakers: Ambassador Murat BİLHAN, Chairman of Center for Strategic Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey

Beyhan UGSUZ, Police Superintendent, Turkish National Police

Coffee Break (15 min.)

Session 4:
Time: 18:00 – 19:30

Chair: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI, Head, Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Turkey

Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Societies

Speakers: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Wilfried von BREDOW, Philipps University in Marburg, Germany

Asst. Prof. Dr. Siret HÜRSOY, Department of International Relations, Ege University, Turkey

The Role of OSCE in Peace Operations

Speakers: Asst. Prof. Dr. Brian COLBERT, Department of International Relations and EU, Izmir University of Economics, Turkey

Discussion Session
DINNER
6 April 2006
Morning Sessions
Session 1:
Time: 09:00 – 10:30

Chair: Yeter YAMAN-NAUCODIE, NATO Information Officer for Turkey, Public Diplomacy Division, Belgium

The Role of the UN and NATO in the Stabilisation of Afghanistan and Iraq

Speakers: Prof. Dr. Hasan KÖNİ, Head, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Yeditepe University, Turkey

Prof. Dr. Ali L. KARAOSMANOĞLU, Head, International Relations Department, Bilkent University, Turkey

Dr. Salih BIÇAKCI, Department of International Relations, Işık University, Turkey

Discussion Session
Coffee Break (15 min.)
Session 2:
Time: 11:00 – 12:30

Chair: Prof. Dr. Ali L. KARAOSMANOĞLU, Head, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Turkey

Regional Perspective to UN Peace Operations – I

Speakers: Annika HILDING-NORBERG, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ahmet SÖZEN, Department of International Relations, Eastern Mediterranean University, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Regional Perspective to UN Peace Operations – II

Speakers: Dr. Csaba TÖRÖ, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hungary
Asst. Prof. Dr. Yücel BOZDAĞLIOĞLU, Head, Department of International Relations, Adnan Menderes University, Turkey

Discussion Session

LUNCH BREAK

Afternoon Sessions

Session 3:
Time: 14:00-15:30

Chair: Prof. Dr. Hasan KÖNİ, Head, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Yeditepe University, Turkey

Politics of Nuclear Weapons and the UN

Speaker: Daniel NORD, Deputy Director of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sweden

Legal Dimensions of Peace Operations

Speakers: Ret. Colonel Orhan NALCIOĞLU, Lawyer
Dr. Mehmet ÖNCÜ, Department of International Relations and EU, Izmir University of Economics, Turkey

Discussion Session
Coffee Break (15 min.)
Session 4: Student Panel Discussions
Time: 16:00 – 17:30

Challenges to Peace Operations and the Role of International Organisations in Peace Operations

Moderator: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Jiri MELICH, Department of International Relations and EU, Izmir University of Economics, Turkey

DINNER

Advisory Committee
Ambassador Murat BİLHAN
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI
Prof. Dr. Ali.L.KARAOSMANOĞLU
Prof. Dr. Hasan KÖNİ

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Asst. Prof. Dr. Siret HÜRSOY
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ABOUT EDITORS
Asst. Prof. Dr. Siret HÜRSOY

Asst. Prof. Dr. Siret Hürsoy studied International Relations and graduated in 1997 from Eastern Mediterranean University – Department of International Relations (T.R.N. Cyprus). In the following year, in 1998, he received his MA degree in International Relations and European Studies from the University of Kent at Canterbury – Department of Politics and International Relations (UK). In the meantime, Mr. Hürsoy served as a research and teaching assistant between years 1998-2000 at Ege University – Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences (Turkey). Later, he completed his Ph.D studies at the end of 2002 by receiving his degree from Philipps-Universität Marburg – Gesellschaftswissenschaften und Philosophie, Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft (Germany).

During his Ph.D studies, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung granted him scholarship, financed his research trips to the UK, and provided the publication costs of his book entitled “The New Security Concept and German-French Approaches to the European ‘Pillar of
Defence’, 1990-2000”. Since the beginning of 2003, Mr. Hürsoy is lecturing on several courses about global security, European Union, and international relations theories as an assistant professor at Ege University in the Department of International Relations. At the same time, he is a part-time lecturer at İzmir University of Economics – Department of International Relations and EU.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Siret Hürsoy is fluent in English and very good in German languages. His main fields of specialisation and research interests are: international relations theories, European Union (integration theories), foreign and security policy analysis, war and defence studies, security sector reform, democratic relations of military to the state and civil society, peace and conflict analysis. His recent publications are including:

• NATO’s Transformation and the Position of Turkey, (İzmir: Ege University Press, 2004)


Moreover, he has organised several national and international conferences.
After her graduation from 9 Eylül University, Mrs. Nesrin ADA completed master degrees at Ege University Faculty of Communication.

In the meanwhile she won a competition and was invited to Brussels by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). After that she took up her duty as an assistant professor in Ege University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Business Administration.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Nesrin ADA has studied research and advertisement. Turkish Journalists Society pressed her research over "Political Advertisement" as a book. She has also written journals for some newspapers and magazines.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Nesrin ADA is lecturing on International Communication Management courses in Ege University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences. She teaches Management, Entrepreneurship & SMEs, Public Relations and French -as second language- courses at the same department of the Ege University.
She is a member of "The International Association of French Speaking Journalists" in Paris. She is also a member of L’Agence France-Press since 1993, TABA-Turkish-American Business Association since 1997 and a member of Press Relations and Introduction Commission since 1998. In 2005 she won a scholarship from the French Government and attended a French course for teachers at Alliance Français in Paris for one month.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Nesrin ADA has many proceedings that are proposed in national meetings. She proposed some of these papers in Atatürk Culture Center (1999), İzmir Women Platforms (2000), The First Family Business Congress (2004), The Second Family Business Congress (2005), The Second SMEs and Productivity Congress (2005).

Her research interest and publications is centered around Organizational Problems, Productivity, Public Relations and Communication. She gives seminars about Public Relations and Communication in banks and several institutions.

Peace operations have been widely discussed not only in academic literature but also in the press and among diplomatic circles. Although some question the effectiveness of these operations, the need for their presence to at least give the hope of peace in conflict zones has become widely accepted. This conference will aim to analyse these operations through the perspective of scholars, government officials, diplomats and organization officials – many of whom have a very distinct insight into its inner dimensions. The Conference brought together specialists in this field to examine the impact, benefits, challenges and future of peace operations in the 21st century.
